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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900160-CA 
J. Val Roberts and Verle Roberts, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Centerville City, Centerville City 
Board of Adjustment, and Nancy H. 
Groll, Chairman of the Centerville 
City Board of Adjustment; William 
Wingo, Norm Wright, Fred Nelson, 
and Dale Rees, members of the 
Centerville City Board of Adjustment, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Davidson (On Law and Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on appellee's motion for 
summary affirmance and on appellant's motion for stay pending 
appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment and, accordingly, 
deny a stay of the judgment. 
J. Val Roberts and Verle Roberts ("Plaintiffs") appeal from 
a summary judgment granted in two cases consolidated in the 
trial court. Plaintiffs filed Civil No. 42831 in the Second 
Judical District Court on January 19, 1988, naming as defendants 
Centerville City and various city officials ("Centerville")/ as 
well as the judges assigned to pending criminal proceedings 
against plaintiffs. The complaint sought to enjoin criminal 
prosecution of plaintiffs for violations of Centerville City 
Ordinance No. 10-354 prohibiting -parking, storing, or leaving 
any motor vehicle of any kind which is in an abandoned, wrecked, 
dismantled, inoperative, rusted, junked, or partially dismantled 
condition whether attended or not, on any public or private 
property within the city for a period of time in excess of seven 
days." Plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance was actually a 
"zoning" ordinance subject to a "prior non-conforming use" 
defense. Plaintiffs filed Civil No. 45446 on May 15, 1989 in 
the Second Judicial District Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-15 (1986), to obtain judicial review of a decision of the 
Centerville City Board of Adjustment refusing to find a prior 
non-conforming use. In proceedings before the Board of 
Adjustment, Centerville showed that the subject property had 
been zoned MagriculturalH since 1952, and that plaintiffs 
purchased the property in 1964. Roberts thereafter argued that 
the use of his property to store inoperative vehicles was an 
accepted and normal accessory use customarily incidental to the 
use of land for agricultural purposes at the time the zoning 
ordinance was adopted. On that basis, plaintiffs claimed that 
their use of the property could not be made illegal by a 
subsequently enacted ordinance prohibiting the storage of 
junked, rusted, or partially dismantled vehicles within the 
city. They also urged the court to find that the Board of 
Adjustment had no jurisdiction to determine the non-conforming 
use question. 
In November, 1989, the two cases were consolidated based on 
the stipulation of the parties, and the court allowed the filing 
of an amended complaint to consolidate the claims. The amended 
complaint, filed November 21, 1989, contains four claims 
seeking: (1) a declaration that plaintiffs' use of the property 
is a prior non-conforming accessory use; (2) a stay of crimina-1 
prosecution against plaintiffs; (3) ade novo-type review of the 
Board.of Adjustment's decision; and (4) a declaration that the 
Board of Adjustment cannot, make the, determination of a 
non-conforming use. The City filed an answer and a counterclaim 
which requested a declaratory judgment that plaintiffs do not 
have a prior existing non-conforming use of their property and 
that the use of the property for storing junked or dismantled 
motor vehicles is not a lawful, accessory use of the property. 
Centerville filed a motion for summary judgment based on 
the following undisputed, material facts: 
1. Plaintiffs1 property is located within an 
agricultural zone in Centerville City, Utah. 
2. As early as April of 1952, the storage of 
junked motor vehicles has not been permitted 
within agricultural zones in Centerville City, 
Utah. 
3. The Roberts purchased their property in 
1964. 
4. Plaintiffs are currently storing 
approximately 30 junked motor vehicles on 
their property in Centerville City, Utah. 
Centerville asserted that Roberts did not have a prior 
non-conforming use because the storage of junked automobiles has 
never been a lawful use of agricultural property during the 
period of Roberts* ownership. Further, Centerville argued that 
the use was not an accessory use because it was not clearly 
subordinate and customarily incidental to the use of 
agricultural land for residential purposes and is a use 
expressly prohibited by city ordinances. Plaintiffs also sought 
a partial summary judgment declaring their use to be a prior 
non-conforming accessory use. The trial court denied 
plaintiffs' motion and granted Centerville summary judgment. 
The court found no genuine issue existed as to any material fact 
and entered judgment as a matter of law against plaintiffs Hon 
the basis that the activities described are not accessory uses 
to a farming operation and not proper uses in an agricultural 
zone; and, the Centerville City Board of Adjustment had 
authority to act and their decision is reasonable and valid.*1 
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal purportedly based on 
dismissal of their claims for an unlawful taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. In their docketing statement/ plaintiffs raise a 
myriad of issues that were not presented to the trial court, 
including claims alleging the unconstitutionality of the 
relevant ordinances. They also raise for the first time on 
appeal claims based on the.Horseless Carriage Act and Junkyard 
Control Act and claims of "detrimental reliance" and improper 
motive by Centerville. Plaintiffs,further claim that the 
district court's decision in this case is contrary.to an earlier 
trial court decision, apparently involving another municipality; 
however, no such decision was argued ta the trial cour.t. 
Finally, they claim that the summary judgment process denied 
them access to the court. ^ Respondent Centerville moved for 
summary disposition on the basis that the majority of the issues 
raised on appeal are not properly before this court and no 
substantial question exists as to the remaining issues. 
Our review of the record reflects that the only issues 
properly before this court are whether the court erred in 
entering summary judgment rejecting Roberts' claims that their 
use of the property was a valid prior non-conforming use or 
accessory use and whether the Board of Adjustment lacked 
jurisdiction to make its determinations as to the non-conforming 
use issue. We also consider Roberts' claim that the judgment 
was procedurally defective. All other issues were not raised or 
were not preserved below and will not be considered for the 
first time on appeal. 
"A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether 
the trial court properly found that there was no genuine issue 
of fact, we view the facts and inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. And in deciding whether the 
trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the 
prevailing party, we give no deference to the trial court's view 
of the law; we review it for correctness." Utah State Coalition 
of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 P.2d 632, 634 
(Utah 1989)(citations omitted.) "In granting summary judgment, 
a trial court must not weigh or resolve disputed evidence." 
Territorial Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 
(Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted.) 
Our review of the record reveals no genuine dispute of the 
material facts. Both parties agree that Roberts purchased the 
property in 1964, began storing inoperative vehicles there prior 
to 1970/ and presently has 25 to 30 inoperative vehicles stored 
on the property. It was also undisputed that the property has 
been zoned agricultural since 1952. In their response to 
Centerville's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs asserted 
that "[t]he factual question of whether the storage of junk and 
old motor vehicles is a "prior existing non-conforming use" or 
Han accessory use for the plaintiffs1 agricultural land-
precluded summary judgment. ^Plaintiffs did not support their 
legal theory with any affidavits containing factual allegations 
regarding the use of their land. Our review of the pleadings 
identifies allegations that the property has been used for 
residential purposes and not for agricultural purposes. We 
conclude that no genuine factual issue was presented, and 
consider whether summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of 
law. 
The 1952 zoning ordinance fox Centervijle City enumerated 
the allowed uses for land zoned for agricultural use. 
CentVrville asserts that the use of agricultural land* for a 
junkyard is not a use enumerated in the ordinance. We note, 
however, that the 1952 ordinance defined ••junkyard- as follows: 
The use of any lot, portion of lot or tract 
of land for the storage, keeping or 
abandonment of junk, including scrap metals 
or other scrap material, or for the 
dismantling, demolition or abandonment of 
automobiles, or other vehicles, or machinery 
or parts thereof; provided, that this 
definition shall not be deemed to include 
such uses which are clearly accessory and 
incidental to any agricultural use permitted 
in the district. 
(Emphasis added.) It is clear that plaintiffs' legal theory was 
fashioned after the language emphasized above. The 1952 zoning 
ordinance defines an -accessory use- as a -subordinate use . . . 
customarily incidental to and located upon the same lot occupied 
by the main use . . . .- Agriculture is defined as: "The 
tilling of the soil, the raising of crops, horticulture and 
gardening, but not including the keeping or raising or domestic 
animals and fowl, except household pets, and not including any 
agricultural industry or business, such as fruit packing plants, 
fur farms, animal hospitals or similar uses.- Thus, for 
plaintiffs to state a claim that the storage of inoperative 
vehicles is a permissible accessory use, they must allege facts 
tending to show that the storage is a accessory to their 
agricultural use of the land. An examination of the record 
demonstrates that the exception in the zoning ordinance is 
inapplicable. An "accessory use" must be customarily incidental 
to a "main use" on the same lot that is agricultural. The 
record fails to raise a genuine factual issue that plaintiffs 
were making any agricultural use of their property. As 
indicated in the pleadings, their use was residential. The 
purported factual issue raised by plaintiffs was merely a 
conclusory misstatement of the exception in the zoning 
ordiances, aserting that the accessory use was allowable simply 
by virtue of the "agricultural" zoning desgination. Plaintiffs 
have not alleged any facts that would have brought them within 
the exception for an accessory use to an agricultural use. In 
response to the present motion for summary disposition, 
plaintiffs now claim that there was a factual issue as to 
whether the vehicles were Mjunked". We note that plaintiffs1 
own pleadings and memoranda have described the vehicles using 
that term and conclude that no genuine factual issue exists. 
Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to 
plaintiffs, we can identify no genuine factual dispute about the 
use of the property. The trial court did not err in concluding, 
as a matter of law, that the use of the land for storage of 
inoperative vehicles was- not an accessory use to an agricultural 
use. Similary, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs purchased 
their property after the enactment of the zoning ordinance and 
thus cannot claim a prior non-conforming use. Having concluded 
that the trial court was correct in ruling as a matter of law 
that no prior non-conforming use or valid accessory use existed 
based on the undisputed facts, it is unnecessary to consider 
plaintiffs' remaining arguments. We further conclude that the 
form of judgment was appropriate because Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
requires only a brief written statement explaining the basis for 
a summary judgment. 
The judgment is affirmed, and the motion for a stay pending 
appeal is, accordingly, denied. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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APPENDIX B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THI 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
J. VAL ROBERTS, et ux., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CENTERVILLE CITY, et al., 
Defendants 
Civil No. 890903165 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED the above entitled matter cane on 
for hearing before the HON. DAVID E. ROTH, judge of the 
above entitled Court, sitting without a Jury, on July 27, 
1938, November 8, 1989 and December 13, 1939. 
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had, to wit: 
A p p e a r a n c e s : 
BRIAN BARNARD, ESQ., 
Attorney for the Plaintiff; 
JODY BURNETT, ESQ., 
Attornev for the Defendant. 
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Case number 42831, J. 
. Centerville City 
hearing on Motion 
and 
for 
others 
Val Roberts 
, time 
Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff's Motion, correct? 
MR. BARNARD: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Who is counsel for Plaintiffs? 
MR. BARNARD: I am. I am Brian Barnard. 
THE COURT: Who else do we have here? 
MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, Jody Burnett and Dan 
Hill representing Centerville City, Randy Randall, Ted 
Kanell, David Young Payne. The only named Defendant we 
do not represent is Judge Alfred Van Wagenen, who is a 
Circuit Court Judge the underlying criminal action is 
assigned to. He is represented by Carlie Christensen of 
the State Court Administrator's Office. But the dispute 
is largely between my clients and Mr. Barnard. Carlie 
advised me she did not plan to attend the hearing. I 
believe, Mr. Barnard, he is named only in the capacity 
an order in this Court might impact on the criminal 
action. 
THE COURT: Mr. Barnard, go ahead. 
MR. BARNARD: Thank you, your Honor. As the 
Court is aware, this case is from Davis County. The 
District Judges there recused themselves and asked this 
4 
1
 Court to hear it. It involves a dispute as to the use 
2
 of some property in Centerville. 
3
 J THE COURT: If it helps you any, I have looked 
at the file and read all your memoranda. So I am 
5 familiar with that material. 
6
 MR. BARNARD: Fine. Essentially what the case 
7
 is is it seeks the determination that my clients' use of 
8 their real property constitutes a non-conforming prior 
9 existing use. My clients are being criminally 
10 prosecuted because they are storing some dismantled, 
11 junked automobiles on their property. The property is 
12 currently zoned agricultural. My clients have been 
13 using that property to store these dismantled rusted old 
14 automobiles since before 1970. We have submitted 
15 Affidavits from James Parish, a neighbor, who is a 
16 lifelong resident of Centerville, saying that prior to 
17 1970 my clients had stored vehicles on the property. 
18 Another Affidavit from Larry Smith indicating again that 
19 they had stored junked automobiles on the property. 
20 in 1970, Centerville City passed an ordinance 
21 prohibiting the storage of such automobiles outside on 
22 property. My clients were storing such vehicles before 
23 1970. It is our position that it is a non-conforming 
24 prior existing use. So we ask the Court to make a 
25
 determination to that effect. If in fact that's the 
1 case, and the Court makes such a determination, then the 
2 criminal prosecution would be resolved because if the 
3 Court makes a finding that it is non-conforming prior 
4 existing use, it is a complete bar to the underlying 
5 criminal case. 
6 The Defendants have suggested that we should simply 
7 raise that as a defense in the criminal case. We 
8 attempted to do that when the criminal case was before 
g J Justice of the Peace Pro Tern David Payne. He declined 
to give that as a Jury Instruction to the Jury trial 
that Verle Roberts had. He also listened to my 
arguments and then declined to rule in my favor on the 
case that we had for Val Roberts. Both of those cases 
have been tried in Centerville Justice Court before 
Judge Payne. Both of my clients were found guilty. We 
then appealed, and the criminal matter is pending now 
17 I before Judge Van Wagenen in Centerville or Clearfield. 
18 So that's where we stand. 
19 THE COURT: Procedurally, what happens after 
20 J that trial, assuming you go to trial in the Circuit 
Court and you lose? 
22 I MR. BARNARD: Well then another— 
23 I THE COURT: Is that an appealable case? When 
24 | it goes from the Justice Court to Circuit Court, is that 
25 the final disposition of the case? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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16 
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1 MR. BARNARD: I am not sure, your Honor. And 
2 the trial is set tomorrow. 
3 THE COURT: Tomorrow? 
4 MR. BARNARD: Yes. If we have an appeal for a 
5 de novo trial from the Justice Court to the Circuit 
6 Court, I would assume that then it would be treated as 
7 I if it were a brand new case in Circuit Court, 
8 I THE COURT: Appealable to the Appellate Court? 
9 I MR. BARNARD: Based upon the record in the 
Circuit Court. I haven't researched it, but my initial 
11 reaction is we would then have an appeal on the record 
from the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals. 
One of the other issues is, your Honor, and it is 
14 I before the Court today, is a Motion for Injunction to 
15 stay the trial tomorrow. So there is two matters. One 
16 is our Motion for Summary Judgment, the other is to stay, 
17 THE COURT: I am not sure what the relationship 
18 is between this Court and that Court with regard to the 
19 two separate actions. Technically there probably is no 
20 connection. 
21 MR. BARNARD: I think from an—under the 
22 statute, I don't think the Court has supervisory power, 
23 but since they are named as the Defendant, since Judge 
24 Van Wagenen is named as the Defendant, and the 
25 prosecutor is named as the defendant, I think an Order 
1
 of this Court telling them not to proceed with the trial 
2
 would have some effect. 
3 THE COURT: The Defendant suggests there is a 
4
 factual issue. 
5 MR. BURNETT: That's correct, your Ho«t5r. 
6 THE COURT: As to whether or not the abandoned 
7
 non-operable vehicles were on the property prior to 
8 1970. What evidence do you have of that? 
9 MR. BURNETT: Well, first of all, even the 
10 evidence presented by Mr. Barnard, his clients, is 
11 somewhat inconclusive. And it depends on what standard 
12 say a Jury in the criminal action, or the Judge, were to 
13 apply. In other words, what's a valid prior 
14 non-conforming use? Does it have to be continuous? Mr. 
15 Barnard suggested that in some vague fashion if there 
16 was any vehicle which at any time was inoperable. The 
17 cases we have cited suggest it must be continuous. Mr. 
18
 Roberts in his own deposition says the cars came and 
19 went. And at times they were operable. Even the one 
20 vehicle he cites he can specifically recall being on the 
21 property prior to 1970. 
22 THE COURT: You make reference to depositions. 
23 I don't have the deposition. 
24 MR. BURNETT: Okay. I would be happy to 
25 provide the Court with a copy. We have got the excerpts 
1
 cited in our memorandum. If I could present to the 
2 Court the deposition, I would be happy to provide the 
3
 Court with a copy. Page 25 cites Mr. Roberts7 
4
 recollection of what vehicles he can recall being on the 
5 property. He said— 
6 THE COURT: Do you object to the publication of 
7 the deposition? 
8 MR. BARNARD: I do not. There are some minor 
9 corrections, but not relating to what Mr. Burnett is 
10 citing. 
n MR. BURNETT: With respect to the M l vehicle, 
12 I think that's page 23, it says it was registered as 
13 recently as '74. So I don't think that meets the 
14 requirements of the elements. 
15 THE COURT: Is it your position we would have 
16 to have inoperable vehicles from 1970, beyond 1970, the 
17 same ones on the property at the same time for the use 
18 to be continuous? 
19 MR. BURNETT: That's right. 
20 THE COURT: I don't buy that. I think the 
21 activities can be continuous and have cars come and go 
22 as long as cars are there any any given time. 
23 MR. BURNETT: With respect to the Court's 
24 question I am at some disadvantage. I have been hired 
25 to represent the Defendants in the City action. I am 
4 
1
 not the prosecutor. Theodore Kanell is one of my 
2 clients. I don't know all the evidence they intend to 
3 J present with respect to that use, or what they 
presented. I know they have got City Administrators, 
5 prior City officials, photographs, things of that 
6 nature. And, of course, we have responded to discovery 
7 in this case based upon that information from the City 
8 Administrator indicating we are not aware of a valid ~^ 
9 non-conforming use prior to 1970. But I would like to 
10 go to the last question first, if I might. 
11 More importantly, I don't think under the present 
12 Judicial Article, the Court has any supervising 
13 authority. The issue isn't raised to the Court to whom 
14 the case is assigned. We are de novo. I have spoken to 
15 Mr. Kanell. He has said the defendants are entitled to 
16 a jury instruction. If the Jury should determine— 
17 THE COURT: What's the Instruction going to 
18 say? There is a lot of legal issues that you have 
19 raised in your objection to the Motion. How do you 
20 draft an Instruction that incorporates all of those? 
21 Are you simply going to say a prior non-conforming use 
22 is a defense? Do you agree and Mr. Kanell agree? 
23 MR. BURNETT: I think he does. I think it 
24 would have to give instruction. 
25 THE COURT: Some of your objections suggest 
1
 this is not a non-conforming use case at all, don't they? 
2 MR. BURNETT: Well, I guess implying the 
3
 elements— 
4
 THE COURT: One of the issues you raise, it 
5 would have to be a commercial enterprise or a 
6
 non-conforming use doesn't apply, it is not a taking 
7
 because—I can't remember the arguments. 
</B MR. BURNETT: The taking is an entirely 
9 different analysis. I will address that. I think 
10 that's a throw away issue. I genuinely do. Clearly 
11 under all the authorities presented in order to have a 
12 taking under the federal or state constitution, you have 
13 to be deprived of all economically available use of the 
14 property. Zoning by definition represents regulation or 
15 restriction on property always, which is or is not 
16 subject to a valid prior non-conforming use exception. 
17 It is a wholly different matter than whether there is a 
18 compensable taking. 
19 Mr. Roberts establishes by his own testimony it has 
20 been used as a home. He has used it for agricultural 
21 purposes. 
22 THE COURT: Is this a zoning case? 
23 MR. BURNETT: Yes, I think it certainly is a 
24 zoning case. 
25 THE COURT: If there is a commercial 
1
 enterprise, a wrecking yard existed before 1970 and 
2
 there was a zoning change saying henceforth this is not 
3
 allowed, this would be a non-conforming use. 
4
 MR. BURNETT: I agree that would meet all four 
5 elements. 
6 THE COURT: Are you right down to the point of 
7
 whether or not there is evidence to support the 
8 non-conforming activity? Is that the whole issue? 
9 MR. BURNETT: No. I agree with the Court there 
10 are a couple of legal issues the Circuit Court Judge 
it might have to resolve with respect to whether he agrees 
12 with the position my client will take that it must be 
13 commercial in nature, and which this clearly is not. 
14 THE COURT: Do any of your cases clearly say it 
15 must be commercial in nature, or are they all the nature 
16 where it is personal? 
17 MR. BURNETT: The latter, your Honor, don't 
18
 address that one way or the other. It just happens to 
19 be that all the cases we found on the nature deal with 
20 commercial use. 
21 THE COURT: Those are not the holding of the 
22 case, that's not the holding it has to be? 
23 MR. BURNETT: Not specifically. I can't cite 
24 the Court to any statement of that nature, no. 
25 THE COURT: I f — 
1
 MR. BURNETT: Tied up in that also is this 
2 issue of a nuisance. 
3 THE COURT: This may be immaterial, irrelevant 
4
 and unfair. Suppose the occupants of a location in the 
5 City had six dogs, and had always kept six dogs for his 
6
 own pleasure. And the City enacted a Kennel ordinance 
7 saying no more than three dogs per household, or some 
8 such thing; non-conforming use? 
9 MR. BURNETT: No. 
10 THE COURT: No because it is not commercial? 
11 MR. BURNETT: Even with a commercial—even with 
12 a valid n o n — i t is a little bit apples and oranges. 
13 That use is still subject to reasonable regulation in 
14 the pursuit of public health, safety and welfare. 
15 THE COURT: Wrecking yard is not in that 
16 category? 
17 MR. BURNETT: No, but—well, you couldn't 
18
 prohibit a wrecking yard. Give you an example. There 
19 is a case we cited that deals with this. Suppose the 
20 wrecking yard is clearly a valid non-conforming use. 
2\ The City enacted an ordinance in order to control dust 
22 emissions. They want you to pave the parking lot. I 
23 think they could require that4parking lot to be paved. 
24 THE COURT: We don't have that in this case? 
26
 MR. BURNETT: No, but going down back to the 
dog illustration the Court brought up, I think if you 
limit the number of dogs in the kennel as a result of 
furthering the public health, safety and welfare, you 
can do that. 
THE COURT: The dogs are public health, safety 
and welfare, the wrecking yard is not, the Roberts case 
is not? 
MR. BURNETT: Aspects of the wrecking case, 
aspects of the Roberts case may be. Go back to the 
taking issue, this would more squarely present the 
taking. I think it shows where it is not a taking. 
This Court does not have a phase out provision. You run 
into some ordinances that do. Even if you have got a 
valid non-conforming use, you have one year, two years, 
three years to terminate it, because you have got two 
policy goals in conflict. The rights of the 
individual's use of the property and the implementation 
of a comprehensive zoning scheme, which is frustrated by 
non-conforming uses. And there are a lot of courts in 
other jurisdictions that say you can have a phase out 
provision. Obviously then that wouldn't be a taking. 
The taking analysis, I don't think whether or not it is 
a valid non-conforming use is the question. I don't 
think there is any conceivable even hypothetical 
analysis that would make it unconstitutional. You would 
n o 
have to be denied all economically viable use of the 
property, not just a use that you may have devoted the 
property to in the past. 
MR. BARNARD: The taking issue is not before 
your Honor. We concede that there has not been a 
taking. There may be a taking if this statute is 
enforced, or if the ordinance is enforced. As of this 
time, it isn't—it hasn't been enforced. We are trying 
to prevent the enforcement. The taking issue isn't 
before your Honor until such time they would actually 
enforce it. We concede there wouldn't be a taking. We 
haven't made a motion for Summary Judgment on the taking 
issue. 
THE COURT: In order for there to be a 
non-conforming use, is it necessary that it be obvious 
to owners that there is a use of the property, a certain 
use of property? Suppose he had a barn with 12 
dismantled inoperable vehicles inside. Nobody knew they 
were there. And the ordinance was then passed. Does 
that make a difference? 
MR. BARNARD: I believe it does. And this 
particular case, there is no question that they were 
readily observable. The two affidavits from Mr. Parish 
and from Mr. Smith, the neighbors, say that it was 
readily observable and they saw it. And if your Honor 
n o 
1
 were to drive by their home today, you can see junked 
2 cars in the front yard. But both of those affidavits 
3
 say that it was readily observable. Also they say that 
4
 there has been various junked and dismantled cars 
5 there. And the deposition of Mr. Roberts says that on 
6
 t h e — o n an average, there was a half dozen inoperable 
7 motor vehicles around the time the ordinance was passed, 
8 referring to page 22, lines 6 to 8. 
9 Also Mr. Burnett suggests that there has to be many 
10 cars there. That is not correct. M y — m y reading of the 
11 underlying criminal ordinance is that if there is one 
12 junked vehicle there, that they can charge the crime. 
13 The ordinance itself says if you leave one junked 
14 vehicle, you have committed a violation of that 
15 ordinance. 
16 THE COURT: If you carried that argument to an 
17 illogical extreme, I suppose if a person had one junked 
18 car in their yard prior to the ordinance, they would be 
19 entitled to have 50 junked cars in their yard, a 
20 non-conforming use. 
21 MR. BURNETT: there is case law to the effect 
22
 that you can't expand the use. So if you h a v e — 
23 THE COURT: In this case, you are saying you 
24 went from half a dozen to about 25. 
25 MR. BURNETT: Up and down. He said on the 
1
 average there was a half dozen. 
2 THE COURT: But there are 25 now? 
3 MR. BURNETT: Yes, at least 25 now. And the 
4
 question there is another issue, too, and that's like if 
5 you are running a gravel pit, can you only run the 
6 gravel pit the same way you were running it when the 
1
 ordinance changed. 
8 THE COURT: Is there an issue of fact as to 
9 whether going from 6 to 25 is a change in the use? 
10 MR. BARNARD: It hasn't been raised. 
11 MR. BURNETT: It is raised, not argued. One of 
12 the bundle of factual issues that will have to be 
13 addressed in the criminal case, and even if the case Mr. 
14 Barnard relies on, the Clackmore case, say that's an 
15 issue of fact. To go back to the illustration the court 
16 raised to the one in the garage, the issue of extended 
17 use, extended actual reasonable use is inherently a 
18 question of fact. 
19 MR. BARNARD: The reason I say it hasn't been 
20 raised, your Honor, they haven't—their position is 
21 there wasn't any cars there in 1970. They are saying as 
22
 far as we know, there were no used, dismantled unused 
23 dismantled cars in 1970. That's why I say it hasn't 
24 J been raised. They aren't conceding that he had a 
non-conforming use, and it has changed. What they are 25 
saying as far as we know there wasn't any vehicles 
there. My client has said there was an average of six. 
Smith and Parish said there were junked vehicles there. 
So although Mr. Burnett has made the argument, they have 
not conceded that there was in fact a non-conforming 
use. I think that's a requirement for them to make that 
argument. 
MR. BURNETT: Well, I think we have got the 
burden of proof reversed on this. This is an 
affirmative defense on which Mr. Barnard bears the 
burden. We have identified the elements. We dispute 
the application, and it is up to he and his clients in 
that' criminal case tomorrow to satisfy those elements in 
order to avail themselves of that defense. It is not up 
to us to refute them in advance, or build up a straw man 
to knock down before we have heard the evidence. 
MR. BARNARD: Mr. Burnett raised the problem 
with the criminal proceeding because he is saying we can 
raise this as a defense in the criminal proceeding. 
That's fine. The standard of proof is beyond a 
reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding. Also my 
client runs the risk of criminal proceedings. This is a 
civil matter. We are here in civil court, a 
non-conforming use, a zoning enforcement of a zoning 
statute should be in civil court. And my client 
i a 
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1
 shouldn't have the possible sanction of a criminal or 
2
 the sanction of a criminal court. And the fact that he 
3
 J has got a criminal case pending against him as a result 
of this, that's why we are here. And that's one of the 
5 reasons we think this Court should resolve it. And the 
6
 matter should be stayed in the criminal court. 
7
 MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, could I address that 
8 last point? 
9 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
10 MR. BURNETT: I think that goes to the very 
11 heart of the question, the constitutionality of the 
12 concept of giving criminal enforcement by misdemeanor 
13 application of zoning ordinances hasn't even been raised 
14 or addressed. All the sudden in a reply memo at the 
15 last instant inferentially raised. This is a civil 
16 matter. We ought to be here. Routinely ordinances of 
17 this nature, by making violations of them misdemeanors, 
18 it is not challenged. It is proper and permissible. If 
19 that's going to be raised, even that ought to be raised 
20 before the court. It hasn't been raised. I don't think 
21 it is appropriate argument to be made at this time. 
22 THE COURT: Anything else? 
23 MR. BARNARD: We are here on Motion for Summary 
24 Judgment. 
25 THE COURT: I know it. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10 
11 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
MR. BARNARD: Mr. Burnett's only facts are that 
Randy Randall—that's the only evidence Mr. Burnett has 
presented, Randy Randall says I don't know how many cars 
there were in 1970. I don't think there were any. My 
client has said there was an average of 6. Parish said 
6
 I there was cars. Smith said there were cars. So I think 
7
 ' from a factual standpoint Mr. Burnett has not met his 
8
 I burden to show there is material, substantial issues of 
9
 J fact. I think it is properly before the Court on a 
Summary Judgment. And it is a matter of law. 
MR. BURNETT: I don't think that's any 
12
 | different than saying four people said the light was red 
13
 I and one guy said it was green, and therefore you ought 
14
 ' to rule as a matter of law the light was red. I mean we 
have answered interrogatories under oath. I don't know 
all the evidence the prosecutor intends to present 
tomorrow, but there is a question of fact. And it is 
not the number of witnesses as we always tell juries in 
support of a proposition that leads to it. That's a 
great jury argument for Mr. Barnard, but it is not a 
question of law. 
MR. BARNARD: If your Honor will look at their 
Answers to Interrogatories, Randy Randall said we have 
24
 looked, we don't know if there was any vehicles. He is 
25 not saying I know for a fact there wasn't any vehicles 
there. And for Mr, Burnett to say, hey, we answered 
Interrogatories and we have raised an issue of fact 
simply isn't true. Randy Randall was the only 
defendant, the only person that submitted an affidavit 
on their behalf. And he says I don't know how many 
vehicles there were there. And that's different than 
him saying no, there wasn't any vehicles there. And my 
client saying there was. 
MR. BURNETT: He is answering for the City and 
saying that to the best of his knowledge there were none 
from what he can determine. 
THE COURT: What are the words? I don't have 
the Answers. Interrogatories are not filed with the 
Court under the current procedure.. 
MR. BURNETT: Without destroying the file 
entirely— 
THE COURT: Just read me what he says. 
MR. BURNETT: Okay. The question was during 
1970, how many inoperable rusted or partially dismantled 
vehicles were on the property more than seven days. To 
the best of the knowledge of these answering defendants, 
there were none. It doesn't say I don't have any idea. 
He says we have looked into it, and we believe there 
were none. Now I don't think that's any different than 
any other cars. Mr. Barnard hasn't deposed Mr. 
4 
1
 Randall. He wants the Court to read something in his 
2
 mind and read something that is really a question of 
3
 I fact. 
THE COURT: It appears there may be a question 
5 of fact. It would be a simple one. If I heard the 
6
 evidence at trial, I would find that prior to 1970 there 
7 were probably half a dozen at any given time. I think 
8 there is another issue of fact in the case, and that is 
9 whether there was a prior non-conforming use. What was 
10 that use? The fact there were six cars then and there 
11 are 25 now, is that the same use or not? I think that's 
12 an issue of fact. I don't see it is a simple all or 
13 nothing case. I think as a result of the trial in this 
14 civil matter, there may be an in between decision that 
15 would be very, very logical. If the person stores up to 
16 half a dozen cars continuously prior to the law going 
17 into effect, is he then justified in storing 25 or 30? 
18 And is that the same use? 
19 I see that as a question of fact. For those 
20 reasons, I will deny the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
21 There is a request for injunctive relief. I am 
22 tempted to try to offer some protection until these 
23 matters are resolved, but not to the point of striking 
24 I tomorrow's trial date. I don't think I have that kind 
of authority over the Circuit Court or the City. I 25 
1
 think we ought to be able to trust the system and the 
2
 Judge to give a proper instruction in your trial. And 
3
 depending upon the outcome, you have your right to 
4
 appeal that decision. And if you are correct on this 
5 issue, ultimately you ought to prevail. 
6
 You haven't asked for this kind of relief, but it 
7
 seems to me it would be appropriate that the City not 
8 file additional charges until there is a final outcome 
9 of the criminal case, or this case. The City have a 
10 problem with that? 
11 MR. BURNETT: No, your Honor. We have not done 
12 so, and I think I am safe i n — 
13 THE COURT: I assume if there is a conflict in 
14 Circuit Court that there is a method for the Defendants 
15 to stay the penalty phase until there is an outcome in 
16 the appellate court, if that's where it goes. With 
17 that, I don't see that there is any serious detriment to 
18
 the plaintiffs in allowing them to go to trial on the 
19 criminal matter where the burden of proof is much higher 
20 than it will be on this civil case. 
21 I think there is an issue as to what the prior 
22
 non-conforming use was as to the extent and scope of 
23 it. That would justify this case going to trial. 
24 Someone want to volunteer and try to memorialize 
25
 this in some sort of Order? 
MR. BURNETT: I will do so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. You want your 
deposition back? 
MR. BURNETT: Yes. Thank you, your Honor 
(November 8, 1989) 
THE COURT: Case number 3165-89, J. Val Roberts 
vs. Centerville City. I assume there is another case 
that's been consolidated with this, and that would be 
number 45446. I haven't seen the Order signed by Judge 
Taylor. I think you all agree that's happened? 
MR. BARNARD: Yes. 
MR. BURNETT: Yes, your Honor. Maybe it will 
be assigned a different number, Davis County number 
42831. The Order was signed by Judge Taylor November 
3rd and forwarded by my office to Davis County Clerk's 
Office on November 6th or 7th to accomplish that 
consolidation. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burnett, you represent the 
Defendants, and you have moved for Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Barnard, you have responded to that and made your 
own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
MR. BARNARD: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burnett, you want to argue that? 
MR. BARNARD: If I may, those Motions were made 
prior to the Stipulation and Order to Consolidate. As 
part of the Stipulation and Order, we have agreed that I 
can file an Amended Complaint consolidating and 
re-alleging both of the allegations from both of the 
cases in this case before you. It seems to me it is 
O "> 
4 
1
 somewhat premature to be arguing these Motions for 
2
 Summary Judgment in light of the fact that we have 
3
 J agreed I can file the Amended Complaint. 
THE COURT: Is that the Amended Complaint in 
5 the file? 
6
 MR. BARNARD: No, the Amended Complaint— 
7
 THE COURT: He is nodding his head yes, and you 
8 are saying no. 
9 MR. BARNARD: The Amended Complaint in this 
10 case deals with the issue of the Board of Adjustment. 
11 We have agreed that there is another Amended Complaint 
12 that we can file which will combine the allegations from 
13 the other case, the Davis County case, with this case. 
14 So, it is my intention to file an Amended Complaint 
15 other than the one that's already in the file. 
16 THE COURT: And that has not been prepared? 
17 MR. BARNARD: That has not been prepared 
18
 because the Order allowing me to do that was only signed 
19 last week, and the stipulation was only signed the week 
20 before. So it seems to me—and these Motions were made 
21 prior to reaching that agreement, and prior to the Order 
22
 Consolidating them. So it seems to me it is premature. 
23 And what we should do, I should file an Amended 
24 Complaint combining all the causes of action, and we 
25
 should brief it and come back before your Honor. 
4 
1
 THE COURT: Did you call Mr. Burnett and 
2
 suggest that to him? 
3] MR. BARNARD: I did. I spoke to him yesterday 
afternoon and suggested we do that. He indicated he 
5 thought the issue—one issue was properly before your 
6
 Honor. 
7 MR. BURNETT: Can I be heard on that, your 
8 Honor? 
9 THE COURT: Sure. 
10 MR. BURNETT: I have got a copy of the Amended 
11 Complaint in the case before Judge Taylor. I will be 
12 happy to present that to the Court for your review. It 
13 seeks determination as a Declaratory Action that 
14 Plaintiffs have non-conforming use, and seeks to enjoin 
15 further criminal prosecution for violation of 
16 Centerville City's Ordinances. 
17 Both of these cases have been a logistical and 
18
 procedural nightmare, dragged out from my client's 
19 perspective far too long. We have been trying to get a 
20 discreet issue, the 10/19 challenge to the Board of 
21 Adjustment for some period of time. The hearing has 
22
 been scheduled for a period of time. I don't see why 
23 combining this Complaint with the presently framed 
24 Complaint before your Honor will have any question about 
25 the discrete issue about affirming or overturning the 
Board of Adjustment. It has been difficult to move the 
case forward. We are scheduled for this, all prepared. 
The memoranda have all be filed. And I see no reason 
why this can't proceed to a determination today. 
For that matter, I think it might ultimately render 
some of the other issues moot. 
THE COURT: What is that? 
MR. BURNETT: That's the Amended Complaint that 
was previously filed with the action with Judge Taylor. 
THE COURT: But it is not the one that you say 
you have permission to file now? 
MR. BARNARD: That's correct. 
MR. BURNETT: Now I disagree with that. The 
stipulation is you can file an Amended Complaint 
combining the actions in both cases. I am saying you 
look at this Complaint and the one he has proposed in 
this case, and that ought to be universal possibilities. 
Even if it is not, I don't see how that will impact the 
Motion presently before the Court to determine the 
validity of the Board of Adjustment's determination. 
MR. BARNARD: The Motion before the Court, your 
Honor, was based upon the original Complaint that was 
filed here. And their Motion was to dismiss the whole 
case because they are saying we had an appropriate 
hearing in front of the Board of Adjustment. End of 
1
 story* I filed a Motion to file an Amended Complaint in 
2 this case, saying the Board of Adjustment doesn't have 
3
 the power to sit as a Court; that the existence or 
4
 non-existence of a prior existing use is an issue of 
5 fact that can be resolved, or should be resolved, by the 
6
 Court. So I filed an Amended Complaint and Motion to 
7
 file an Amended Complaint in this action. That has not 
8 been received by the Court because we just recently 
9 stipulated that I could do so. 
10 And then I filed, as Mr. Burnett indicated, a 
11 proposed—or an Amended Complaint in the other case. 
U And I need to combine the two. And the allegations will 
13 be not only that there is a non-conforming prior 
14 existing use, but the Board of Adjustment does not have 
15 the power to sit as a Court of Law and determine that 
16 there isn't a non-conforming use. 
i? So I think all of the issues are tied in together. 
18
 And it is inappropriate to say okay, we will determine 
19 now that the Board of Adjustment was okay. And if I 
20 make some other allegations, we will look at those. I 
21 think the right way to handle it is to allow me to file 
22 an Amended Complaint and combine all of those causes of 
23 action and come back and resolve it. 
24 THE COURT: Are you saying that your memorandum^ 
25
 doesn't deal with the issue of whether or not the Board 
1
 of Adjustment has the power to do what they did? You 
2 haven't addressed those issues yet? 
3 MR. BARNARD: No# it has. 
4
 THE COURT: Then what would you give me in 
5 addition to that if you filed your Amended Complaint? 
6
 MR. BARNARD: Well, on that issue, probably 
7
 nothing more. 
8 THE COURT: What other issue would you raise? 
9 MR. BARNARD: The other issues are a factual 
10 issue with regard to whether or not there is a 
11 non-conforming use. What the situation was with regard 
12 to the case that was in front of Judge Taylor, we filed 
13 an action, and we alleged that there was a 
14 non-conforming prior existing use. That case was 
15 pending. While that was pending, the City took some 
16 action against my client. We requested a hearing, and 
i? we had a hearing before the Board of Adjustment as to 
18
 the action that was taken by the City. And we alleged 
19 in that hearing that there was a non-conforming use. 
20 THE COURT: What was the date of that hearing? 
21 Is that the March 13th hearing? 
22 MR. BARNARD: That was the early part of this 
23 year, yes. 
24 THE COURT: The same as the one in my case? 
25
 MR. BARNARD: That's correct. 
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1
 THE COURT: What's the difference between my 
2
 case and Judge Taylor's case? 
3
 I MR, BARNARD: Judge Taylor's case was a law 
suit we filed asking for determination by the District 
5 Court that there was a non-conforming use. While that 
6
 was pending, a separate administrative proceeding was 
7
 started. And in that separate proceeding, there was a 
8 hearing and a presentation. 
9 THE COURT: When did you file the case before 
10 Judge Taylor? 
11 MR. BARNARD: 1988. I am not sure when, but 
12 substantially before the administrative hearing. And 
13 then we filed an Amended Complaint a month or two ago in 
14 that action before Judge Taylor eliminating a couple of 
15 Defendants and changing the causes of action in that 
16 case in front of Judge Taylor. So actually we have two, 
17 two ways of asserting that we have a non-conforming use. 
18
 THE COURT: This all boils down to the same 
19 issue? 
20 MR. BARNARD: It does. What they are 
21 contending, what the City is contending, is the Board of 
22 Adjustment is the ultimate decider. They make a 
23 determination as to whether or not there is a 
24 J non-conforming use. It doesn't matter that we filed a 
separate action in front of Judge Taylor asking the 25 
1
 District Court to make that factual determination. They 
2
 are saying we had our chance, we told our story in front 
3
 of the Board of Adjustment, although we have told that 
4
 story after we filed the law suit in front of Judge 
5 Taylor. And so then they are saying, well, you have had 
6
 your chance and the Board of Adjustment's decision is 
7
 final. That's why Mr. Burnett is suggesting that if 
8 this Court upholds what the Board of Adjustment did, 
9 then our objection, our Complaint that was before Judge 
10 Taylor, is moot. 
11 THE COURT: The case I have was filed after the 
12 Board of Adjustment action suggesting that they acted 
13 inappropriately, or for some other reason, and asking 
14 this Court to overturn it. Judge Taylor's case, which I 
15 haven't seen, was filed prior to the Board of Adjustment 
16 ever meeting? 
17 MR. BARNARD: That's correct. 
18
 THE COURT: What happened in that case in the 
19 meantime? Did either of you ask that that be remanded 
20 back to the Board of Adjustment? 
21 MR. BURNETT: No. 
22
 THE COURT: It just sat there? 
23 MR. BARNARD: Just sat there. 
24 THE COURT: This all happened in the meantime? 
25
 MR. BARNARD: That's correct. 
1
 MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, could I address this 
2
 issue briefly? 
3
 THE COURT: Sure. 
4
 MR. BURNETT: Our position is not that somehow 
5 the Board of Adjustment's determination divested the 
6
 District Court of jurisdiction, but it is a basic 
7
 administrative exhaustion and due process argument. It 
8 would be nice for a lot of applicants appearing before 
9 administrative bodies if we avoid raising issues before 
10 those bodies. They could go before the Court and say 
11 this wasn't addressed and therefore Courts ought to 
12 address it. That would totally emasculate the process. 
13 We think the framework is clear. This is a matter 
14 appropriate for resolution before the Board of 
15 Adjustment. The Plaintiffs are here to challenge that, 
16 i don't see how an action styled somewhat differently, 
17 but involving the same subject matter beforehand, that 
18
 laid dormant, somehow ought to be an impediment to it 
19 being resolved. 
20 THE COURT: Should this have gone to Judge 
21 Taylor in the case, say wait a minute, we haven't had 
22
 our hearing before the Board of Adjustment, this action 
23 is filed prematurely and should be stayed or remanded or 
2* administrative remedies haven't been exhausted, 
25
 therefore— 
1
 MR. BURNETT: Well, I would suggest that fact 
2
 occurred, your Honor. We had—actually, your Honor 
3
 heard a Motion in about July of 1988 in that case with 
4
 respect to injunctive proceedings against further 
5 criminal prosecution in the Justice and Circuit Court; 
6
 separate issue. The other issue laid dormant. We had a 
7
 status conference in about February of 1 9 8 8 — o r '89, 
8 excuse me, this year. And a trial date was scheduled in 
9 June. That trial date was postponed by stipulation of 
10 counsel precisely because of the pendency of the Board 
11 of Adjustment determination. The Plaintiffs professed 
12 to file an Amended Complaint in that action. The 
13 Amended Complaint they filed was filed in October of 
14 this year in that case, long after even the Motions were 
15 framed in this case as an apparent attempt to expand 
16 those issues. I don't think it is fair to say that 
17 there was any maneuvering unfairly to cast a pall over 
18
 that proceeding. I may have that stipulation with me. 
19 And I think it refers specifically—okay. The 
20 stipulation recites that the trial date ought to be 
2t continued to a date convenient with the Court and 
22
 parties as a result of pending motions in a related 
23 proceeding in the Circuit Court and administrative 
24 J hearing before the Centerville Board of Adjustment. 
Until such decision has been received, it would be 25 
1
 premature to proceed to trial in the District Court 
2
 actions. And parties will not be able to frame the 
3
 issues pursuant to a recent ruling granting Plaintiff's 
4
 Motion to Amend. 
5 MR. BARNARD: Back where we started, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Just a minute. A couple of things 
7
 make me uneasy. I think this thing has to finish 
8 sometime, some place, and I would like to do it in such 
9 a way we wrap it all up in one tight package, rather 
10 than having some loose ends. And I see loose ends here 
11 because the Order to Consolidate was signed a day or two 
12 ago I assume by Judge Taylor. I haven't seen it. And I 
13 don't have his file. In fact in reading one of the 
14 letters that Mr. Barnard sent, I was of the 
15 understanding it would be consolidated and shifted to 
16 his court because that's what your letter said. 
17 Apparently the Order says otherwise. 
18
 I don't think I am up to speed on the case to decide 
19 what the effect is of a case filed in another court and 
20 then later a hearing was had with no reference to that 
21 hearing in the case, no Order saying this is stayed 
22
 pending resolution of your administrative remedies. I 
23 am really not sure that what we are talking about isn't 
24 form over substance. It seems that way to me. But I 
25
 also seem to think that unless I have had a chance to 
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1
 see what your ultimate complaint is going to be, and 
2
 what your ultimate argument is going to be in the 
3
 J memoranda, I prefer not to rule until I have it all in 
one package. 
5 I think I can probably bifurcate the cases. We can 
6
 go forward on this one. I think I am pretty much on top 
7
 of this, having read your memoranda and pleadings. But 
8 to tie it all up now that it is consolidated, I don't 
9 think I can accomplish that today. It seems to make 
10 sense to do it all at once or we go forward on just this 
11 case. 
12 MR. BURNETT: No, I think my client is 
13 primarily interested in consolidating and getting the 
14 entire issue resolved. If the Court's preference in 
15 doing that is to hold o f f — 
16 THE COURT: I don't want to start a whole new 
17 series of memoranda going back and forth. Can we avoid 
18
 that by setting a date now and letting you file your 
19 Amended Complaint, file an answer, update your 
20 memoranda, both independent of each other any way you 
21 want to, and come back in 30 days? 
22
 MR. BURNETT: I would be in favor of that. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Barnard? 
24 MR. BARNARD: That's fine. 
2
* THE COURT: Will that work? Rather than 
1
 following the rule 4501 where we have to go back and 
2
 forth and make a request for hearing. What I recommend 
3
 you do, have you got the Complaint ready to file? 
4
 MR. BARNARD: It can be done within a week. 
5 THE COURT: Where are we? You will have that 
6
 done by the 15th. Are you able to respond within a week? 
7
 MR. BURNETT: Yes, your Honor, we could. 
8 THE COURT: In the meantime, if you have some 
9 idea what the issues are going to be, if you could both 
10 have your memoranda updates prepared and submitted by 
11 the 29th, and exchange copies with each other. 
12 MR. BARNARD: That date would be a problem for 
13 me, your Honor. I have a trial that week. 
14 THE COURT: December 6th? 
15 J MR. BARNARD: That would be fine. 
THE COURT: We will have a hearing on the 
13th. I am sorry we couldn't finish this today. I 
wasn't aware which way it was going to be consolidated, 
19 I and I haven't had a chance to look at the other file. 
20 MR. BURNETT: What time would that be on the 
21 J 13th, your Honor. 
THE COURT: 11:00 o'clock. Tell Jerry not to 
23 I set anything else. 
24 MR. BURNETT: Very well. 
25 MR. BARNARD: Thank you, your Honor. 
16 
17 
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22 
1
 THE COURT: Thank you. 
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1
 (December 13, 1989) 
2
 THE COURT: 3165-89, Roberts vs. Centerville 
3
 I City. Time scheduled for hearing. Two cases were 
consolidated. The other case is 42831, Davis County 
5
 file that was transferred up to Judge Taylor, and now 
6
 consolidated with 3156-89. 
7
 I have examined all the documents in both files, 
8 re-read the memoranda that were submitted, plus any 
9 additional documents that were filed. Is it still the 
10 Defendant's Motion for hearing? 
11 MR. BARNARD: There is a — 
12 MR. BURNETT: There is a Motion for Partial 
13 Summary Judgment by the Plaintiff, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Matter to you who goes first? 
15 MR. BARNARD: I am closer to the podium. 
16 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
17 MR. BARNARD: Thank you. There is two issues, 
18
 your Honor. One is whether or not the Board of 
19 Adjustment is the exclusive agency to determine whether 
20 or not there was a non-conforming prior existing use. 
21 And that's the issue of our Motion for Partial Summary 
22
 Judgment. Mr. Burnett suggests that given the fact the 
23 Board of Adjustment determined we did not have a 
24 J non-conforming prior existing use, that's the end of the 
story. We can come here for plenary review as to 25 
1
 whether or not it is arbitrary or capricious. I don't 
2
 think that's the law. I think we are entitled to have a 
3
 determination by the District Court whether or not we 
4
 have a prior existing non-conforming use. And the fact 
5
 that we did avail ourselves of the Board of Adjustment 
6
 hearing process doesn't preclude us from asking this 
7
 Court, or a District Court, to examine the issue. 
8 And the fact of the matter was that we had filed an 
9
 action, the action that has now been consolidated into 
10 this one, for a court determination, a District Court 
11 determination as to whether or not we had a 
12 non-conforming prior existing use before we went before 
13 J the Board of Adjustment. So that's one issue. And we 
have discussed that in detail in our memorandum. 
The other issue is whether or not in fact we have a 
prior existing non-conforming use. My client bought the 
real property in 1964. At that time it was zoned 
agricultural. It is our position that as of 1964 when 
they bought it, an appropriate accessory use was to 
store junk, to store vehicles, to store machinery. 
In March of 1970, the City enacted an ordinance 
which then prohibited the storing of junk vehicles. It 
is that 1970 ordinance that my clients are being 
criminally prosecuted under. And that ordinance, from , 
March of 1970, makes it clear that the storage of junk 
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1
 vehicles is illegal. So what our position is, is that 
2
 prior to 1970 the storing of rusted junked vehicles was 
3
 I an appropriate accessory use for agricultural land. As 
of 1970, when that storage was specifically outlawed, it 
5 was no longer an appropriate accessory use, and 
6
 therefore we have a prior existing non-conforming use. 
7
 With Mr. Burnett's Motion and my Motion, we have 
8 attached copies of Affidavits from two Parish brothers 
9 and a Mr. Smith, who are neighbors, and my client, 
10 indicating that they were in fact storing those junk 
n vehicles prior to 1970. Mr. Burnett suggests that this 
12 Court can rule as a matter of law that we don't have a 
13 prior existing non-conforming use. I don't think that's 
14 the case. I think we have a factual dispute. And the 
15 factual dispute is whether or not prior to 197 0 the 
16 storage of vehicles like this was an appropriate and 
17 legal accessory use in an agricultural zoned area. 
*8 There is no question at all that after 1970 it 
19 wasn't a legal use because of the ordinance 10-3-54. 
20 But I think we have a factual dispute as to whether or 
21 not before 1970 it was an appropriate accessory use. I 
22
 don't think that can be resolved as a matter of law. 
23 Thank you. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Burnett. 
25
 MR. BURNETT: Thank you, your Honor. First of 
4 
1
 all with respect to the authority of the Board of 
2
 Adjustment, I think it is important to delineate the 
3
 J origin of that authority. The challenge here is not the 
authority of the Board of Adjustment per se, but the 
5
 I process. The appeal to the Board of Adjustment was not 
6
 a direct request of the Board of Adjustment to determine 
7
 this issue. It is the appellate right to pursue by a 
8 person aggrieved of a decision of the Zoning 
9 Administrator, really, trying to take issue with the 
10 interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance by the 
11 zoning ordinance, which is an appeal. 
12 Secondly, I don't know what significance there is to 
13 J the 'fact there was a pre-existing lawsuit. It is really 
a question of exhaustion. And if you could always 
15 I circumvent an exhaustion right by being the first to 
16 beat a path to the courthouse door, obviously the 
17 J requirement would be meaningless. I think in this State 
18
 I there is a clear exhaustion requirement in seeking a 
19 I judicial review in the land use decisions. 
14 
20 Let me give the Court a couple of cases. They are 
21 j not in the memo directly. I wasn't certain what the 
22
 I thrust—Merrihew vs. Salt Lake, found at 659 P2d 1065, a 
23 I 1983 opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. And Christ vs. 
24 Mapleton City at 497 P.2d 633, a 1972 decision of the , 
25
 Utah Supreme Court. But more importantly than that, I 
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think the fundamental problem with the Plaintiffs' 
approach to this case is that they obviously ignore the 
earlier ordinance prohibiting junk yards and related 
types of uses in A-2 zones. And that's why I don't 
think that there is a factual dispute and it is a 
question of law. 
The issue here is not that Centerville City has 
attempted to countermand the contents of those 
affidavits submitted. Those affidavits were reviewed by 
the Board of Adjustment and the Centerville City 
Administrator. And they identify storage of up to 6 
vehicles from 1964 to 1970 on the property in question. 
There is a fundamental question with respect to the 
character of that use at that time because those 
affidavits address the temporary storage for purposes of 
repair to operabilityf renovation, that type of thing. 
I think the Board of Adjustment as a secondary basis for 
their decision determined there was a fundamental change 
in the character of use once he started storing 25 or 3 0 
junked vehicles without an apparent attempt to renovate 
on the property. But the primary thrust of the Board's 
decision was based on a 1952 ordinance which determined 
that this was not a permitted use in this zone. And 
that's Exhibit I to our July 3, 1989 memorandum. And X 
think it requires you to walk through the ordinance. 
4 
1
 The ordinance speaks in terms of what is permitted and 
2 says anything not permitted is prohibited. 
3
 I This is an A-2. You may do all things permitted in 
R-2. That's page 6, back up to page 4 of Exhibit I it 
5 I recites you may do certain things as accessory uses. 
6
 But it clearly says all other uses are prohibited. And 
7
 in a separate section defines junk cars. And defines 
8 that as storage of inoperable vehicles on the premises. 
9 Long before the Roberts purchased, long before the 
10 non-conforming use, that was a prohibited use in 
11 Centerville. That's the thrust of our position with the 
12 Court. Regardless of whether it is a plenary review or 
13 a de novo review by this Court, in either event it is 
14 clearly a question of law that can be addressed by the 
15 Court. And Plaintiffs, in none of their memoranda have 
16 J addressed the earlier ordinance at all; silent with 
respect to it. 
There is also confusion between non-conforming use 
19 I and accessory use. I don't think there is any defining 
20 as accessory prior non-conforming use. The 
21 J non-conforming must have been lawful before it is later 
prohibited, of course. That's our thrust with the 
23 I ordinance in question. 
24 J Accessory use defined in this ordinance involves a , 
use which is customary, incidental to the use of the 
17 
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1
 property that's properly zoned for and defined in the 
2
 ordinance. I know the terms on all fours or squarely on 
3
 I the numbers are often over used. I don't know how you 
get much closer than Board of County Commissioners vs. 
5
 I Thompson, the Colorado case we cited to the Court, where 
6
 specifically you had some farmstead uses. An argument 
7
 was made the storage of old Packard vehicles as a hobby 
8 was incidental use and an accessory use. The Court said 
9
 no, it is not, it stands the whole zoning ordinance on 
10 its head to stretch it that far. That's exactly what 
11 has occurred here. There has been no attempt to 
12 distinguish that case. It establishes for the use, Mr. 
13 J Roberts' use, it is prohibited as a non-conforming or 
accessory use. 
15 I i don't know there is any fact question regardless 
16
 of whether you look at it as a plenary or a direct and 
17 J de novo, direct as a matter of law. 
Absent questions from the Court, we are willing to 
19 I submit it on that basis. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Barnard. 
21 MR. BARNARD: Thank you. Mr. Burnett says we 
22
 should look at Exhibit I of his—attached to his 
23 memorandum. And Exhibit I has a series of definitions 
24 I in it. And at section 31 of Exhibit I talks about junk 
yard. Exhibit I is the 1952 ordinance. And there is no 
14 
18 
25 
1
 question that junk yards were outlawed by the 1952 
2
 ordinance. But what is pertinent in that is at 
3
 paragraph 31 in the definitions, it defines junk yard. 
4
 And it defines a junk yard as the use of any lot, 
5 portion of lot or tract of land for the storage, keeping 
6
 or abandonment of junk, including scrap metal or other 
7
 scrap material, or for the dismantling, demolition or 
8 abandonment of automobiles or other vehicles or 
9 machinery or parts thereof. Provided that this 
10 definition shall not be deemed to include such uses 
11 which are clearly accessory and incidental to any 
12 agricultural use permitted in the district. 
13 So he is correct. Junk yards were outlawed in 
14 1952. But what that definition says is if it is an 
15 accessory use and incidental to agricultural use, it is 
16 not a junk yard. Therefore, it is not outlawed. 
17 in 1970 the City then enacted an ordinance which 
18
 clearly outlawed the storage of junk, even in an 
19 agricultural area. And our position is it is the 
20 accessory use that is the non-conforming prior existing 
21 use. So we are saying yes, it is agricultural land. 
22
 And an accessory to that, accessory use to that, just as 
23 in their definition of junk yard, was to store junk and 
24 old vehicles. And so we had a prior existing 
25
 non-conforming use based upon the accessory use,which 
1
 then was outlawed in 1970. 
2 So back where we started. The question is the 
3 question of fact. And that is whether prior to 1970 we 
4
 had an appropriate non-conforming prior existing 
5 accessory use to store junk on that agricultural land. 
6
 I don/t think it can be resolved as a matter of law. 
7
 With regard to the involvement of the Board of 
8 Adjustment, we attached that to our memorandum also. 
9 Previously when somebody made an application—somebody 
10 could make an application to the Board of Adjustment in 
11 Centerville City and say I have a non-conforming use, 
12 please certify it. Please authorize me to have that 
13 use. And then the City was authorized to give a permit 
14 and say yes, in fact you do have that. The current 
15 statute, the current ordinance in Centerville doesn't 
16 allow that. There isn't an approval process at this 
17 point. And so under the old statute if there was an 
18
 argument and you applied to them, they said yes, you 
19 have a proper use and certified it. Then you could 
20 continue to use it. That was eliminated. And that is 
21 again cited in our memorandum. That was eliminated and 
22 no longer is the case. 
23 So what was the process at one time with the Board 
24 of Adjustment could approve those uses is no longer the 
25 case. And that's why I think that the appropriate forum 
4 
1
 to determine the existence of a non-conforming use is 
2
 the District Court that can look at all the facts and 
3
 I make a judicial determination. And the fact that that 
authority was taken away from the Board of Adjustment, I 
5 think, is a strong indication they don't have the power 
6
 and are not the exclusive remedy for determining whether 
7
 or not there is such a use. Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: I am prepared to find, and do find, 
9 that the activities described by Mr. and Mrs. Roberts in 
10 the evidence that they have submitted to the Court, I 
11 don't know whether we call them Plaintiffs or Defendants 
12 at this point, the activities that they have described 
13 are not accessory use in a farming operation. And they 
14 would not be valid and proper in an agricultural zone. 
15 And, having made that finding, Centerville City's 
16 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
17 i think that resolves the issues in both cases. To 
18
 the extent it might not, I also recognize the authority 
19 of the Board of Adjustment to do what they did and make 
20 the findings that they made. And if the matter were 
21 submitted for plenary review of this Court, the decision 
22
 would be the same. 
23 Centerville City is making a request for 
24 injunction. Neither party has responded to that. I 
25 think it is an appropriate request, and I will grant 
it. However, I will stay any action to enforce the 
injunction for a period of 30 days so that the Roberts 
can consider what options they have at this point. 
Mr. Burnett, will you prepare the necessary 
documents? 
MR. BURNETT: I will do so and forward them to 
Mr. Barnard, your Honor. Thank you. 
MR. BARNARD: Thank you. 
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APPENDIX C 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upot 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain i 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi* 
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his &• 
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whomi 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the timt 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to tht 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatoriea, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on tho 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuino 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If oo 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually aoi 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon mail 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to whicfc 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in tho 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action til 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
APPENDIX D 
CSSTaflVILLr tOW 2CN3C ORDNANCE 
AN ORDINANCE TO R20ULAT2 BY 2 0 KB T32 LOCATION, **IO»T AND BULX 
OF BUILDISGS A*D OTHSR STRUCTnRSS; T « P2RC3ITAGE OP LOT W^IC* KAT 
B t OCCUPIED: TS5 S I 2 2 OP LOTS, COURTS, AND 0T*2R OPSN SPAC5S: TS2 
DENSITY AND DISTRIBUTION CF POPULATION; T K LOCATION AND us 3 OF 
BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES FOR TRADE. INDUSTRY, R2SIDD«C\, RECREATION, 
PUBLIC ACTIVITIES OR OTHER PURPOSES: 
BE X? ORDAINED BY THE BOA'D OF TRUSTTSS OF COT*HVTLLZ TOWN, 
STATE OF OTAh\ AS FCLLO*S: 
f a c t i o n 1 . SHORT TITLE. 
This ordinance s h a l l be to own aa tha Zoning Ordinanee af Cant ar -
v i l l e , Utah. 
Sactlon 2 . PURPOSE. INTERPRETATION AND CONFLICT* 
A* Thlj ordlnanea la deaigned and anactad for tha purpoae of 
promoting tha haa l th , a e f e t y , o o r a l j , convenience, order, proeperi ty 
and welfare of tha praaant and future inhabitanta of C e n t e r v i l l e , 
including amongst othar thinga tha leaacning of congeation in tha 
atraata or roaca, secur ing , safety from T1T% and othar dangara pro-
v id ing adequate l i £ h t and a i r , c i a a a i f i c a t i o n of land usea and d i s -
t r ibut ion of land development and u t i l i z a t i o n , protact lon of tha tax 
base , securing eccncsy in £Ovarr.aental e*penditurea, foatarlng tha 
Town1a a g r i c u l t u r a l and othar lnduatr iea , and tha protact lon of both 
urban zr.d nonurban development. 
3. In in terpre t ing and applying tha proviaiona of thia ordin-
ance, the requirements contained herein are declared to ba tha min-
imum requirements for the purposes aat for th . 
C. Thia ordinance aha 11 not n u l l i f y tha mora r e a t r i c t i v e pro-
viaiona of covenant! , agreesenta, othar ordlnancaa or laws, but 
ahal l preva i l notwithstanding auch proviaiona which are laaa r e -
a t r l c t i v a . 
Sactlon 3 . DEFINITIONS. 
A* Por tha purpose of thia ordlnanea, certa in words and teraa 
ara defined aa f o l l o w s : words uaad in tha praaant tanaa include tho 
future; worda in tha s ingular number include tha p lural and tha 
p lural tha s ingu lar ; words not included herein but daflnad in tha 
Building Coda ahal l ba aa daflnad there in . 
1. xccaaaory Uaa or Building — A Subordinate use or bu i ld -
ing customarily inc identa l to and locatad upon the same l o t occupied 
by tha main uaa or bu i ld ing . 
^5^ Agriculture — Tha t i l l i n g of tha s o i l , tha ra i s ing of 
crops , h o r t i c u l t u r e and gardening, but not including tha keeping or 
ra i s ing of domestic an i sa la and fowl, except houaahold p e t s , and not 
including any a g r i c u l t u r a l lnduatry or buainess, auch- aa f r u i t pack-
ing p l a n t s , fur farms, animal h o s p i t a l s or s imilar uaaa. 
3 . Apartmant Hotel — .JIJ building which containa dwel l ing 
unita and a l s o s a t i s f i e s tha d e f i n i t i o n of a h o t e l , aa defined in 
th ia ordinance. 
4 . Apartment Motel — *ny building or group of bui ldings 
which containa dwell ing units and alao aatlaf iaa the d e f i n i t i o n of 
a touriat court as defined in thia ordinance. 
5. Apartmant House — See Dwelling, Mult ip le . 
6 . Al ley — A public thoroughfare lass than twenty-aix (26) 
f e e t wide. 
7 . Basement — A story part ly underground, having at laaat 
one-half ( 1 / 2 ) i ta he ight above the average l eve l of the adjoining 
ground. 
8 . Boarding Houae — u building where, for eompenaetion, 
meala ara provided for at laaat f i ve (5) but not more than f i f t e e n 
(IS) persona. 
9. Building — Any s tructure having a roof aupoorted by a 
columns or v a l l a , for the housing or enclosure of peraona, animals 
or c h a t t e l s . 
10, Bui ld ing , Aooeaaory — A subordinate b u i l d i n g , customer-
i l y inc identa l to and locatad upon the aama lo t occupied by the mair« 
bu i ld ing . On any lo t upon which la locatad a dwall ing any b u l l c i r g 
which ia inc identa l to the conducting of any agr i cu l tura l uaa s*u\«. 
be deemed to be an accessory bui ld ing . 
11 . Bui ld ing , slain — The principal bui lding or one of the 
pr inc ipa l bui ldings upon a l o t , or tha building or one of tha prin-
c i p a l buildinga housing tha pr inc ipal use upon the l o t . 
12. Building, HJlg.1i of v e r t i c a l distance irom iao 
^ ^ ^ r 
oK I U ( i > Y N ^ 
ocx-W* !Dru/^r JmCfca* 
grade to the highest point or the coping of a f l a t roof or to the 
deck l ine of a- Mansard roof , or to the plate l ine of a pitch or hip 
roo.*» 
U* C j l i a r — .\ s tory having acre than one-half of ita 
height beJow the average l e v e l of the adjoining ground. A c e l l a r 
ahall not be counted as a s tory for the purpoeea of height aeeaure-
aent . 
1*. ;nurt — An open, unoccupied space, other than a yard, 
on the aaue io'. with a bu i ld ing or group of bu i ld ings , and which la 
bounded on in cr -or* «ldes by such G l i d i n g or bui ld ings . The 
widtl. of a co-irt is i t s l e a s t horizontal d iaens i en , aeaaured between 
apposite s lde j in the sase general d i r e e t i o n ' e e the yard or lot l i n e 
on which the court opens . The length of a court la i ta leaat h e r i -
>ntal djaeneion measured at r ight angles to l t i width, 
/
^ 5 B*iry "• A c e c s e r c i a i e s tabl iahsent for the manufacture 
'^^or re ta i l sa le of dairy prod-r.ts . 
15. Dwelling — /ny j u i l d i r g , or portion thereof, which la 
d e s i r e d f o r u j e * o r **w**ow*ii2>l purposes, escept h o t e l s , boarding 
houses, lodging houres a.-c» to^rl«r\. c*bxns. 
V \ ^ c l l i n c * « , l r g i i - f a s i i 7 — /. bui lding arranged or de-
signed :.-) re occupied h^ or.2 f > a i \ } , the structure having only one 
dwV.Un^ '-ni'-. 
1 ., 3-rcIlir.0 , ?•*<.-~*n;iy — A bui lding arranged or designed 
to be j . s ip i jr i by rwc .V.s'li***. the structure having only two dwe l l -
ing ur. *: * % 
i ° . DwelU.-g, Three-Tari ly - - A bui lding arranged or des ign-
ed to be occupies by three f . i s ! l i e s , the structure having only three 
dwelling units* 
20* Duel l ing , F'-vr-Pamily - - A building arranged or designed 
to be occupied by four f a m i l i e s , the atructure having only four 
dwelling u n i t s . 
21 . Dwelling* a tu l t ip le -Puai iy - - A bui lding arranged or de-
signed to^be occupied by sore than four (4) f a s i l i e a * 
(22y f e l l i n g , Group — One or acre b u i l d i n g s , not sore than 
two and one-half (2*) a t o r l e s in he ight , containing dwelling units 
and »mng9d around two (2} or three (3) aldea of a court enich 
opena onto a s tree t* 
23. Dwelling Unit • • One or sore rooms in a dwelling deaign-
ed for l iv ing or s leeping purposes, and having cne but not sore than 
one (1) kitchen* 
£24} Paaily ?ood Production • - The keeping of not acre than 
one horse: one cow; two sheep; one pig (over 2 aontha o l d ) ; twenty 
rabbits ; twenty-f ive c h i c k e n s ; ten each of the fol lowing or other 
barnyard fowl, turkeys; g e e s e , ducks; pheasants; pigeons provided, 
that an addit ional number of an ica l s equal to the nusber l i s ted 
herein and an addi t iona l number of fowl equal to f ive t iaee the 
number l i s t e d herein aay be kept for each f i v e thouaand (SCOQ) square 
feet in the lo t over and above e ight thouaand (8000)square feet* 
22* Garage, Pr ivate — An accessory building designed or 
used for the storage of not sore than four (4) autooooiles owned and 
uaed by the occupants of the building to which i t la accessory; pro-
vided, that on a lot occupied by a multiple dwel l ing , the private 
carage say be designed and uaed for the storage of one and one-half 
(11J tinea as aany automobiles aa there are dwelling units in the 
s u l t i p i e dwel l ing . Ca a l o t with a dwel l ing , a garage shal l be con-
aidered • part of the d w e l l i n g i f the two strueturee have one or 
•ore walls in eoeaon. Whore a garage la thus part of a dwelling, 
i t shal l require the same aide yard and front yard aa a dwelling in 
the aaae tone. Where a garage la not thus part of a dwelling, but 
la provided with a front yard and aide yard equal to that required 
fer dwell ing, in the d w e l l i n g to which i t i s accessory; otherwise, 
i t shal l be located not leaa than s ix (6) f ee t in the rear of the 
dwelling and not c l o s e r tnan f i f t e e n (15) f e e t to any exis t ing 
dwel l ingon adjacent property* 
T 4I& Oarage, Publ ic — A bui lding or portion thereof, other 
than a private garage, des igned or uaed for s e r v i c i n g , repairing, 
equipping, h i r i n g , s e l l i n g , or s tor ing motor-driven v e h i c l e s . 
27. Grade* 
(a) Por bui ld ings adjoining one (1) s t r e e t only, th- t\ -;." 
t ion cf th-s sidewcik at the eo*ifsr of that well a d j u r i n g t \c »-. • : . 
(b) Por bui ld ings adjoining more than one (1) :tree-. , the 
average of e l evat ions of \.he sidewalk i t thv centers of a l l wells 
adjoining s t r e e t s . 
(c) For bui ld ings having no wall adjoining the s t r e e t , 
the average l e v e l of the zrzvnt ( f in i shed surface) adjacent to the 
exter ior walla of the b u i l d i n g . All wails ep?rc*unately paral le l 
cttsztZLLZ ~.:;r. l e i . , o u T:..v;w: Page : 
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to *nj r.ct more than f i v e (2) Test from a s t r e e t l i n e are to be eon* 
• r.»r*n cs adjoining a s t r e e t . 
*8 . Soae Occupation - - An occupation carried on 07 the 
0*-.pant of a dwell ing as a secradnry use In connection with whioh 
ir?.T9 Is no d i sp lay; no stock ir. trade; and not aore than two (2) 
persons employed, other than members of the family residing on the 
premises* 
29, Hotel — A bui ld ing designed or occupied as the aore or 
l e s s temporary abiding place of f i f t e e n (12) or aore Individuals 
who are, for compensation, lodged, with cr without a e a l s , snd In 
which no provision Is aside for coo King In any Individual room or 
su i t e* 
30 . Household ?ets — Anlsels or fowl ordinar i ly permitted 
in the house and kept for coo par. 7 or p l e a s u r e , such as dogs, c a t s , 
end canaries # but not Including s u f f i c i e n t number of dogs to con-
s t i t u t e a kennel , as def ined 1.. t h i s ordinance. Household pets may 
lne lude^he keeping of not more than ten (10) pairs c h i n c h i l l a s . 
(3pl Jupk Yard — the use of any l o t , portion of lot or 
t rac t or lancffor the s torage , keeping or abandonment of Junk, In-
cluding %IT^P metals or other screp m a t e r i a l , or for the dismantling 
denollt ion(jrr abandonment of automobiles , or other v e h i c l e s , or 
machinery o.- parts thereof ; provided, that t h i s d e f in i t i on s h a l l 
not b* *eesed to Include sueh usee which sre c l e a r l y accessory and 
i n c i . . « i l to any a g r i c u l t u r a l use permitted In the d i s t r i c t . 
32. Xennel — Any l o t or premises on which three (3) or more 
dogs , s t l eas t four (4) months o l d , are kept . 
33 . Lodging House — A building where lodglsg cnly Is pro-
vided for compensation to f i v e (3) or more, but not exceeding 
f i f t e e n (12) persons, In c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to hote l s open to trans* 
l e n t s . 
34. Lot — A parce l of land occupied or to be occupied by 
a main building or group of main bui ld ing and accessory building, 
together with such yards , open spaces , l o t width %nd lo t srea i s 
are required by this ordinance, and having frontage upon a s treet* 
Sxcept for group d w e l l i n g s , where more than one dwelling is placed 
on a l o t , each dwel l ing s tructure sha l l be provided with the min-
imum lot frontage, l o t area , front yard, rear yard and side yards 
as are required for one such dwell ing on a l o t la the same tone. 
33 . Natural Waterways — These a r e a s , varying in width, 
along streams, creeks , apringa9 g u l l i e s , or washes which sre nat-
ural drainage channels as determined by the Building Inspector, In 
which l£4*s no bui ld ings s h a l l be cons truc ted . 
"*^ ( 3 j j Nonconforming Use — 7h9 use of any building or prem-
i s e s contrary to the use regulat ions of t h i s ordinance for the cone 
In which the bui lding or premises Is located* 
37. Parking Lot — An open srea , other than a s t ree t , used 
for the temporary parking 0 / more than four (4) automobiles and 
ava i lab le for public u s e , whether f r e e , for compensation, or as an 
accomodstion for c l i e n t s or customers* 
38. Parking Space — Space within a bu i ld ing , l o t or perk-
ing l o t for the temporary parking or s torage of one (1) automobile. 
39. S tab le , Pr ivate — a detached accessory building for 
the keeping of horses owned by the occupants of the premises and 
not kept for remuneration, h ire or s a l e . 
40. S t s o l a , Public - - A s tab le other than s private s t s b l e . 
41 . Story — That port ion of a b u i l d i n g , other than a 
c e l l a r . Included between the surfsce of any f l o o r and the surface 
Of the f loor or c e l l i n g next above. 
42. Story, Half - - A story with a t l e a s t twe (2) of i t s 
opposite s ides s i tua ted in a s lop ing roof, the f loor area of which 
does not exceed two-thirds (2 /3 ) of the r ioor immediately below i t . 
43. Street — A publ ic thoroughfare which affordi pr inc ipa l 
means of sccess to abut t ing property and Is more than twenty-six 
(26) feet wide. 
44. Structural A l t e r a t i o n s — Any change in the supporting 
members of a bui ld ing , such as bearing w a U s , columns, beams or 
g i r d e r s . 
43. Tourists Court — A group of attached buildings ccn-
t a i r . n ; .'•d'v.'duil s l e e r ' . n j rcor.j . des l i^«d lor or U.»T2 • .m\ * r 
by automobile t c : r ! : f r - •?****. « j r t s , ^ i th c***age ** — •' •* . ' • 
lng space c-snrsn'.er. ;!•• I J C - C C - *^ ear: u^4 ;. .nclu-Jr.c »••*- » - u - . £ . 
motels or - j - .cr lou^ec-
46. * r a l > r , .vj*.cmcbi3e - - A v c h i c l o with .cr withou- - c : 
power, d e s i ^ c l i* t*. -.c£ f t r :r 'rj - ^ t : 4 :•-.:* ' :dbcf?HoM 
S^'LXrj o K QQ. ^A-te<t~ 
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'*". Trai ler camp — Any area or tract ef land uaed or de-
Bi£?.t%. ?o accomodate two (2) or more autosobl le t r a i l are or camping 
p*—. i - j * > - ^ 
• « ^ (48^ Use, Accessory - - A subordinate u s e , cuatoaurily in* 
e i w c n t a l t o and located upon the sane lo t occupied by the main u s e . 
49* Yard — An open space en a l o t other than a court , un-
occupied and unobstructed from the ground upward* except ae other* 
v i s e provided herein* 
50 . Yard* Front — An open space on the aame lo t with a 
bu i ld ing , between the front l i n e of the building (exc lus ive of s t e p s ) 
and the front l o t or s t r e e t l i n e and extending aeroaa the f u l l width 
of the l o t . 
51 . Yard, Rear — An open, unoccupied space on the same l o t 
with a bui lding, between the rear l ine of the bui lding (exclusive of 
s t eps ) and the rear l i n e of the l o t and extending the f u l l width of 
the l o t . 
52* Yard, S ide — An open, unoccupied space en the saae l o t 
with a building, between the s ide l ine of the building (exclus ive of 
atepa) and the side l i n e of the l o t and extending fro01 the front 
yard l ine to the rear yard l ine* 
Sect ion 4. ESTABLISHMENT 0? ZONZS. 
A* For the pur^oa^M of t h i s ordinance, Centerv l l l e i s divided 
into seven c lasses of t o n e s , as f o l l o w s : 
Residential xone . . . . . . . . . R-l 
Residential tone R-2 
Residential zone R-3 
Agricultural zone . . . . . . . . A-l 
Agricultural zone . . . . . . . . A-2 
Commercial zone . . . . . . . . . C - l 
Commercial zone • C-2 
Manufacturing zone . * £-1 
Agricultural Zone • • A-J 
Section 5. BOUNDARIES OF DISTRICTS AXD ZONES T^SRSIM. 
A. The boundarlea of each of the d i s t r i c t s of Centervl l le 
which are hereby zones , and the zones, t h e r e i n , are hereby estab-
l i shed a* shown on the ssap or maps e n t i t l e d "Zoning Map of Center-
v i l l a " , or as herea f t er amended, which map or maps are attached, 
and a l l boundaries, n o t a t i o n s , and other date shown thereon are made 
by th i s reference as much a part of th i s ordinance aa i f f u l l y des -
cribed and deta i led here in* The se id map or maps s h a l l be f i l e d in 
the custody of the Town Clerk of Centerv l l l e and may be examined by 
the publ ic , subject to any reasonable regulat ions eatabllshed by the 
Town Cleric. 
B. where uncer ta in ty e x i s t s as to the boundary of any d i s t r i c t 
or zone therein, the f o l l o w i n g rules s h a l l apply: 
(1) *h9r*vQr the boundary i s indicated as being approximately 
upon the center l i n e of a s t r e e t , a l l e y or block, or along a property 
l i n e then, unlesa o therwise d e f i n i t e l y indicated on the nap, the 
eenter l ine of sueh s t r e e t , a l l e y or block, or sueh property l i n e , 
• h a l l be constructed to be the boundary* 
(2) Wherever such boundary l ine is indicsted as being 
approximately at the l i n e of any r i v e r , i r r i g a t i o n canal, or other 
waterway or railroad r i g h t - o f - w a y , or any sect ion l i n e , then in 
such ease the center of such s t rean , canal or waterway, or of such 
rai lroad r ight-of -way, or the boundary l i n e of such public land or 
such sect ion l ine s h a l l be deemed to be the boundery* 
(3) where such boundary l ines cannot be determined by the 
above r u l e s , the ir l o c a t i o n may be found by the uae of the scale 
appeerlng upon.the sap* 
(4) Where the a p p l i c a t i o n of the above rules does not c l a r -
i fy the boundary l o c a t i o n , tho 3oord of Adjustment sha l l Interpret 
the map* 
Saction 6* K5SIDe*TIAL ZONE R-l 
A* Use Regulations* 
In Residents 11 Zone R-l no bui lding or land s h a l l be used, end 
no building sha l l be e r e c t e d which is arranged, ist»r.-?sd 3- c* . - ' t r*-
to be used for other than one or more or th- f alio* \ r - \ . 
1. S i n g l e - f a m i l y d w e l l i n g s . 
2. C-urches, except temporary r-< + .2± t.-...•. ..- -.'la'" .r^s . 
*• L*h.*-. -m, suseuiss , art £ i l % , . - i . s . 
rj**i - . / v : - - " ! ; ,.-..»••< w* * • - • - . ' « . • « ! .r.zt^r'.ir:;* ;*.***.£ 
a -u-rizulum *«'..:l*- tr V.zz r r j «.:.-?•] 1/ ^:v«r .-.
 4 -us i i - St..*;.*., 
ch i ld dav car? or rv.irs~r:* 
<;•••". H-r i l l - ••' -'N-»w W.CX!'A>:.£ — ?oge 5 
"• ? ; t l l e parka, public recreat ional ground* and bu i ld ings ; 
• • • * • • G i l d i n g s ; public u t i l i t i e s . 
*• " Household p e t e ; agr icul ture; nurser ies and greenhouses, 
p : t - L i d that there 1J no r e t a i l or wholesale shop operated in coa-
B.;-.:sn therewith; provided that a l l Incidental equipment and sup-
p l l * . including f e r t i i i x o r and empty cana, a t e , art kept within a 
r u i l d i n g . 
7. One unl lghted eignboard not exceeding e ight (8) square 
f e e t in area , appurtalnlng to the lease or s a l e of the property, 
a l s o a b u l l e t i n board not exceeding elghtean (18) square f ee t in 
area erected upon the ?r%mi3** of a church or other i n s t i t u t i o n for 
the purpose of d i sp lay ing the naae and a c t i v i t i e s of serv ices t h e r e -
in* provided that such signboard oust be set within tan (10) f ee t 
of the bui ld ing l i n e s ; ono i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s ign so t exceeding twelve 
(12) square fae t in area* for buildings ether than dwell ings* 
8 . Temporary buildings for uses Incidental to construct ion 
wo He, which bui ld ings s u s t be removed upon the completion or aband-
onment of the construct ion* 
9. Home occupat ions . 
10. Accessory uses and buildings cuetomerily inc identa l to 
the above. 
11. Rabbits and chickens for family food production. 
B« Area Regulations 
1'. „» minimus lo t area sha l l be not l ess than 10,000 square f e e t 
for ar.y main building* 
C. Frontage Regulat ions . 
The minimum width of any lo t for a main bui lding s h a l l be 
e ighty (80) f e e t at a distance th ir ty (30) f e e t back from the front 
l o t l ine?" 
D. Yard Regulationa. 
1. Side Yards. 
The minimum s ide yard for any dwell ing s h a l l be ten (10) 
f e e t , and the t o t a l width of the two required side yards sha l l be 
not leas than twenty- f ive (22) f e e t . Other main buildings sha l l 
have a minimus side yard of twenty (20 i f ee t and the t o t a l width of 
the two s ide yards s h a l l be not l ees than forty (40) f e e t . Except 
aa provided in the d e f i n i t i o n of private garages, accessory build* 
lngs s h a l l have a s ide yard of not l e s s than one f o o t , and sha l l be 
located not c loaer than twenty-five (25) f e e t to a dwell ing on adja-
cent property . On eorner l o t s , the side yard which facea on a 
t t r e e t s h a l l be not leaa than twenty (20) f e e t for both main and 
accessory b u i l d i n g s . 
2* Front Yard 
The minimum setback for main buildings sha l l be th i r ty (30) 
f e e t , or the average of the e x i s t i n g buildings where f i f t y (50) per 
cent of the frontage i s developed, but in no case l e s s than f i f t e e n 
(13) f e e t . The minimum setback l ine for accessory buildings sha l l 
be at l e a s : twenty f i v e (25) feet in the rear of the main build l a g s , 
except for pr ivate garages aa provided In the d e f i n i t i o n thereof, 
which ahal l be s i x (6) f e e t . 
3 . Rear Yard. 
The minimum rear yard for any main building s h a l l be t h i r t y 
(30) f e e t , and for accessory buildings one (1) f o o t , provided that 
on corner lo ta which r**r upon the aide yard of another l o t , eeeaa-
sory bui ldings s h a l l be Located not c loser than ten (10) f ee t to 
such side yard. Unattached garages sha l l be s ix (6) f ee t back of 
the houae. 
2 . Height Regulat ions . 
No bui ld ing s h a l l be erected to a height greater than two and 
one-half (2*) s t o r i e s or t h i r t y - f i v e (35) f e e t , except ai otherwise 
provided h e r e i n , and no dwelling structure s h a l l be erected to a 
height l e s s than e ight feet s ix lnehes ( 8 ' 6 " ) . 
Sect ion 7 . RSSIL *?IA1 Z0K3 R-2. 
A* Use Regulat ions . 
In R e s i d e n t s l l Zone R-2, no building er land sha l l be used and 
BO bui ld ing s h a l l be erected which is arranged, intended or designed 
to be used for other than one or more of the fol lowing u s e s : 
1. Any use permitted in Residential r.one P 1 
2 . Two-family dwel l ings . 
B. Area Regulat ions . 
The minimum lot are* shal l be not less t.-tr. «.< -.*.-> f ive hundred 
(8 ,500) aquare f e - t f c r any sain building. 
C. Frontage. ?.«•-!*tirr.a. 
The r.in-tv.m wiith zC amy lot fcr a mxi:: bullr.'nr -!.sll be 
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s ixty-seven (6*) faet at a diatanee t h i r t y (30) f e e t back froo the 
front lot Una-
T. Yard Regulationa. 
i» Side Yards. 
Tha minimum side yard for nny dwel l ing aha l l be eight (8) 
f e e ; , and tha to ta l width of the two required aide yard* ahall be 
c o t leaa than twenty (20) f e e t . Other a*In bulldlnga sha l l have a 
minimum side yard of twenty (20) f e e t , and the t o t a l width of the 
two side yards sha l l be not l e t s than forty (40) f e e t . Except aa 
provided in the d e f i n i t i o n of pr ivate parages , aeeeaory bulldlnga 
ahal l have a side yard of not leas thsr. one (1) f o o t , and sha l l be 
located QO t c loser than f i f t e e n (1^ / fact to a dwel l ing on adjacent 
property. On corner l e t s , tr.-i s iiz y*rA which faeea on a s t r e e t 
ahal l be not leaa then rsentv '??> fas t for both Bain and aeeeaaory 
bui ld ings . 
2 . Front and Rear 'Iirta in J S l ight Regulat ions . 
Same as for Resident H I Zone R- l . 
section e. assnm: ZAI -CKS R-3. 
A. Use Regulations. 
l i Residential Zone R-3, no bui lding or land s h a l l be uaed and 
no building shal l be erected which ia arranged, intended or des ign-
ed tc b* uaed for other than one or sore of the fo l lowing uaea: 
1. Any use permitted in Res ident ia l Zone R-2. 
2. Four-farsii- d w e l l i n g s . 
p. Area Regulations. 
The ninisua lot area s h a l l be not l e s s than seventy f ive hun-
dred ;7,£00) square f e e t for the f i r s t un i t and not l e s s than f i v e 
hundred (500) square f e e t for each add i t i ona l u n i t . 
C. Frontage Regulat ions: 
The alnlaua width of any l o t for a main bui ld ing sbal l be 
s l a t y (60) feet at a d i s tance t h i r t y f ee t (20) f e e t back froa the 
front lot l i n e . 
T. Yard and height Regulat ions . 
Same aa for Res ident ia l Zone R-2. 
Sect ion 9. ACRICULTVHAL Z0N2 A - l . 
A. Use Regulations. 
In Agricultural Zone A - l , no bui lding or land s h a l l be uaed 
and no building sha l l be erected which la arranged, intended or de -
signed to be used for other than one or more of the fo l lowing uaea: 
1. Any use p c r s l t t e d in Res ident ia l Zone R- l . 
2 . Fruit and vege tab le stands for the s e l e only of a g r i -
cul tural products produced in Davis County and providing, further , 
that such stands eocply with the safety standards as adopted by 
Cenrervi l le Town. 
T. Animals *«d fowl for family food production. 
4. Fruit and vegetab le storage and peeking plants for the 
storage cr packing of a g r i c u l t u r a l products produced on the premise a, 
B. Area, Frontage k Yard Regulat ions . 
Same as for Res ident ia l R- l . 
Sect ion 10. AGRICTJLTURAi ZOKI A-2. 
A. Use Regulations. 
In Agricultural Zone A - 2 , no bui lding or lend s h a l l be uaed 
and oo building sha l l be erected which ia arranged. Intended or 
designed to be ueed for other than one or sore of the fol lowing uaea* 
1. Any uae permitted in A- l . 
3 . Area, Frontage and Yard Regulet lone . 
Same aa r e s i d e n t i a l R-2. 
Sect ion 11 COMLZRCIAL ZONE C- l . 
A* flee Regulations. 
In Commercial Zone C - l , no bui lding or land sha.il be uaed and 
ao building shal l be erected which la arranged, intended or d e s i g n -
ed to be used for other than one or more of the fo l lowing u s e s : 
1. Art or antique shop. 
2 . Bakery, provided a l l gooda produced ar» scld * . r s t i a l 
on the premises; book or s ta t ionery s t o r e ; boauty v*cr-.~; - i - y c l c 
ahop. 
3 . Cafe; *!cr.fc:t ionery; c lo thes c>or.;no >r: « c i r ^ ; 
co l l ec t ion sc*rcv; r?fr^sr- .e-t stnne, *"'. rso; in^Ius i -^ the so l e 
of draft beer-
^•\oiw>oir)l(e& 
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4* Drugstore; d e l i c a t e s s e n . 
«• I / o l l i n g s . 
€• V l s r i s t or g i f t shop; f r u i t s tore . 
7 . Grocery, meat or vegetable s t o r e , including frozen-food 
lockers i n c i a e n t a l to the s a i n grocery or food business. 
8 . Ice cream shop, provided a l l goods produced are sold at 
r e t a i l on the premises; i c e s t o r a g e , of not nore than five (5? tons 
Chfazi^y; i n t e r i o r decora t ing i t r r ^ 
9. Jewelry stcre 
10. Locksmith. 
1 1 . Magazine shoo. 
12. O f f i c e s , bus ines s ar prwf*»i.r:,*l« 
13. Pa inter , cr pa?r.t s - o r s ; pap«r hnnger, or wellpapcr 
s t c r e ; public parking area* fioMz u t i i i t r substations and s e r v i c e s ; 
put l i c b u i l d i n g s . 
14* Serv ice s t a t i o n s , out not including public garages or 
automobile r e p a i r i n g , automobile painting or welding; shoe 
repair shop; shoe-shine *R'„$\ S i n g l e - f a o i l y dwell ing. 
15. Ta i lor shop; t a x i s tand . 
16. Accecso.-v uj<i» ond bui ld ings customarily incidental to 
the abcre, 
.
 f f B. Specia l Fro«iai?r.r« 
S ieu^l f sLS bfaorrJZ I y©rK.U *f **• *bovs s p e c i f i e d s t o r e s , shops or businesses shal l be r e t a i l 
<r
"^ "*
[ l
 < A > ' ^ ' ^ e e t a b l ^ i i e n t s uni s U l l be permitted only under the following con-
d i t i o n s : 
1. Such b u s i n e s s e s s h a l l bo conducted wholly within an en-
closed bui ld ing , or on a l e t which i s enclosed by a so l id wal l , 
boar.-*, fence or evergrt.~:r. hedge not l e s s than six (6) feet in h e i g h t , 
except for the s a l e of g a s o l i n e and o i l 07 service s ta t ions , the 
parking oT automobi les , and s e r v i c e to persons in automobiles. 
ST. Al l products produced, whether primary or inc identa l , 
sha l l be sold at r e t a i l on the premises . 
3 . Any e x t e r i o r s i g n displayed sha l l pertain only to a uae 
conducted within the b u i l d i n g or l o t or sha l l appertain to the l ease 
or sa le of the property; such s ign sha l l be attached f la t against a 
wall of the bu i ld ing or the enc los ing wal l , fenee or hedge and par-
re l l e i to lta h o r i z o n t a l d imension, and shal l not exeeed t h i r t y - s i x 
(36) square f e e t in area . One such si*n only , or l ta equivalent in 
square footage in not more than three (2) s i g n s , shal l ba permitted 
on each wa l l , fence or hedge fac ing a s t r e e t or a parking l o t . In 
no aaaa s h a l l a s ign p r o j e c t above the height of the building. 
C. Area and Frontage Regulat ions . 
Hone. 
D. Yard Regu la t ions . 
1. Side Yards 
?cr d w e l l i n g s , same aa Res ident ia l Zone R-2; otherwiae none, 
except thct wherever a bu i ld ing la bu i l t upon a lot adjacent to a 
Raaldentali or A g r i c u l t u r a l Zone boundary there ahall be provided 
a aide yard of not laaa than ten (10) f e e t on tha aide of the b u i l d -
ing adjacent to the zone boundary l i n e , and on corner lo ta , tha 
aaae yard which facea on a s t r e e t s h a l l be not leas than twenty 
(20) f e e t . 
2 . Pront Yard. 
The minimum setback for a l l bu i ld ings , hedges, fences and 
walla sha l l be twenty (20) f e e t . 
3 . Reer Yard. 
The minimum rear yard for a l l buildings shal l be f i f t een 
(IS) f e e t . 
S. Height. 
Ho building s h a l l be eree ted to a height greater then two and 
one-half ( 2 i ) s t o r i e s or t h i r t y - f i v e (35) f e e t . 
SSCTIOH 12. COMMERCIAL ZONE C-2. 
A. Use Regulat ions . 
In Commercial Zone C-2, no bui ld ing or land shal l be used, and 
BO building s h a l l be erec t ed which la arranged, intended or designed 
ta be used for other than one or more of the following uses: 
1. Any use permitted in Commercial Zone 2-1-
2 . .let**.!.* s t o r e s c r b u s i n e s s e s . 
3 . Advert i s inc s i g n s or structure* a.,d billls-e.-**; ar-.r*-
•ent e n t e r p r i s e s , inc luding a b i l l i a r d or pooi h e l l . ••-^.i*- i - l i ey , 
boxing arena, dar.ee ' . .al l . gc-^es of s k i l l Lz.t c - i t - . c , -*err.\ \rztzt, 
shooting g a l l e r y , t n c s t e r cuditarium; aport.T*:r.» c : t ? l i . :tart:.:*r.: 
a o t e l s ; autctat- lfc ar.d t r a i l o r s e i * s arr*. 
^ W^Sftop not Cc^<su>^ 
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4 . Bathe; pet abop or taxidermiat; bird atora; business 
c n l l s g r or private school operated aa a corner*1*1 enterprise; bua 
depot; blueprinting or photoetat ing. 
5 . Catering eatabllahment; e ircue or aaueemant enterprl ie 
of s imi lar type, trans ient in character; c leaning ee tab i i shaent . 
6 . S l e c t r i c a l and booting equipment; employment agency. 
7 . Depertaent, furniture or rmdio s t o r e ; dreascaklnc' abop; 
d iy gooda or notions s to r* . 
8 . F i la eschar;e 
9 . Boapltala or sanitariums (except animal h o e p i t a l a ) ; 
h o t e l s . 
10. lee t torage . 
11 . Laundry. 
12. Manufacture cf gaoJg co hi s%*!C At r e t a i l on the pre-
m i s e s ; medical or dental . l l n U s and l a b o r a t o r i e s ; mi l l inery shop, 
music conservatory or mu«ir i*»trust Ion; aonument works, r e t a i l ; 
mortuary; a o t e l a . 
IS . Ke«stand; nursery, f loner or p l a n t , provided that a l l 
i n c i d e n t a l equipment and • v p p i i e s , including f e r t i l i s e r and empty 
i^ n ^ c/ , */ C "*\ 1 <KKI# cane, a t ^ . , er j kept *l t : : i i . a bui lding. 
0 K £ . K ^ i r t ^ J \H v~ " d LLriC ffj\ Pawnshop; plumbing or sheet metal shops, If conducted 
T\r-i>ss> i r^\/' «T?r, n 7 ^ k V wholly V i t a in a completely enclosed bu i ld ing ; pony-riding r ing, 
V* I v ^ c ^ O ^ ^ l ^ C F v r s & / without s t a b l e s ; pr in t ing , l i thographing or publ i sh ing; public 
J ^ S O ^ ^>r-jWHi r^o^x^-ft 9 i)Q*^) g a n g * . Including sjJtQflfliLiie_^eja_lr_lng. and Inc identa l body and 
A n ( I T Tender work, painting or uphols ter ing, IT a l l operations are con-
" d- L ^ ^ - ^ 4 \ ducted wholly within a completely enclosed bu i ld ing ; public s e r v i c e s , 
v
 including e l e c t r i c d i s t r i b u t i n g subs ta t ion , f i r e~or po l ice s t a t i o n , 
welaphone exchange snd the l i k e . 
15. Second-hand s t o r e , i f conducted wholly within s com-
p l e t e l y enclosed bu i ld ing; s ign-paint ing shop, i f conducted wholly 
within a completely enclosed bui lding; storage bui lding for house-
hold goojis; studios (except motion p ic ture )* 
Q * 5 Tire shop operated woolly within e bui ld ing; tour is t 
court ; t r a i l e r camp; trade achool If not objec t ionab le due to n o i s e , 
. /" x —-i~T- v-», o<ior, v i b r a t i o n , e t c . , 
A ] U H H N \ L i i X o i M ^ w l l 1 7* Upholstering shop, i f conducted wholly with a completely 
1 x
 \ H i ^ i ( v . i u oncloaad bui ld ing . 
18. wadding chapel , reacua mission or temporary revival 
church; wholesale aerchandlae broker, excluding wholesale s torage . 
19, Accessory uses and buildings customari ly incidental to 
the above* 
B. Ares and Frontage Regulationa. 
Hone 
C. Yard Regulationa. 
1. *ido Yards. 
The sinisium side yard for any dwel l ing s h a l l be eight (8) 
f e ? t , and tr? t . ' tal width of the two required s ide yards sha l l ba 
not l e s s then - ighteen (18) f e a t ; provided, that dwell ing s truc-
tures over t h i r t y - f i v e (35) f e e t in height s h a l l have one (1) foot 
of addi t ional side yard on each a ide .of the bu i ld ing for each two 
f e e t , such structure exceeds t h i r t y - f i v e (35) feat in he ight , and 
for other bui ld ings , sea* as Commercial Zone C- l . 
2. Pront Yarda. 
Hone 
3. Rear Yards. 
Same as for Cosmareial Zone C-l« 
D« Height Regulationa. 
Hone 
Sect ion 13. MAHTJ?ACrjRD*0 Z0HS M-l. 
A. Use Regulat ions. 
In Manufacturing Lone M-l, no building or land s h a l l ba used 
and no building sha l l ba ereetad whleh i s arranged, intended or de-
elgnad to ba uaed for other than one or more of the fol lowing uaee: 
1. any use permitted in Commercial Zone C-2 except mul t ip le 
dwe l l ings , h o t e l s , apartmant h o t e l a , motels and apartment motels. 
2 . Assembly of e l e c t r i c a l appl iances , e l e c t r o n i c ins tru-
ments and d e v i c e s , radios and phonographs, including th* menu's?tur* 
of smell parts ~niy, such as c o i l s , condens-r- , zr*r.£f?"~±rm. rnl 
eryata l holders . 
3 . /.'JtcscMle as -rect i lnc , pain. ir . w , Vi.rc±-.* • . - , . 4^^' l ld -
ing , recondi t io .mr e . be t? and farmer rcr'.*. %. J- < r . , ^ * . . * : *r 
overhauling; i i r * i e . .-' .is .r.c# rwciopirs .* : i .*c . . ^ i* . ts* / sar.ufsc-
ture . 
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4. Elicksmith shop, welding or machine »*wpf « « ^ ^ g l h a 
i^ i l^Jr . . - : Jjnuh presses over twenty (20) tons rmted capaci ty , 
urr.p ufuc^rw and automatic screw machines. 
5 . rb-jndry, cas t ing l ir ,ht-weight nonferroua metal not 
causing noxious odors or fume3. 
6* Laboratories* 
?• Manufacture, compour.ainp,.. process ing , packaging, cr 
treetaent of such product* as battery goods, candy, cosmet ics , dairy 
products, drugs, perfures • p h a r c a c u t l c e l s , perfused t o i l e t soap, 
t o i l e t r i e s , and food products except the fo l lowing: 71sh, s e a t , 
sauerkraut, p i c k l e s , v inegar , y e a s t , and the rendering of f a t s and 
o i l a . 
8 . Manufacture, compounding, a s sech i ing or treatment of 
a r t l c l e a of merchandise from the fo l lowing previously prepered 
mater ia l s : Bona, ce l lophane , •ar.ves, c l o t h , cork, feather*, f e l t , 
f i b e r , fur , g l a s s , h a i r , horn, l e a t h e r , paper p l a s t i e s , prec-ous 
or sealprecious metals or s t o n e s , s h a l l , straw, t e x t i l e s , tobacco, 
wood, yarn and pa int . 
9 . Manufacture of pottery and f lgurlnea or other s imi lar 
cermale products, using only previous ly puiver i ted c l a y , and k i lns 
f ired only by e l e c t r i c i t y or gas . 
10. Manufacture and salntenanee of e l e c t r i c and neon s i g n s , 
b i l lboards , eo&aercial adver t i s ing s t r u c t u r e s , l ight sheet-metal 
prodjcts , including heating and v e n t i l a t i n g duets and equipment, 
cornices and eaves , e t c . 
11. Manufacture of musical l n s t r u e e n t s , t o y s , nove l t i e s and 
rubber and metal stamps. 
12. Veterinary or dog or eat h o s p i t a l ; kennels . 
13. Wholesale b u s i n e s s ; storage warehouse. 
14. The fo l lowing u s e s , provided they are conducted wholly 
within a completely enclosed bui ld ing or within an area enclosed on 
a l l s ides with a so l id w a l l , compact evergreen hedge or uniformly 
painted board fence not l e s s than s ix (6) f e e t in he ight ; 
(1) Motion p ic ture s t u d i o . 
12) Coal and wood yards , lumber yards and planing « m -
(3) Contractor's equipment storage yard or plant , or 
rental of equipment corsmonly used by c o n t r a c t o r s . 
(4) Dreying, f r e i g h t i n g or trucking yerd or terminal . 
(5) Building mater ia l s a l e s yard, including the sa le of 
rock, tend, gravel and the l i k e as an inc identa l part of the main 
bus iness , but excluding concrete mixing. 
® > funk Yard, 
(7) Tower, l i g h t or steam plant central s t a t i o n . 
(8} Small boat bu i ld ing . 
{9* Stane monument works, who lesa le . 
1 J . Accessory uses and bui ldings customarily incidental to 
the above. 
B. *;at P"#gu l e t lone. 
The min'.auia lot area shall be not less then five thousand 
(5000) square feet for each one-family dwelling, with seven hundred 
fifty (~50) additional square feet for eech additional family unit 
in a dwelling structure having more than one (1) dwelling unit; 
for group dwellings, not less than five thousand (5CCO) square 
feet for the first separate dwelling atructure, with two tbouaond 
(2000) square feet for each additional aeparete dwelling structure, 
and with seven hundred fifty (750) squere feet additional for eech 
additional dwelling unit in excess of one (1) dwelling unit in 
eech separate dwelling structure; not less than ten thousand (10,000) 
squere feet for any motel or trailer camp; and not leas than five 
thousand (5000) square feet for any other main building. 
C. Frontage Regulat ions . 
The minimum width of any lo t for any me in building s h e l l be 
s i x t y (60) f e e t . 
D. Yerd Regulat ions . 
1 . Side Yards. 
Same as for Res ident ia l Zone R-2 except that dwell ing s t ruc -
tures over t h i r t y - f i v e (35) f e e t In height sha l l hove one (1) foot 
of addit ional s ide yerd on eeeh side of the building for eech two 
(2) feet such structure exceeds t h i r t y - f i v e (35) f ee t in he ight . 
2 . Front Yarc. 
The minimum setback for mx. in bui ldings sha l l be t h i r t y (30) 
f e e t , or the average of the e x i s t i n g t u i l i i - ^ s wnere f i f t y (50) p^r 
cent of the frontage is developed, but in no es-se l e s s than f i f t e e n 
(15) f e e t . The minimur. setbaex l ine for oc-essory buildings sha l l 
be at l eas t ten (10) f e e t in tne rear of the main build i n s . 
:.. %\9T Ycrd . 
:,:-.* •..* *ci Res ident ia l Zc*.«* R-l 
•* J-!*•!.: a d u l a t i o n s * 
Mo ut;U/. r? .-fceUl be erected to a he ight greater than s i x (6) 
i c v ? *s cr •*v«.f<, - f iv* (75) f** t . 
? . Cov'jro-^ hes i ta t ions* 
Mo bui lding *r group cf bui1 dinars, with t h e i r accessory bu i ld -
ings , s h a l l cover racr^ *.tan scv?-:;- '.''C) per cent of the rrcn sr 
tho lo t* 
Soction 14. ACaiCTLTUHAL A*^ (N-* *on* suggested) 
A* Use Regulat ions . 
In Agricul tural Zone A-T., no r^j lie* ins er land shal l be used and 
no bui ld ing s h a l l be eroctod wfcUh 1- arranged, intended or dasJgned 
to be used for other than :r.c cr nor; cf the fo l lowing MI^IZ 
1* Any use peruitce^ l:i a g r i c u l t u r a l A-2* 
2 . Bi l lboards for d i r e c t i o n a l and informational s ignj cn ly . 
B. Araa, ?rontage and Yor£ Regulationa* 
Same aa for Resident la?. A-2. 
f a c t i o n 15. Q2l'£.?J>L FWISIOWS. 
The regulat ions here inaf ter se t forth in t h i s soetion qual i fy 
or supplement, as t i e case any bo, the tone regulat ions appearing 
al - :**. - i ' . in tfc.1? ordinance. 
A. AQdit lc .bl Use Regulat ions . 
1. The requirements of t h i s ordinance as to minimum bu i ld -
ing s i t e arse sha l l not be construed to prevent the use for a s i n g l e 
fam.ly dwel l ing of any lot or parce l of land in the e*ent that such 
l o t or parcel of land is held in separate ownership at the t lae t h i s 
ordinance becomes e f f e c t i v e * 
3 . Additional Yard Regulat ions . 
1. On any l o t held under a separate ownership from adjacent 
l o t s , and of record at the time of the passage of th i s ordinance, 
the side yard requirements may be waived to the extent that the 
bul ldadle width of such lot i s not reduced to l e s s than twenty-f ive 
(25) f e e t , except that at l e a s t a four (4) foot s ide yard i s requir-
ed on each s ide of any i n t e r i o r l o t and the s ide yard on the s t r e e t 
aide of a corner l o t must be at l eaa t ten (10) f e e t . 
2« Svery port of a required yard s h a l l be open to the sky, 
unobstructed except for accessory bui ld ings in a rear yard, and ex-
empt for the ordinary projec t ions of stryll&hts, s i l l s , be l t courses , 
cornices and other ornamental features* 
3 . Open or l a t t i c e enclosed f i r e escapee; fireproof out-
aldo s ta irways , and baleonles opening upon f i r e towers project ing 
into a ycrd not more than f i v e (5) f e e t and the ordinary project ions 
of chimneys a-.j f lues ere permitted. 
C. ><*.wi4-!cnal Height Regulat ions . 
1* PutUe , semipublic or public serv ice buildings or h o t e l s , 
when 4ut :*cr i / - i -n a tone, may be erected to a height not exceeding 
s i x t y (6w) f e e t , If the bui lding i s s e t back from each otherwise 
e s tab l i shed bui lding l ine at l e a s t one (1) foot for each addit ional 
foot of J u i i l i r g above the normal height l imi t required for the tone 
in which the bui lding is e r e c t e d . 
2 . Penthouses or roof s t ruc tures for the housing of e l e -
v a t o r s , s t iarways , tanks, v e n t i l a t i n g fans or s imi lar equipment r e -
quired to operate and maintain the b u i l d i n g , and f i r e or parapet 
w a l l s , s k y l i g h t , towers, s t e e p l e s , f l a g p o l e s , eh l sneys , smokestacks, 
water tanks, w ire l e s s masts , theater l o f t s , s i l o s or similar s t ruc -
tures may be erected above the height l i m i t s herein prescribed, but 
no space above the height l i m i t s h a l l be allowed for the purpose of 
providing addi t iona l f loor space . 
i 3* Ho main bui lding s h a l l be ereeted to a height l ess than i i^u fl-3to* ^  «wd •'•"^••i^.r: "•• 
i I I ^ - ^ H Annexed land s h a l l be c l a s s i f i e d in the sesjp tone as 
ttC^eo ^&yio that exlsting^orT-coTrriguous Igngn — ~ " 
S. Clear View of I n t e r s e c t i n g S t r e e t s . 
No obstruct ion to view m excess of two (2) feV. in he ight , 
exeept a reasonable number of lawn t r e e s , s h a l l be 3ai;.taintd on t*s 
premises of s corner lo t between the front and s ide s treet l ines 
and the bui lding l i n e s , provided that such trees as are planted 
ahal l be not l e s s than f i f t e e n (15) feet from the front snd side 
s t r e e t l i n e s , and are pruned high eoou££ tc permit unobstructed 
v i s i o n to automobile d r i v e r s . 
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? . Animals and Powl. 
Vo animals or fowl ifea.ll ba kept or maintained elosar than 
forty (40) f a a t from d w e l l i n g , tad no born, eoop§ pan or corral 
• h a l l ba kapt e losar than forty (40) faat to any a t r e e t . 
0 . Building Regulat iona. 
Domestic water supply and sewage disposal sha l l comply with 
the County Board of Health requirements as represented by a c e r t i -
f i c a t e of approval from said Board of Seeith In a l l applications 
far a bu i ld ing permit where e i ther an approved supply of piped 
voter under pressure , or a sewer, la not ava l iable* 
H. O f f • • t r e a t parking and spaea regulat ions* 
1* Automobile parking space. There sha l l be provided at 
the time of erec t ion of any main building or at the time any main 
building la enlarged or increased in capaci ty , minimum o f f - s t r e e t 
parking apaca with adequate provision of in grass and egress by 
•tandord s i t e d automobi les , aa fo l l ows : 
a. Parking spaea for dwe l l ings : 2a a l l r e s ident ia l 
d i s t r i c t s there s h a l l ba provldad in a private garage or la aa area 
properly loeatad for a future garage, apaca for the parking of one 
(1) automobile for each dwel l ing unit la a new dwel l ing, or each 
dwell ing u n i t adc*9d ir t*e case of the ealargament of aa ex i s t ing 
bu i ld ing . 
- . For b u i l d i n g : other than dwe l l ings : For a new b u i l d -
ing ^ .*ar ary *nlargcment or increase la a seat ing capacity, f l o o r 
a. aa 'JT gt-3»t r^cos of anv e x i s t i n g main bui lding there shal l be 
at les.ct one (1) p e m a n e n t l y maintained parking spaea of not l e s s 
than one hundred t w e n t y - s i x (126) square f e e t new area, as f o l l ows : 
(1) For church, high sehool, co l lage and universi ty 
auditoriums and for t h e a t r e s , general auditoriums, stadiums and 
jthar s imi lar places of assembly, at l eas t one (1) parking space 
for every tan (10) f i x e d s ea t s provldad la said bui ld ings: 
(2) For h o s p i t a l s , at l eas t one (1) parking spaea 
for each two beds c a p a c i t y , including i n f a n t s ' cr ibs and ehlidrens 
beds. For medical and dental c l i n i c s , at laaat tan (10) parking 
spacae provided that three (3) addit ional parking spaeaa i h a l i be 
provided for each doctor or d e n t i s t having off leaa in such c l i n i c 
la excoaa of three (3) doetors or d e n t i s t s . 
(3) For t o u r i s t courts and apartment motels , at laaat 
one (1) parking spaee for each Individual s leeping or l iv ing u n i t ; 
for h o t e l s and apartment h o t e l s at l e a s t one (1) parking spaea for 
«ach two s l eep ing rooms, up to and including the f i r s t twenty (20) 
s leeping rooms, and one (1) parking space for each three (3) s l e e p -
ier, rooms over twenty ( 2 0 ) . 
(4) For res taurants or establishments that serve 
meals, Luncn^s, or drinks to patrons e i t h e r in t h e i r ears or in the 
build-nc,, ^nd f?r dance h n l l and recreat iona l places of assembly, 
at l e a s t c:.e f]J spoce for each two hundred (200) square feet of 
f loor *j-ar« in che b u i l d i n g . 
'5 1 For mortuaries , at l e a s t t h i r t y (30) parking 
spor*.-' Tis l iquor s t o r e s , at l e a s t twenty (20) parking spaces. 
'5 ) For r e t a i l s tores s e l l i n g d irec t to the pub l i c , 
one por^i-.ft *pcca (1) for each f i v e hundred (500) square feet to 
f l oor space in the b u i l d i n g . 
Ptrking space as required above sha l l ba on the soae lot with 
the main bui ld ing , or in the cose of bui ldings other than dwell-
i n g s , may be located not farther than f i v e hundred (500) feet 
thorefrom. 
c . Public parking «ireaa: Every parcel of land hereafter 
used as a publ ic parking area s h a l l be paved with an esphalt le or 
concrete surfacing and s h a l l have appropriate bumper guards vbere 
needed as determined by the Building Inspector. Any l ights used to 
i l luminate sa id par*ing areas s n a i l be so arranged as to r e f l e c t 
the l i ght awey from adjo in ing premises in any Residential Zone. 
Section 16. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT. 
A* A Board of Adjustment is hereby e s t a b l i s h e d , the aembers 
Of which s h a l l be appointed by the Board of Truetees of Centervi l le 
Town. The Board s h a l l c o n s i s t of f ive (5) members, each to be 
appointed f<-r a term of f i v e (5) years and w r s M i t*)r causa by 
the appointing authori ty upon written charges and a f t i r publi : 
bearing, except that of the f i r s t fivo (5) •nenbers so unpointed, 
one aember s h a l l be appointed to serve u n t i l July i , 1952, one 
member to serve u n t i l July l t 1953, one iie*scer to i^rve unt i l July 
1, 1954, one member to servo unui l July 1, 1955, and one member to 
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eerre u n t i l July 1, 1956. In the aonth of June 1952. end ewery 
year t h e r e a f t e r , one member sha l l be appointed for a f ive year 
period to take the place of the member whoee term s h a l l next exp ire . 
Any vacancy occurring on sa id Board by reaton of death, res ignat ion* 
removal* or d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n ahall be promptly f i l l e d by the Beard 
of Trueteae ef w « n t e r v i l l e Town for the unexpired tana of •ueh mem* 
ber. One member ahal l be a member of the Cent err i l l e planning Com-
alia a i o n . 
B. It a h a l l be the duty of eueh Board to hear a l l appeal* 
taken by any person aggrieved or by any o f f i c e r * department, board 
or bureau of the IOWTJ a f f e e t o d by and dec i s ion of the of f l e e r in 
eharge ef the adminis trat ion of th is ordinance. Said Board sha l l 
adopt rules for the regu la t ion of i t s proceedure and eonduct of i t s 
dut ies not i n c o n s i s t e n t with the provis ions of t h i s ordinance or of 
the s t a t e lav and s h a l l have the power to hear and decide appeals 
for varlancee from the terms of th is ordinance in s p e c i f i c cases 
whore such a variance w i l l not be contrary to the public in teres t* 
where owing to s p e c i a l condi t ions a l i t e r a l enforcement ef the pro* 
v i r i o n s ef th i s ordinance w i l l resul t in any unnecessary hardship, 
and for the purpose of aaaurlng that t h i s ordinance s h a l l be ob-
served in s p i r i t and s u b s t a n t i a l Just ice done thereunder. Cteept 
ao otherwise provided here in* such vorlanees s h a l l be l imited to 
reasonable reductions in required side yards* front yards* rear 
yor i s* height r e g u l a t i o n s ; reasonable reduction in the requirements 
o.* l o t srea , f rontage , o f f - s t r e e t parking areas* and minimum court 
d i n t s * i o n s . 
?«, m exerc i s ing the above mentioned powers such Board may in 
coniormity with the prov i s ions of the law, reverse or affirm, wholly 
ov vart ly* or soy modify the order* requirement* dee i s loo or determ-
inat ion appealed from and may make sueh determination as ought to be 
Bade and to that end s h a l l have a l l the powers of the o f f i c e r from 
whom the appeal i s taken* provided* that before any variance may be 
granted i t s h a l l be shown that spec ia l elreumstanees attach to the 
property covered by the appl icat ion* which do not general ly apply to 
the other property in the same tone; that beeeuse of said spec ia l 
circumstances* property covered by the appl i ca t ion la deprived of 
p r i v i l e g e s possessed by other properties in the same tone; end that 
the granting of the variance i s e e e e n t l a l to the enjoyment of a 
subs tant ia l property r i g h t possessed by other property in the same 
zone. 
Z* The concurring vote of a majority of the f i v e members of 
:hw Board sha l l be necessary to f^^nm any order, requirement, or 
d e p r e c a t i o n of any such administrat ive o f f i c i a l * or to deelde in 
favor ef the appl icant on any matter on which i t i s required to pa si 
or co <".f*ct any such v a r i a t i o n or s p e c i a l exception to th i s ordin-
ance-
*. ?rj Board of Adjustment may* oftar public not i ce and hear* 
lag , vary •.*• a p p l i c a t i o n of the oee lone regulat ions herein ee -
t a b l i < , f i '.:J hirmeny with t h e i r general purpose and Intent as fclbea: 
I . Where a tone boundary l ine d iv ides a l e t in s ing le 
ownership - t m? time of the passage of th i s ordinance* pera i t s 
use authorises on e i t h e r port ion of such l o t to extend to the en-
t i r e l o t , iut r.zz sore than f i f t y (50) f ee t beyond the boundory 
l i n e of such « . . * in which such use is outhorixed. 
2 Permit a temporary building for commerce or industry 
in a residence tone , which building is inc identa l to the r e s i d e n t i a l 
development, such permit to be Issued for not more than a period of 
one (1) year. 
Sect ion 17. S*P0RC2*2H?. 
A. The Building Inspector , appointed under the provisions of 
the Building Code of C e n t e r v U l e Town is hereby designated end 
authorised as the o f f l e e r charged with the enforcement of th i s 
ordinance, but the Board of Trustees of CentervUle Town may by 
reso lut ion or ordinance, from time to t ine entrust such e d n i n i s t r o -
t i o n , in whole or in part* to sny other o f f i c e r of CentervUle Town 
without cdmendaent to th i s ordinance. 
3 . Fros tno timo of the e f f ec t ive date o." t h ! i crd r.s:.**, the 
Building Inspector s h a l l not grant a pcrai t fcr the ccn^tr--rticn or 
a l t e r a t i o n of ~n? t u i l d i n g or structure i f rue . conjtructic.-: cr 
a l t e r a t i o n would bt. in v i o l a t i o n of any of the prevision-- cf th is 
ordinance; nor s h o l l any n u n i c i p : ! o f f i c e r crcnt ar-7 pers i t or 
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c H f c ^ f K q ^ paM&icn£> 
l i c e n s e for the uee of any bu i ld ing er land i f auch uae would be in 
v io la t i on of the ordinance* 
C. Fowere end Dut ioe . 
It ahmll be the duty of the Building In a pec tor to in a pec t or 
teniae to be inepected o i l bui ld ing a in eourae of construction or 
repair . He ahall enforee a l l of the provlalona of thla ordinance, 
entering act lone in the court when neceeaary, and hla f a i l u r e to 
da ao iha l l not l e g a l i z e any v i o l a t i o n of auch prov i i i on . The 
Building Inapector aha l l not laaue eny permit unlet a the plana of 
and for the propoaed e r e c t i o n , conatruct ion, reconatruet ion, a l t e r * 
at lon er uae f u l l y conform to a l l toning regulation a then in e f f e c t * 
Sactloo 18* BUILD 1KG PERMIT AJTD CSKTIFICAT3 OF OCCWAKCT. 
A* Building permit required. 
The eonatruetlon* a l t e r a t i o n * repa ir , removal or oecupency of 
any atructure or of any part thereof , ae provided or aa r^^rl***^ 
i^ »H<« py^twoBea. t h a l l not ba commenced, or proceeded wi ta , ex-
eapt after the laauaaea ftf a " * t t a n _ P 0 r t a i t * o r *&• • * • • °7 the 
Town Building Inapector; provided max, no permit ahal l ba neceaaary 
where the erec t ion , conatruct ion , reconatructlon or a l t e r a t i o n la 
minor in character aa def ined herein or aa determined by the Build* 
ia^ Inapector. 
3* C e r t i f i c a t e of Occupancy required. 
'.?3 land ahal l be ueed or occupied and no building hereaf ter 
•structurally a l t ered or ereeted ahal l be uaed or changed in uae. 
4 i : - p t for agr i cu l tura l purpoaea, u n t i l a c e r t i f i c a t e of occupancy 
*n.ill have been laaued by the Building Inapector, a tat lng that ths 
*>j*.*dlng or the purpoaed uae thereof , or the uae of the land, com-
p l i e s with the provlalona of thla ordinance* A l ike c e r t i f i c a t e 
ahall be laaued for the purpoae of maintaining, renewing, changing, 
or extending a nonconforming uae. A c e r t i f i c a t e of occupancy e i ther 
for the whole or a part of a bu i ld ing , ahall be applied for c o i n c i -
dental ly with the a p p l i c a t i o n for a bui lding permit, and i h a l l be 
laaued within the tan (10) day a a f t e r the ereet loa of atructurel 
a l terat ion of auch b u i l d i n g , or part , ahal l hove been completed in 
conformity with the provlalona of thla ordinance* 
Section 19* AMSHX*5H?3* 
The Board of Truateee of Centerv i l ia Town may from t ine to 
time amend the number, ahnpe, bounder lea or area of any d l a t r l c t or 
d la tr lc ta or of any xone, or any regulat ion of or within auch d l a -
t r l c t or d l a t r l c t a or tonee , or any other provii ion of the toning 
ordinance, but any auch amendment ahal l not be made or become e f f e c -
t i v e unlesa the acme aha l l have been propoaed by or be f i r i t aub-
mltted for the approval, dlaapproval , or auggeetlone of the Center-
v l l l e Planning Conaiaalon, and If disapproved by such coomlaalon 
within thirty (20; days a f t e r auch aubmlaalon, auch amendment, to 
become e f f o e t l v e , aha l l rece ive the favorable vote of not leaa than 
a majority of the e n t i r e membership of the Board of Truateee of 
Cantervll le Town* 
Before f i n a l l y adopting any auch amendment, the 3ocrd of 
Trustees s h e l l hold a publ ic hearing thereon, at leaat th ir ty (30) 
daya notice of the time and place of which shal l be given by at 
leaat one (1) c u b l i c a t i o n in a newspaper of general c i r c u l a t i o n 
in the County. 
Section 20. *ON-C0HF0RHING US2S. 
X: Any lawful uae of bui ldings or land ot the time of the 
paaaoge of thla ordinance, that doea not conform to the regulat ions 
prescribed in thla ordinance, aha l l be deemed a non-conforcilng uae 
and such uae may be continued, but If auch non-conforming uae la 
dlacontlnued for the period of one year or more, except for r e s i -
dent ia l structures or acceaaory farm s tructures , any future use of 
eeld building or land muat be in conformity with the provis ions of 
th i s ordinance. * r.on-conforning uee say be extended to more f l o o r 
aieo throughout a bu i ld ing provided no i t r j c t u r u l changes are made. 
A non-conrormi*ig usg. I f changed to a ccnforuir.g uae may not t h e r e -
af ter be chansed back ?o any nox;-confcrying uae. 
". repair* and s t r u c t u r a l a l t era t ions «^> • niJ *.J .• r.on 
conforming l u i i d i r g r .^v id ing tliot the P e e r spec- *. .•: A .u l i n -
ing la not Incr -ar .c -
C. A non-corforr.lr.g building or j f j e t u r t •*.':!• lr donrged 
or part ia l ly de- . trsy-s by f i r e , f iord , wino, turtnouaice, cr c t h s r 
calamity or oct cf Gca, or the public er.«r.y, :c the extent of r.rt 
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mora than one and ono half ( l i ) time* ita aeeoeoed value at that 
time, vij to destroyed and the occupancy or oeo of sueb building, 
etructura, or part thereof
 $ which exlated at the time of aueh per-
t l a l destruction, may bo eontiaued or resumed, provided that aueh 
restoration la starred withia a porlod of OBO (1} year and la d i l -
igently proeecuted to completion, m tho •••at such damage or des-
truetion exeeeda ono and oao-half ( l i ) tlaoa tho aaaoaaod value of 
aueh non-conforming building or atructure, BO ropolra or roc on at ruc-
tion ahall bo mad*, oxeopt la tho eaao of residences or aoeoaaory 
farm buildings, ualoaa every portion of aueh building or atrueturo 
la mode to conform to o i l regulation* for now buildings la tbo sono 
la which It la located. 
Seetlon 21* LICarSIKO fc T&KLTT2S. 
All department*, o f f i c i a l s and public employeoe of Contortillo 
Torn, which are Tea ted with tho d-ty or authority to laauo permits 
or licenses shal l conform to tho previa lone of this ordinance and 
a ca l l laauo no aueh permit or licenses for uaoa9 buildings, or pur-
poses vaere tho same would bo la conflict with tho prow la ion a or 
t s i* ordinance, aad any aueh permit or lleeaae, if lsaued la con-
f l i c t with th* prow la ions of this ordinance, aha 11 bo null aad 
TO id, 
*ry person, firm, or corporation, whether aa principal, agent, 
crp.cyed or otherwise» violat ing or causing or permitting the vio-
la ;*cn of any of the provisions of this ordinance shall bo guilty 
ex a mlademeanor, and upon eonvlction thereof shall be punishable 
L? - fine of not more than two hundred ninety-nine (299.00) dollars 
or oy imprisonment In tho County Jail of Davis County for a term 
not exceeding three (3) months, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment. Such person, f i r s , or corporation shall bo doomed to bo 
guilty of a separata offenao for each and every day during which 
any portion of any violat ion of thla ordinance la committed, con-
tinued, or permitted by aueh person,firm, or corporation, and 
ahall bo punishable aa heroin provided. 
Section 22. VaXIDITY. 
Should any aoetlon, elauao, or provision of tha ordinance 
bo declared by tho courts to bo invalid, the sea* shall not effect 
tho val idity of tho ordinance aa a whole or any part thereof, 
other than tho part so declared to bo invalid. 
This ordinance w i l l boeoao effective at on 
§ 10-354. STORING, PARKING OR LEAVING DISMANTLED 
OR OTHER SUCH MOTOR VEHICLE PROHIBITED: 
EXCEPTIONS. No person shall park, store, leave, 
or permit parking, storing, or leaving any motor 
vehicle of any kind which is in an abandoned, 
wrecked, dismantled, inoperative, rusted, junked, 
or partially dismantled condition whether attended 
or not, on any public or private property within 
the city for a period of time in excess of seven 
days. . . . 
Code of Revised Ordinances of Centerville, Utah, 1985 
Revision. 
That ordinance was enacted and became effective on December 
17, 1985. 
The predecessor of § 10-354 was § 7-5-4 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Centerville, Utah 1968; that ordinance enacted 
on March 17, 1970 and repealed on December 17, 1985 provided 
in pertinent part: 
DISPOSITION OF WRECKED OR DISCARDED VEHICLES. No 
person in charge or control of any property within 
the City, whether as owner, tenant, occupant, 
lessee, or otherwise, shall allow any partially 
dismantled, non-operating, wrecked, junked, or 
discarded vehicle to remain on such property 
longer than 30 days; and no person shall leave any 
such vehicle on any property within the City for a 
longer time than 30 days; . . . 
The Cente rv i l l e City Ordinances define ,fnon-conforming 
use1' a s : 
A use which lawfully occupied a building or land 
at the time this Zoning Ordinance became effective 
but which does not conform with the use regu-
lations of the zone in which it is located. 
§ 12-310-2 (l)(AO.). 
The applicable Centerville City Ordinance governing 
non-conforming uses is found at § 12-350-3 (2) and provides 
in pertinent part, as follows: 
Except as hereinafter specified, any use, . . . 
lawfully existing at the time of the enactment or 
subsequent amendment of this Ordinance, may be 
continued, even though such use . . . does not 
conform with the provisions of this Ordinance for 
the district in which it is located. . . . 
A. Affidavit: Following effective date of this 
Ordinance or any amendment thereto, by which a 
use, . . . becomes non-conforming, the owner of 
the land use, . . . may register such 
non-conforming use . . . with the Zoning Adminis-
trator an affidavit setting forth the time that 
said use, . . . came into existence, . . . and the 
size of and extent of the non-conforming use 
existing on the effective date of this Ordinance, 
or applicable amendment. The Zoning Administrator 
shall preserve the affidavit and on the basis of 
the affidavit issue a Certificate of Occupancy. 
APPENDIX E 
41-21-i. "Utah Horseless Carriage'1 
de-fined. 
"Any motor vehicle which is thirty 
years or older, -from the current year, 
primarily a collector's item, and used 
•for participation in club activities, 
exhibitions, tours, parades, occasional 
transportation, and similar uses, but 
which is not -for general daily 
transportation, shall, for the purposes 
of this act, be known as a "Utah 
Horseless Carriage-" 
41-21-2. "Registration—fees-A-ff i davit-
-Af f i davi t—Certi f i cate—Li cense p 1 ates. 
"(1) In lieu of the annual 
registration fees levied in Section 
41-1-127, the registration fees for any 
"Utah Horseless Carriage" shall be *10, 
-4-
41-1-195 MOTOR VEHICLES 
ARTICLE 17 
OPTIONAL TITLES FOR COLLECTOR MOTOR 
VEHICLES 
41-1-195. Definitions. 
As used in this article: 
(1) "Division" means the Motor Vehicle Division of the State Tax Com-
mission. 
(2) "Lienholder" means a person with a security interest in a collector 
motor vehicle. 
(3) "Owner" means a person, other than a lienholder, having clear title 
to a collector motor vehicle or having title to the property subject to a 
security interest. 
(4) "Collector motor vehicle" means any motor vehicle 20 years or older 
from the current year that is not used on the highway and has been 
acquired primarily as a collector's item. 
(5) "Security interest" means an interest which is reserved or created 
by an agreement to secure the payment or performance of an obligation 
and which is valid against third parties. 
History: C. 1953, 41-1-195, enacted by L. came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
1990, ch. 292, § 1. Utah Const.. Art. VI. Sec 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 292 be-
41-1-196. Optional certificate of title — Application by 
owner — Grounds for refusal of application — 
Certificate of inspection required — Qualified in-
spectors — Duties. 
(D The division shall provide for an optional certificate of title for a collec-
tor motor vehicle under this article if: 
(a) the applicant certifies that the vehicle qualifies under the definition 
of a collector motor vehicle under this article; and 
(b) the applicant complies with all other optional titling provisions of 
this article. 
(2) An owner shall apply for an optional certificate of title on forms pre-
scribed and furnished by the division. Each person to be recorded as owner 
shall sign the application. All signatures shall be notarized. The application 
shall contain: 
(a) the name, residence address of the owner, or business address if the 
owner is a firm, association, or corporation; 
(b) a description of the collector motor vehicle including the make, 
model, the model year as specified by the manufacturer, the manufac-
turer's identification number, the vehicle identification number, and any 
other information required by the division; and 
lc) a statement by the owner listing one lien or encumbrance, if any, 
upon the collector motor vehicle and the names and addresses of all per-
sons having any security interest in it. 
90 
MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 41-1-198 
(3) Every application for an optional certificate of title for a collector motor 
vehicle which has been titled in another state or foreign country shall be 
aCCOmpanied by the certificate of title last issued. In the event the collector jxiotor vehicle is from a state or foreign country which does not issue or require 
certificates of title, the owner shall submit a bill of sale, sworn statement of 
ownership, or any other evidence of ownership required by the division. 
(4) (a) Every application for an optional certificate of title for a collector 
motor vehicle not previously titled in this state shall be accompanied by a 
certificate of inspection by a qualified motor vehicle identification num-
ber inspector. 
(b) Members of the State Tax Commission, any officer; of the division 
designated by the State Tax Commission, and all peace officers of the 
state are qualified motor vehicle identification number inspectors. The 
inspectors shall inspect the collector motor vehicle and make a record of 
the inspection on a form prescribed by the division. 
(c) No fee may be charged for the inspection. 
(5) An optional certificate of title for a collector motor vehicle issued under 
this article may not be used as a certificate of title required prior to register-
ing a motor vehicle under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 41-1-196, enacted by L. came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
1990, ch. 292, § 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 292 be-
41-1-197. Certificate of title — Records — Division require-
ments. 
The division shall maintain a current record of any optional certificate of 
title issued by it. Records of the division relating to titles are public records 
and shall be available to the public during office hours in accordance with 
Section 41-1-9. 
History: C. 1953, 41-1-197, enacted by L. came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
1990, ch. 292, § 3. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 292 be-
41-1-198. Security interests and liens — Recording proce-
dure. 
Security interests and liens against collector motor vehicles shall be re-
corded under and subject to Sections 41-1-80 through 41-1-87. 
History: C. 1953, 41-1-198, enacted by L. came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
1990, ch. 292, § 4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 292 be-
91 
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41-1-79,5. Abandoned and inoperable vehicles — Determi-
nation by commission — Disposal of vehicles. 
An abandoned and inoperable vehicle, for the purposes of this act, shall not 
be considered a "motor vehicle" under said act when said vehicle has been 
inspected by an authorized investigator or agent appointed by the State Tax 
Commission, and when said investigator or agent shall have made a written 
determination that the vehicle in question cannot be rebuilt or reconstructed 
in such a manner as to allow its use on the highways of this state as a self-
propelled vehicle. 
Before the issuance of such a written determination as provided herein, an 
affidavit shall be required from the owner of said inoperable vehicle or the 
purchaser thereof for salvage, identifying the vehicle by serial number and 
certifying that said inoperable vehicle will not be rebuilt or reconstructed or 
in any manner allowed to operate upon the highways of the state of Utah as a 
self-propelled vehicle. The operator of the junk or salvage yard disposing of 
such an inoperable motor vehicle shall be required to keep copies of such 
affidavits and such other written records as shall be required by the State Tax 
Commission. 
Upon such determination that such a vehicle is inoperable and cannot be 
rebuilt or reconstructed, the vehicle in question may be converted to scrap or 
otherwise disposed of without necessity of compliance with the requirements 
of Sections 41-1-78 and 41-1-79, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
History: C. 1953, 41-1-79.5, enacted by L. act," referred to in the first paragraph, means 
1965, ch. 76, § 4. Laws 1965, ch. 76, which appears as §§ 41-1-1, 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 41-1-49, 41-1-79.5 and 41-1-134. 
247 
APPENDIX F 
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1 1 1 DESEtET NEWS. Wadnniloy, Auguil I I , 1971 X Ul 
Town Orc/fcrJ Removal Of Antique Autos 
By WANDA4 LUND 
Deseret News Staff Writer 
FARMINGTON — A man 
*ho has been collecting an-
tique automobiles since 1939 
has been ordered to rid him-
self of the old vehicles before 
Aug. 28. 
He is Melville B. Held Sr., 
66, 547 N Mam, who has col-
lected 22 Model A Fords and 
numerous other old auto-
mobiles He keeps 20 of h i s 
Model A s on his Farmington 
property, a iy4 acre lot. 
When he first came to 
Farmington in 1941 he had al-
reach collected a 1923 Essex, 
a 1923 Packard Phaeton and a 
1934 DeSoto Airflow, and he 
has added to this collection 
over the years. 
"I've been notified by letter 
that I must get rid of the ob-
solete vehicles* I have or I 
will be fined or put in jafl,M 
he said. "I won't pay a fine. I 
wilL let them put me in jail. 
"If 1 have to, I will get 
enough licenses to put on that 
whole string of cars/' he said. 
"1 am going to keep my 
Model AV* 
He said % has A special 
An Eyesore? Farmington says so, and has ordered owner to remove cars. 
fondness for the cars and 
never w&nts to sell them "as 
long as I have enough to eat. 
"When I get hungry, I'll sell 
them," he said. 
He was told in a form letter 
that Farmington City has had 
a toning ordinance since De-
cember, 1957, and t h a t he 
would have to get rid of his 
obsolete cars. 
"This ordinance was adopt-
ed for the express purpose of 
insuring that the community 
would grow in an orderly 
fashion and that the beauty 
and desirability of Farmington 
would be constantly im-
proved," the letter said in 
part. . 
Held retained an attorney to 
represent his interests. In a 
letter to Jay Johnson, city 
zoning administrator, the at-
torney, Bill Thomas Peters, 
said the Held family had 
moved onto the property No-
vember 15, 1941 with three 
cars and had contim 
quire other vehid 
then. -
"The ordinance 
seek to enforce ag 
Held was not passe 
years and one montl 
time that Mr. H 
menced using his h 
manner above desci 
wrote 
"Under the law, 
opinion that Mr. H 
nonconforming use, 
nonconforming use 
scribed as the use 
building that exist 
when the zoning 
became effective ar 
continued to exist 
time. 
"The action yoi 
take against Mr. 
been held to be a i 
constitutional right 
tected by the Uni 
Constitution and a 
protected by the ( 
of the State of Utah 
He said zoning 
must permit the c 
of nonconforming u 
tence at the time 
nance was enacted, 
©PY 
Hay 25, 1939 
Brian M. Barnard, Attorney 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Dear Bri£*n: 
Enclosed please -find three copies of a Deseret News article 
dated Wednesday, August 18, 1971„ I'm sure I do not need to draw 
to your attention the parallels between what Farmington tried to 
do eighteen years ago and what Centervilie City has been trying 
to do over the last couple o-f years- This case was resolved in 
the District Court in Farmington by Judge Thornley K„ Swan 
against Farmington City on a -finding o-f prior noncon-f orming use. 
Five or six years ago I contacted attorney Bill Thomas 
Peters but could not get his cooperation in going back into his 
closed files. Perhaps you will have more success, I can also 
follow up with Farmington City and try searching the District 
Cour t r ecor ds again if- you t h i n k t hat a good move * 
I've enclosed a check for $300.00 in case you have to spend 
some money with Mr „ Peters to get access to his files- If- you 
don*t, you may apply the entire amount to what I owe you for the 
work you have already done. This case was generally widely known 
in Davis County and is the one that I referred to in my letter to 
City Attorney Keith Stable* I do not believe the City's 
complaints against my wife and myself were actually brought in 
good -faith,. 
Si ncerely yours, 
J- Val Roberts 
Attorney at Law 
JVR:vhr 
EncI • 3 Deseret News articles 
Check #7414, $300.00 
GADD v. OLSON 
Cite as 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984) 
Utah 1041 
officials had acquiesced for several months. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that 
where the owner's actions are induced by 
the conduct of municipal officers, and 
where in the absence of an estoppel, he 
would suffer a substantial loss and the 
"municipality would be permitted to stulti-
fy itself by retracting what its agents had 
done," an estoppel would be raised by the 
court. See also the later Illinois case of 
City of Evanston v. Robbins, 117 111. 
App.2d 278, 254 N.E.2d 536 (1969), holding 
that in zoning cases the doctrine of estop-
pel may be applied where the record sug-
gests that the detriment to the public is 
negligible and there is no risk to public 
health or safety. 
Other cases invoking estoppel where 
building permits had been issued and con-
struction had been commenced or complet-
ed include Tankersley Brothers Indus-
tries, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 227 Ark. 
130, 296 S.W.2d 412 (1956); Strong v. 
County of Santa Cruz, 15 Cal.3d 720, 125 
Cal.Rptr. 896, 543 P.2d 264 (1975); Town-
ship of Haverford v. Spica, 16 Pa.Cmwlth. 
326, 328 A.2d 878 (1974). In the latter 
case, the court quoted with approval at 882 
the following from In re Heidorn, 412 Pa. 
570, 195 A.2d 349 (1963): 
While courts are reluctant, and should 
be, to impose the sanction of laches on 
governmental divisions, equity cannot 
close its eyes to the sloth, indifference or 
official neglect of a municipal body any-
more than it can to the neglect of an 
individual where such neglect harms an 
innocent person. 
I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. The undisputed evidence and the 
findings of fact made by the Board of 
Adjustment and the trial court require the 
imposition of an estoppel against the city in 
enforcing its ordinance against this proper-
ty owner. The misleading acts and inac-
tion of the city, together with the reliance 
thereon by the owner, are clear. There 
was no prevarication or equivocation here 
by the owner as the majority suggests. 
The city does not contend that any problem 
°f public health or safety will be encoun-
tered if a variance is granted. I am in full 
accord with the statement made by the 
court in New-Mark Builders, Inc. v. City 
of Aurora, 90 Ill.App.2d 98, 233 N.E.2d 44 
(1967), cited in City of Evanston v. Rob-
bins, supra, that "[m]unicipal corporations, 
as well as private corporations and individ-
uals, are bound by the principles of fair 
dealing." 
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Hal GADD, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
York A. and Rose T. OLSON, Defend-
ants, Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Mark T. JOHNSON, Third-Party 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 18876. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 5, 1984. 
Owner of land brought action against 
former owners to recover amounts due un-
der contract and for eviction. Former own-
ers filed action against financier. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Paul G. Grant, J., granted summary judg-
ment in favor of current owner and the 
financier, and former owners appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that 
former owners adequately alleged fraud 
based on misrepresentation of effect of le-
gal documents involved in financing trans-
action by the financier. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
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1. Judgment <3=>181(2) 
Motion for summary judgement can 
only be granted when there is no genuine 
issue as to any materal fact and, even 
assuming the facts as asserted by the par-
ty moved against to be true, he could not 
prevail. 
2. Fraud <3=>10 
Misrepresentations of law or of the 
legal effect of contracts and writings do 
not constitute remedial fraud. 
3. Fraud <s=10 
Where the speaker sustains a confiden-
tial relation to the hearer or possesses su-
perior means of information or wilfully 
misleads him into a misconception of his 
rights and liabilities, misrepresentation as 
to the legal effect of written instruments 
may be actionable fraud. 
4. Contracts <S=>94(1) 
Fraudulent misrepresentations as to 
the legal effect of an instrument will avoid 
it, even if made to one who has actually 
read it, if unable to judge of its true con-
struction; the fraud must be contempora-
neous with the execution of the instrument 
and most consist in obtaining the assent of 
the party defrauded by inducing a false 
impression as to its legal or literal nature 
and operation. 
5. Fraud ®=»44 
Complaint which alleged that financier 
represented to homeowners that he was in 
the business of helping people save their 
homes from foreclosure and would loan 
them enough money to save theirs, that the 
representation was false and known by the 
financier to be false, that the financier 
misled the owners to believe that docu-
ments executed in the transaction effected 
nothing more than a loan rather than a sale 
of the home, that the homeowners were 
under emotional and economic distress at 
the time and had no legal counsel, that 
owners relied upon the representations 
made by the financier, and that owners 
suffered a loss of the equity in their home 
and were eventually evicted therefrom stat-
ed a claim for fraud based on misrepresen-
tation of the legal effect of the documents. 
6. Judgment <3=>185.2(1) 
If party moving for summary judg-
ment chooses not to file affidavits, oppos-
ing party need not file affidavits in order to 
avoid summary judgment. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 56(e). 
Robert B. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants, third-party plaintiffs and appel-
lants. 
James H. Deans, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
Richard W. Perkins, Salt Lake City, for 
third-party defendant and respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice. 
York and Rose Olson, defendants and 
third-party plaintiffs herein, appeal from a 
summary judgment that dismissed their 
third-party action against Mark Johnson 
for fraud. 
Prior to April 8, 1981, the Olsons (herein-
after "appellants") were in default in the 
payment of their obligations under a trust 
deed note and trust deed on their house. 
To avoid losing the house through foreclo-
sure, appellants accepted an offer of finan-
cial assistance from Mark Johnson (herein-
after "respondent"). On April 8, a transac-
tion conceived by respondent was effected 
between the parties (i.e., appellants and 
respondent) whereby appellants conveyed 
their interest in the house to respondent by 
warranty deed at a purchase price equal to 
the unpaid principal balance of the trust 
deed note ($30,748.89), plus the amount 
needed to cure the default ($4,250.48), and 
respondent simultaneously leased the 
house back to appellants with an option to 
repurchase at a price of $42,400. 
The nature of the April 8 transaction is 
at the core of the instant dispute. Al-
though the instruments evidencing the 
transaction clearly characterize it as a sale, 
lease back and option to repurchase, appel-
lants maintain that respondent represented 
the transaction to be a mere "loan" and the 
said instruments to be the necessary vehi-
cle for effecting the loan 
spondent's representations led them to be-
lieve the transaction would permit them to 
retain ownership of the house, rather than 
relinquish such ownership. 
Respondent denies having made such 
representations. He maintains that his 
characterization of the transaction was in 
all respects consistent with that set forth in 
the instruments themselves. 
Following the subject transaction, re-
spondent remedied the default and as-
sumed the outstanding trust deed obliga-
tion. Less than a month later, he sold the 
subject property to Hal Gadd (plaintiff 
herein) subject to the above-described lease 
and option. Gadd likewise assumed the 
loan outstanding on the property. In addi-
tion, he paid consideration of approximately 
$6,500 and executed a trust deed in the 
sum of $1,000. Thereafter, beginning in 
May of 1981, appellants tendered their 
monthly payments (considered by them as 
"loan" payments) to Gadd. They continued 
to do so through the month of February, 
1982. In March, however, they apparently 
defaulted. As a result, Gadd brought this 
suit to collect the delinquent payments and 
to have appellants evicted. 
Subsequently, after appellants had en-
tered their responsive pleadings, Gadd filed 
a motion for summary judgment. On Sep-
tember 28, 1982, the court granted the mo-
tion, awarding Gadd restitution of the sub-
ject premises together with a money judg-
ment. 
Included in the responsive pleadings filed 
by appellants in the eviction action was a 
third-party complaint wherein appellants al-
leged they had been defrauded by respon-
dent Mark Johnson. Respondent filed an 
answer to the said complaint and later en-
tered a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings. 
At the hearing on respondent's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, the court 
1. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Hall v. Fitzgerald, Utah, 
671 P.2d 224, 226 (1983). 
2. McBride v. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 431, 432 
(1980) 
Utah Rep. 682-692 P 2d—9 
GADD v. OLSON 
Cite as 685 PJ2d 1041 (Utah 1984) 
They claim re- examined not 
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only the pleadings them-
selves, but other documents as well, such 
as the written lease, the option, the notice 
of default on the trust deed, a letter that 
had accompanied respondent's payment of 
the expenses related to appellants' default 
and the cancellation of notice of default. 
The court then ruled that summary judg-
ment be granted in respondent's favor. 
This appeal ensued. 
Appellants contend that the trial court 
erred in two respects: (1) in granting a 
summary judgment upon respondent's mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings; and (2) 
in granting summary judgment at all, since 
genuine issues of material fact exist and 
remain unresolved. We address only the 
latter, inasmuch as it constitutes the basic 
and dispositive issue. 
[1] A motion for summary judgment 
can only be granted when "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact," l 
and "even assuming the facts as asserted 
by the party moved against to be true, he 
could not prevail." - This Court has also 
stated: 
[S]ince the party moved against is denied 
the opportunity of presenting his evi-
dence and his contentions, it is and 
should be the policy of the courts to act 
on such motions with great caution, to 
assure that a party whose cause might 
have merit is not deprived of the right to 
access to the courts for the enforcement 
of rights or the redress of wrongs.[3] 
Appellants argue that respondent's deni-
al (in his answer) of their allegations in the 
third-party complaint, that respondent had 
defrauded them by misrepresenting the 
character and legal effect of the subject 
transaction, created such a factual dispute 
as to preclude the entry of summary judg-
ment. 
Respondent's defense of the summary 
judgment consists of two arguments: (1) 
the written instruments executed by appel-
3. Id. 
1044 Utah 685 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
lants disprove their theory as to the charac-
ter of the transaction; and (2) appellants' 
bare, self-serving allegations in their plead-
ings did not raise a factual dispute suffi-
cient to preclude summary judgment. The 
first argument is premised upon the follow-
ing rule: 
A motion for summary judgment per-
mits an excursion beyond the pleadings, 
and if the facts discovered irrefutably 
disprove facts pleaded, summary judg-
ment is appropriate.^4! 
Respondent submits that the facts discov-
ered by the trial court in its "excursion 
beyond the pleadings," specifically the war-
ranty deed, the lease and the option, "irre-
futably disprove" the facts pleaded by ap-
pellants relative to the mischaracterization 
of the transaction and that summary judg-
ment was therefore appropriate. 
[2] Relevant to the instant inquiry is 
the general rule that "misrepresentations 
of law or of the legal effect of contracts 
and writings does [sic] not constitute reme-
dial fraud." 5 This rule would be disposi-
tive were it not for certain applicable ex-
ceptions. 
In Adamson v. Brockbank,6 a case in-
volving a similar misrepresentation as to 
the legal effect of a written instrument 
(deed), this Court acknowledged the afore-
mentioned general rule, but noted that 
"[t]here are exceptions to the rule, or rath-
er circumstances or conditions rendering it 
inapplicable . . . . " 7 The Court held that 
such excepting circumstances and condi-
tions did exist in that case, though it did 
not specify what they were.8 
[3,4] The circumstances that generally 
render the rule inapplicable include the fol-
lowing: 
4. Aird Ins. Agency v. Zions First National Bank, 
Utah, 612 P.2d 341, 343 (1980). 
5. Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 
264, 276 (1947) (quoting Ackerman v. Bramwell 
Investment Company, et aL, 80 Utah 52, 12 P.2d 
623, 626 (1932)). 
6. 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
7. Supra note 5. 
[W]here the speaker sustained a conft 
dential relation toward the hearer 
possessed superior means of informa-
tion, or wilfully misled him into a mis* 
conception of his rights and* 
liabilities.^ [Emphasis added.] * 
In this same regard, some courts have held: 
Fraudulent representations as to the 
legal effect of an instrument will avoid 
it, even if made to one who has actually 
read it, if unable to judge of its true 
construction. But the fraud must be 
contemporaneous with the execution of 
the instrument and must consist in ob-
taining the assent of the party defraud-
ed, by inducing a false impression as to 
its legal or literal nature and opera-
tionS10^ [Emphasis added.] 
[5] In the instant case, appellants al-
lege the following facts or "conditions and 
circumstances" as grounds for their claim 
of misrepresentation: (1) respondent repre-
sented to them that he was in the business 
of helping people save their houses from 
foreclosure and would loan appellants 
enough money to save theirs; (2) said rep-
resentation was false, and respondent 
knew it was false; (3) respondent misled 
appellants to believe that the documents 
executed in the transaction effected noth-
ing more than a "loan"; (4) appellants were 
under emotional and economic distress at 
the time and had no legal counsel to assist 
them; (5) appellants relied upon the repre-
sentations made by respondent, and such 
reliance under these circumstances was 
reasonable; and (6) as a result of the trans-
action appellants suffered a loss of their 
equity in the house and were eventually 
evicted therefrom. Assuming these factu-
al assertions are truthful, as we are com-
pelled to do by the rules governing summa-
8. Supra note 6, at 276. 
9. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 158 (1963). See also 
White v. Harrigan, 77 Okl. 123, 186 P. 224 
(1919). 
10. Stegman v. Professional & Business Men s Life 
Ins. Co., 173 Kan. 744, 252 P.2d 1074, 1081 
(1953) (quoting Berry v. Whitney, 40 Mich. 65 
(1879)). 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, WEBER COUNTY 
CITY OF CENTERVILLE ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VERLE ROBERTS, 
Defendant, 
I DECISION 
i Case No. 88-1000-034 
Defendants motion is hard to catergorize. It doesn't 
fall into any of the traditional post-conviction motions. Under 
Section 77-35-23 Utah Code Annotated, the Defendant can file a 
Motion to Arrest the Judgment anytime prior to sentencing. A 
Motion for a New Trial must be made, pursuant to Section 
77-35-24 (c) Utah Code Annotated, within ifi days of sentencing. 
Under Section 77-35-26 Utah Code Annotated, the Defendant has 30 
days to appeal. None of these rules appear to apply. Even if 
they did, Defendants motion wouldn't be timely. 
Section 77-35-22 (e) Utah Code Annotated allows the 
Court to correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in 
an illegal manner, at anv time. The Court is not certain that 
this provision is applicable. However, if the Defendant is 
relying upon this provision, then her motion is premature. Her 
conviction or sentence hasn't been determined to be illegal. 
Page Two 
City of Centerville vs. 
Verle Roberts 
Case No. 88-1000-034 
Finally, the court is concerned about the fact that 
although the Defendant did request a stay of the criminal case 
pending the civil case, the Defendant could have tried to obtain 
injunctive relief from the District Court. She didnft do so. 
The Defendant's Motion in Arrest of Judgment is denied. 
i IT 
DATED this » day of November, 1989. 
/to. BA>U)A 
W. Brent West 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foreging Decision to Brian M. Barnard, Attorney for 
Defendant, at Utah Legal Clinic, 214 East Fifth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111-3204, and to Ted E. Kanell, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, 4 Triad Center #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, 
dated this j ^ day of November, 1989. 
Sianedftx^A^V 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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FOESYTH v. HAMMOND. 
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 8EVENTH 
CIRCUIT. 
No. 615. Argued January 20, 1897. — Decided April 19, 1Q9T. 
Under the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, the power of this court la 
certiorari extends to every case pending in the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
and may be exercised at any time during such pendency, provided the 
case is one which, but for this provision of the statute, would be finally 
determined in that court. 
While this power is coextensive with all possible necessities, and sufficient 
to secure to this court a final control over the litigation in all the courta-
of appeal, it is a power which will be sparingly exercised, and only when 
the circumstances of the case satisfy this court that the importance of 
the question involved, the necessity of avoiding conflict between two or 
more courts of appeal, or between courts of appeal and the courts of ft 
State, or some matter affecting the interests of the Nation, in its internal 
or external relations, demands such exercise. 
As, in the contests between the parties to this suit, the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of the State of 
Indiana had reached opposite conclusions as to their respective right** 
and as all the unfortunate possibilities of conflict and collision which 
might arise from these adverse decisions were suggested when tail 
application for certiorari was made, it seemed to this court that, 
although no final decree had been entered, it was its duty to bring toe-
case and the questions here for examination at the earliest possible-
moment. 
The plaintiff in error having voluntarily commenced an action in the 
Supreme Court of the State to establish her rights against the city o^  
Hammond, and the questions at issue being judicial in nature and within* 
the undoubted cognizance of the state court, she cannot, after a decUloa 
by that court be-heard in any other tribunal to collaterally deny it* 
validity. 
Though the form and causes of action be different, a decision by a court of 
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Opinion of the Court. 
said: " It is evident that it is solely questions of gravity and 
importance that the Circuit Courts of Appeal should certify 
to us for instruction; and that it is only when such questions 
are involved that the power of this court to require a case 
in which the judgment and decree of the Court of Ap-
peals is made final, to be certified, can be properly invoked." 
Lau Ow Bew, Petitioner, 141 U. S. 583, 587; In re Woods, 
143 U. S. 202; Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 
58 ; American Construction Company v. Jacksonville Railway 
Company, 148 IT. S. 372, 383. 
We have declined to issue writs of certiorari in cases where, 
there being only a matter of private interest, there had been 
no final judgment in the Court of Appeals. Chicago de Forth-
western Railway v. Osborne, 146 U. S. 354. On the other 
hand, in The Three Friends, at the present term, ante, 1, we 
issued a writ of certiorari in a case appealed to the Circuit 
Court of Appeals before any action had been taken by that 
court; but this was in view of the fact that the question 
involved was one affecting the relations of this country to 
foreign nations, and therefore one whose prompt decision by 
this court was of importance, not merely for the guidance of 
the Executive Department of the Government, but also to 
disclose to each citizen the limits beyond which he might not 
go in interfering in the affairs of another nation without vio-
lating the laws of this. 
We reaffirm in this case the propositions heretofore an-
nounced, to wit, that the power of this court in certiorari 
extends to every case pending in the Circuit Courts of Appeal, 
and may be exercised at any time during such pendency, pro-
vided the case is one which but for this provision of the 
statute would be finally determined in that court. And 
further, that while this power is coextensive with all possible 
necessities and sufficient to secure to this court a final control 
over the litigation in all the Courts of Appeal, it is a power 
which will be sparingly exercised, and only when the circum-
stances of the case satisfy us that the importance of the 
question involved, the necessity of avoiding conflict between 
two or more Courts of Appeal, or between Courts of Appeal 
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and the courts of a State, or some matter affecting the interests 
of this nation in its internal or external relations, demands 
such exercise. 
Among the considerations thus suggested are those which 
indicate why in this case the court properly exercised its 
power and issued the writ of certiorari. There was a conflict 
between the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of the State of 
Indiana. The latter court had declared that the proceedings 
by which the contiguous territory was annexed to the city of 
Hammond were legal, and, therefore, that that territory was 
to be considered by all the officers of the State of Indiana as 
within the territorial limits of the city. The United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals by its decision in this case had 
declared that such annexation proceedings were invalid ; and 
that the property of this petitioner was not within the city 
limits. This tract of plaintiff's was not on the extreme limit 
of the lands sought to be incorporated into the city, and if 
the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals was enforced 
there would be a tract of a few hundred acres within the 
exterior boundaries of the city of Hammond, as delined by 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State, withdrawn 
from the city's jurisdiction, and in fact excepted from its 
territorial limits. All the unfortunate possibilities of conflict 
and collision which might arise from these adverse decisions 
were suggested when this application for certiorari was made, 
and, although no final decree had been entered, it seemed to 
us a duty to bring the case and the question here for exami-
nation at the earliest possible moment. 
Coming now to the merits of the case it appears that on 
the pivotal question of the validity of the annexation pro-
ceedings the decision of the Supreme Court of the State is 
one way and that of the Court of Appeals directly the re-
verse. It is insisted by the plaintiff that the determination 
of the boundaries of a municipal corporation in the first 
instance, and any subsequent change in its boundaries by 
annexation of outside territory, are matters solely of legis-
lative cognizance, and not judicial in their nature; that such 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter, 
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STEWART, Justice: 
Robert Dunn's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was 
dismissed without a hearing on the ground that all the issues 
raised were waived because they could or should have been raised 
on Dunn's prior direct appeal. We reverse and remand to the 
trial court for a hearing. 
A jury convicted Dunn of second degree murder and 
aggravated kidnapping.1 He was represented at trial by a 
court-appointed attorney. After the conviction, the attorney 
wrote to Dunn and advised against an appeal based on the 
attorney's belief that if the appeal were successful, Dunn could 
be resentenced to death at a retrial. The attorney's belief was 
incorrect. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 prohibits imposition of 
1. Both of the offenses that Dunn was originally charged with, 
first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping, were capital 
offenses at the time the charges were made. Dunn was convicted 
of aggravated kidnapping and the lesser included offense of 
second degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The crime of aggravated kidnapping was subsequently reduced from 
a capital felony to a first degree felony by a 1983 amendment. 
a new sentence that is more severe than the prior sentence.^ 
Wisden v. District Ct. of Sevier County, 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 
1984); State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180-81 (Utah 1981); 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980)- See Bullinaton 
v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1983) (penalty phase of a capital 
proceeding is a trial on the issue of punishment and double 
jeopardy considerations apply; therefore imposition of a life 
sentence by a jury in a first trial precludes subsequent 
imposition of a death penalty following retrial). 
Nevertheless, Dunn insisted on an appeal, and the 
•attorney filed with this Court what purported to be an Anders 
brief and a motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967); State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
The brief summarily recited the prosecution evidence and the 
defendant's evidence and then framed four issues: whether the 
trial court erred in (1) denying a motion for a change of venue; 
(2) admitting a photograph of the victim's body; (3) refusing to 
suppress bullets found in Dunn's belongings; and (4) ruling that 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction. Each issue 
was stated in a single sentence, followed by a few case 
citations. The relevance of the cases was neither stated nor 
argued nor in any way related to the facts of the case. There 
certainly was no argument and no presentation of the law and 
facts of the case in the best light possible for defendant. 
Dissatisfied with his attorney's efforts, Dunn filed 
what purported to be a pro se brief. Three of the issues listed 
in the brief were repetitious of three issues in the Anders 
brief. None of the issues presented by Dunn was supported by a 
statement of facts, argument, analysis, or authorities. 
This Court granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw 
and affirmed Dunn's conviction in a per curiam opinion, State v. 
Dunn, 646 P.2d 709 (Utah 1982). Without any legal or factual 
analysis, the opinion simply held that the issues raised were 
"without merit." 646 P.2d at 711. The opinion disposed of the 
case without examining any of the points raised in either 
brief. 
Thereafter, Dunn filed a pro se petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the district court, asserting primarily that 
his counsel had rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1978) provides: 
Where a conviction or sentence has been 
set aside on direct review or on 
collateral attack, the court shall not 
impose a new sentence for the same offense 
or for a different offense based on the 
same conduct which is more severe than the 
prior sentence less the portion of the 
prior sentence previously satisfied. 
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at trial. Specifically, Dunn alleged that his counsel failed 
(1) to make proper objections, (2) to obtain evidence, and 
(3) to request jury instructions regarding accomplice 
involvement, and (4) he stipulated to the admission of evidence 
which should have been excluded- Dunn asserted that his counsel 
had refused to raise issues on appeal which Dunn had requested 
and had filed an Anders brief contrary to Dunn's desire. Dunn 
also alleged that the trial court erred in (1) denying his 
motion for a change of venue, (2) refusing to exclude a 
photograph of the victim's body, (3) refusing to suppress 
evidence found in a search of Dunn's belongings, and 
(4) admitting testimony of defendant's conviction of a prior 
crime. Dunn also argued that the trial court erred in the 
selection of the trial jury, that some jurors had prior 
knowledge of the case, and that jurors had access to information 
from the co-defendant's trial. 
The State moved to dismiss Dunn's petition on the basis 
that the claims either had been raised on direct appeal or were 
waived because they should have been raised on direct appeal. 
The trial court agreed that all the issues either were raised or 
could have been raised on direct appeal and dismissed Dunn's 
petition. Dunn appeals that dismissal. For this appeal, this 
Court appointed counsel because it appeared there might be some 
merit to some of Dunn's issues. 
The doctrines of waiver and res judicata do not stand 
as an unyielding bar to the litigation of claims that either 
once were or could have been litigated in a prior proceeding. 
However, a few of our cases over the years have stated only part 
of the governing rule in this jurisdiction, thereby leaving the 
impression that waiver or res judicata might be an absolute 
bar. The policy of finality certainly does have a high place in 
our hierarchy of judicial values, but that policy is not so 
compelling as to be more important than the vindication of a 
person's constitutional right to a fair trial, notwithstanding 
the defaults of a defendant's attorney. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 
1029, 1034-35 (Utah 1989). 
Our cases are replete with instances where issues were 
addressed on the merits pursuant to a habeas corpus petition 
which had been addressed and resolved on direct appeal or should 
have been raised on direct appeal and were not. Recently, in 
Hurst, this Court described the interaction of the doctrines of 
waiver and res judicata and the priority accorded them on a 
habeas hearing for a post-conviction remedy: 
The function of a writ of habeas 
corpus as a post-conviction remedy is to 
provide a means for collaterally attacking 
convictions when they are so 
constitutionally flawed that they result 
in fundamental unfairness and to provide 
for collateral attack of sentences not 
authorized by law. The general judicial 
policy favoring the finality of judgments 
cannot, therefore, always prevail against 
an attack by a writ of habeas corpus. As 
important as finality is, it does not have 
a higher value than constitutional 
guarantees of liberty- Protection of life 
and liberty from unconstitutional 
procedures is of greater importance than 
is res judicata. . . . M[H]owsoever 
desirable it may be to adhere to the 
rules, the law should not be so blind and 
unreasoning that where an injustice has 
resulted the [defendant] should be without 
a remedy." 
This Court has frequently held that 
while habeas corpus is not a substitute 
for appeal, a conviction may nevertheless 
be challenged by collateral attack . . . 
where an obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right has occurred, 
irrespective of whether an appeal has been 
taken. 
777 P.2d at 1034-35 (citations omitted, footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979)). The 
same point was made in State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 894 (Utah 
1988), where we stated that a "defendant•s failure to raise his 
claim on direct appeal is not dispositive" of his habeas corpus 
petition. See also Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989); 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980); Gonzales v. Morris, 
610 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1980); Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1979); Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979); Rammell v. 
Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977); Allaood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1976); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 
(1968). 
Our cases are in accord with the rules governing 
post-conviction procedures. Rule 65(B)(i) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure expressly recognizes that a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus may be filed after an appeal from a conviction 
has been taken. Subsection (2) of Rule 65(B)(i) states, "The 
complaint shall also state whether or not the judgment of 
conviction that resulted in the confinement complained of has 
been reviewed on appeal, and if so, shall identify such 
appellate proceedings and state the results thereof." The 
existence of prior appellate proceedings, however, does not ipso 
facto bar subsequent habeas corpus proceedings. Recently this 
Court, after a direct appeal had resulted in the affirmance of a 
conviction, used a writ of habeas corpus to order remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on the ground that the defendant had been 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Fernandez v. 
Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989). The Court reasoned that counsel 
who represented the petitioner both at trial and on appeal could 
not have effectively presented an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on appeal when that argument would necessarily 
have challenged his own performance at trial and on appeal. 
Nevertheless, not all petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus may be heard on the merits after a trial and appeal or 
the waiver of an appeal; finality does prevail unless a 
petitioner can prove the existence of unusual circumstances. As 
we noted in Hurst, ordinary types of trial error that are not
 fc 
likely to affect the outcome may not be challenged on petitions 
for writs of habeas corpus. 777 P.2d at 1035 n.5. See Bundy v. 
DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988). To be entitled to a writ, a 
petitioner must show that there was an obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right. 
Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035. In short, "the unusual circumstances 
test was intended to assure fundamental fairness and to require 
reexamination of a conviction on habeas corpus when the nature 
of the alleged error was such that it would be 'unconscionable 
not to reexamine' . . . and thereby to assure that 'substantial 
justice [was] done' . . . ." Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 
1115 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Martinez v. 
Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 
2d 96, 99, 440 P.2d 968, 969-70 (1968)). 
This case is not unlike Fernandez. Although Dunn had 
an appeal from his conviction, unlike Fernandez, Dunn now 
alleges, in effect, that his prior direct appeal was a sham 
because of his counsel's ineffective representation. In fact, 
Dunn further contends that because his counsel also rendered 
ineffective assistance at trial in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, it was all but impossible for him to 
provide effective assistance on appeal. Dunn's direct appeal 
was presented by counsel in the form of an Anders brief and a 
short supplemental pro se brief filed by Dunn. The Anders brief 
did not meet the standards necessary to provide effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. 
The constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel 
encompasses the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
both at trial and on the first direct appeal of right. Evitts 
v. Lucey. 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 685 (1984). We acknowledge that this Court stated in 
its per curiam opinion that "counsel has complied in every 
respect with the Anders requirements." State v. Dunn, 646 P.2d 
709, 711 (Utah 1982). It was on that basis that the Court 
granted counsel's motion to withdraw. Nevertheless, in light of 
the authorities and analysis that have been provided by Dunn's 
present counsel on this habeas appeal, we have a far better 
basis for judging whether the Anders brief filed on behalf of 
Dunn fell short of the standards required of Anders briefs. We 
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hold that it did fall short in a number of respects. Among 
other things, it failed to raise several nonfrivolous issues 
which should have been raised on the appeal, as demonstrated by 
Dunn's present counsel on this appeal. Unfortunately, this 
Court was not in a position to have detected those issues on its 
own in the prior appeal. 
In this state, Anders has been supplemented by State v. 
Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). In Clavton, we stated: 
[C]ounselfs brief must contain a statement 
of the facts, a description of the 
proceedings, and the citation of pertinent 
authorities sufficient to permit this 
Court to fulfill its obligation [to decide 
whether the case is wholly frivolous]• 
. . . The brief must also certify that 
counsel has met the requirements of 
[furnishing the indigent with a copy of 
the brief and time to raise any points 
which he chooses], and it should 
incorporate, in as full detail as 
appropriate, any points the indigent has 
raised with counsel. . . . 
. . . [T]his Court will grant counsel 
permission to withdraw and will affirm the 
conviction (rather than dismiss the 
appeal) in criminal appeals that are found 
to be wholly frivolous, but will do so ' 
only when the Court is unanimous in that 
decision. Otherwise, the appeal must be 
pursued on the merits. 
639 P.2d at 170. An Anders brief is in one sense an abbreviated 
form of a regular brief, but it is different from a regular 
brief in that it must demonstrate that the potentially 
meritorious issues are frivolous. At the same time, counsel 
must retain an adversarial stance by showing that the record has 
been searched and the law researched with the good faith intent 
of advancing the defendant's interest. That is not to say, 
however, that counsel may exceed the boundaries of ethical 
representation. Counsel must continue to identify with the 
defendant's position, until it is truly clear that the issues 
are frivolous. 
It is not enough to list issues and case citations; the 
arguments must be sufficiently articulated to justify the 
conclusion that counsel has truly sought to present meritorious 
issues but cannot. Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346 (1988). In 
Robinson v. Black, 812 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1987), the court 
stated: 
Counsel did not act as an advocate for 
Robinson when he briefed all issues in 
favor of the government and concluded 
Robinson's claims were meritless. Robinson 
had a right to expect counsel to brief and 
argue his case to the best of counsel's 
ability, showing the most favorable side of 
defendant's arguments. Counsel changed the 
adversarial process into an inquisitorial 
one by joining the forces of the state and 
working against his client. 
812 F.2d at 1086-87. See also DeMarrias v. United States, 444 
F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1971); Smith v. United States, 384 F.2d 649 
(8th Cir. 1967) . 
The Anders brief filed here briefly recited the 
prosecution evidence and the defense evidence and then stated 
four issues. Each issue was phrased as a single short 
sentence. The brief had no argument. The brief simply listed a 
few cases, but their facts and the principles they stand for 
were not stated. Only two of the four stated issues contained 
citations to any part of the record. Dunn's pro se brief had 
seven typewritten pages which set forth an array °of questions 
based on the record. One page listed seven issues without any 
argument or citation of authority. 
The so-called Anders brief filed by counsel violates 
the Anders, Penson, and Clayton requirements in at least three 
ways. First, no arguments were articulated, which demonstrated 
that each issue was in fact frivolous. Although defense counsel 
might think that an issue is frivolous, Anders requires that he 
objectively demonstrate that the issue is frivolous. Second, 
only two of the four issues counsel raised were supported by 
record citations, and even in those instances only a range of 
pages where the issue arose was given. Each of the issues 
should have contained references to the record. The issues 
should have been analyzed and appropriate record and legal 
citations given in each instance. A complete brief on the 
merits is usually unnecessary; however, this Court needs to be 
assured that an issue is not just meritless, but that counsel 
has engaged in sufficient analysis of the record and case law to 
be secure in the belief that the issues are frivolous. Third, 
the Anders brief should have included and addressed the issues 
that Dunn raised in his pro se brief. While two of those issues 
do appear to be frivolous on their face, two are not frivolous 
on their face. Those two issues should have been argued to the 
extent they were arguable. 
In all events, Dunn can hardly be held to have waived 
the effective assistance of counsel issue by not including it in 
his pro se brief. It requires effective counsel to demonstrate 
that prior counsel's performance did not meet constitutional 
standards. 
The State relies upon Hafen v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 
(Utah 1981), for the proposition that the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel may not be raised in a habeas proceeding 
since it should be raised on direct appeal. The State also 
cites Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 P.2d 34 (1972), 
and Brvant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967), for 
the proposition that ineffective assistance may not be raised in 
a habeas proceeding. To the extent that these cases can be said 
to stand for the proposition that the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel may not be raised on habeas, they are 
hereby disapproved. For practical purposes, they were 
disapproved sub silentio in Fernandez, if they ever in fact 
constituted a full and proper statement of Utah law. 
Finally, the State once again seeks to have this Court 
adopt the federal cause and prejudice standards to govern waiver 
on habeas. We expressly decline to do so. The circumstances of 
federal habeas are different from the circumstances of state 
habeas. In our view, it is appropriate that federal habeas 
review be more difficult to obtain than state habeas review. 
In sum, the conclusion is unavoidable that the Anders 
brief was inadequate as a matter of law and shows that Dunn 
received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. Penson v. 
Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346 (1988). It follows that the prior appeal 
is not a bar to the habeas proceedings and that the case must be 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989). The failure to 
raise a number of substantive issues that have been identified 
by Dunn's attorneys on this appeal supports the proposition that 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance on the direct appeal. 
The State also argues that Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 
832 (Utah 1989) held that a petitioner must show "good cause" as 
to why claims raised in a habeas corpus proceeding which could 
or should have been raised earlier were not raised in a prior 
post-conviction proceeding. The State suggests that without a 
showing of good cause, it is "an abuse of the writ and requires 
dismissal of the petition." Andrews, 773 P.2d at 833. The 
State, however, is in error. Andrews v. Shulsen, was an appeal 
from Andrews' third petition for habeas corpus.3 The issue in 
that case was what the petitioner had to show to raise an issue 
that had not previously been presented in a prior petition. The 
Court held that although an issue was not necessarily waived 
forever, if not raised in a petition, it could be subsequently 
raised only upon a showing of "good cause" for not having done 
so previously. See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989). 
3. Andrews' second petition for post-conviction relief grew out 
of a petition for habeas corpus in the federal district court. 
Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 82 (Utah 1983). See Andrews v. 
Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832, 832-33 (Utah 1989). 
The Court expresses its gratitude to appointed counsel 
for their excellent work on this case. 
Reversed and remanded for proceedings on the merits of 
the petition. 
I CONCUR: 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring in the Result) 
I join the majority's analysis of the deficiencies of 
trial counsel's representation of appellant on his initial 
appeal. For that reason, I conclude that this case presents the 
"unusual circumstances" necessary to permit the raising of the 
effective-assistance-of-counsel claim by way of collateral 
attack. Fernandez v. Cook, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (1989); 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989) (collecting cases 
on "unusual circumstances"). 
However, just as I did not join in the Hurst opinion, I 
cannot join the present opinion of Justice Stewart, speaking for 
himself and Justice Durham. It tracks the dictum in Justice 
Stewart's opinion in Hurst, dictum which can be read to suggest 
that the requirement of unusual circumstances is relatively 
meaningless and that we readily permit the raising of new issues 
on collateral attack. There are certainly a number of instances 
where we have found unusual circumstances to exist, but there 
are a great number more where we have not. Counsel should not 
be lulled by the seeming liberality of the language used by the 
majority into thinking that we casually entertain collateral 
attacks. We do not. 
I likewise cannot agree with the majority's apparent 
effort to distinguish Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832 (Utah 
1988), an effort that can only reinforce the misimpression 
created by the dictum on unusual circumstances. The majority 
seems to be restricting to cases arising in a very specific 
procedural context the requirement discussed in Andrews that 
before a petitioner is entitled to have a court address claims 
raised on collateral attack that could or should have been 
raised earlier, the petitioner must show "good cause" why those 
claims were not raised earlier. 
It is true that Andrews arose in a procedural posture 
different than the present case. However, that is not 
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dispositive for me. The issue in Andrews was the same as the 
issue in Fernandez and in the present case: Has the petitioner 
demonstrated that there was a sufficiently good reason why the 
issues raised had not been presented earlier? In all three 
cases, an attempt at that showing was made- And in answering 
that question, it is not important whether it is labeled Mgood 
cause" under rule 65B(i)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
or "unusual circumstances" under our habeas corpus case law. In 
my view, the standard is operatively the same, regardless of the 
rubric used. By attempting to distinguish Andrews as it has and 
minimize the good cause requirement, the majority can only 
further delude the bar about the nature of the threshold showing 
necessary before the merits of a claim will be addressed on 
collateral attack. 
One final point. I heartily join in that portion of 
the majority opinion applauding the efforts of counsel we 
appointed to represent appellant. Their pro bono efforts are 
but one example of a fine tradition in the legal profession that 
too seldom receives the recognition it deserves. 
Hall, Chief Justice, concurs in the concurring opinion 
of Justice Zimmerman. 
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, concurs in the result. 
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APPENDIX G 
P. 0. Bo;< 606 
Centerv 111 e,, Utah 840i4 
February 28j, 1990 
David A* Hales, City Administrator 
Cen t er v i i 1 e C i t y 
521 North 400 West 
Cenfcerville, Utah 84014 
Dear Mr » Hales: 
As per your telephone request at Februarv 20th, my 
wife, Veryl , and I will plan to meet with you and the C.it/ 
Engineer, Fred Campbell, at your offices an the :.itternoon of 
M a r c h 51 h a t 3 : 0 0 p - m. It 1 s rn\ u n d e i4"«t a n cl i n q t \ $ a t 
C ity ns pjosition has changed and that because there is some 
State money available to pay ior sidewalk .i mpru^^wv.-ri hs, the 
City is now considering th<? purchase of- -*.u f r 1 c 1 en t 
additional right of way in front of my property upon whir..:!-. 
to install curb, gutter, and sidewalk. 
Sine er e1y y our s, 
J. Va1 Rob er t s 
JVR:vhr 
*-.A . I .J. 
^ "-' If 
P. 0- Box 6t>6 
Centervi31e„ Utah B40J4 
March 20, 1990 
Dav3 d A. Ha1es „ C ity Admi nistra tor 
Centervilie City 
521 North 4O0 West 
Centervilie, Utah 84014 
Re: Sidewctl! improvement Project 
Dear Mr. Hal ess: 
Mv letter of February Z'8, J 990, confirming our telephone 
conversation clearly seated that the willingness of m / WJ f e e-nd 
myseLf to attend c<ny meeting regarding sidewali i n frcnt o* our 
property was ba«=cd upon your statement that the rew Oi t ,' 
Adm i ni strctt i on had char»ged the position at the prior" 
Admi m st rat 3 or» and was now W3 3 13 ny to ar.qui re„ by pure, base, 
sufticient additional r j gh t -of ~-wav to install siclewait . 
The statement you made wh3ch opened ou\~ March '5, j9'-'«>,, 
meeting -it J :o0 p.m., "We have decided th<_-a we own ten •<•--&t ot 
• our properly west of the curb and gutter," was the .rame L "» nd oi 
an i nt i mi d at i on t ac 11 c that h aa been used b y r or iner co» mc i i .nun , 
Hob Arbucl ]«?„ at the t j rue that the present curb =»rr"j gut-ier wa--
placed m front of my property and that of- my neighbors J r, the 
Spring of J 976 and was inconsistent with your 5ariit.-r 
representations and ineonsistent with vour Marcn 3*t>, 1990, 
letter, paragraphs 3„ wherein you state,, '* [ + land and temporal" * 
construction easements need to be acquired troiri /ou ror rhis 
pr o j ec t „ theri j list compensat i on wi 1 J be pai d . n 
The recollection of my neighbor, James G. P^rrish, arid T»V 
own is that you were one of those in attendance £\t the Jast 
meeting held with City Officials and Andy Sopl- o wherein Mr. Sop I- o 
a f f i rmed the ac 11 on t al en near 1 y ten y ear s ecr 1 i er b v ^he St -31 e 
in allowing the present curb and gutter to be placed on^ toot 
east of the actual right-of-way which nelonged to the ^tate at 
that time. My file reflects that Mr. Goptons comments to ail 
concerned were, "Mr « Roberts is correct. The State does not own 
sufficient right-of-way on the west side o^ bR-lOo upon which to 
install sidewali . u There does not seem to be ciny rational 
D a v i d A- H a l e s 
L i t y A d m i n i s t r a t o r ~ 2 - M a r c h 2 0 , 199'.) 
e x p l a n a t i o n - fo r t h e a s s e r t i o n y o u made on M a r c h 5 t h „ "We p r o b a b l y 
own an a d d i t i o n a l t e n - feet o-f t h e P a r r j s h p r o p e r t y when vou 
c o n s i d e r t h e q u i d - c l a i m d e e d s we g u t when we p u t in t h e 
SJ d e w a l I « n 
The p r o b l e m i s n o t n o w , and bias n e v e r b e e n , t h e t o t a l w i d t h 
o f t h e r i g h t - o f - w a y a s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e 1^51 s u r v e / w h i c h 
M r , H o l h r o c 4 b r o u g h t t o t h e m e e t i n g . On t h i s p o i n t , i r e f e r vou 
t o t h e O c t o b e r 2 4 , i c ?75 , l e t t e r f r o m A n d r e w J - Sop I o t o H i e 
H o n o r a b l e S t a n l ey G r e e n , Mayor , C e n t e r v i l i e C i t y , par t J cuJ a r l y 
p a r a g r a p h 2 w h e r e i n Mr.. Sop I o s t a t e s t h a t he ana t h e D i s t r i c t 
E n g i n e e r , M r , B j o r n Wang, d e t e r m i n e d t h a t , " T h e S t a t e d o e s n o t 
h a v e a 33 f o o t r i g h t - o f - w a y w e s t oi t h e monument l i n e t h r o u g h t|-,e 
ares, m q u e s t i o n , b u t t h a t t h e p l a c e m e n t o f c u r b and g u t t e r w i t h 
b a d o f t h e c u r b 2 5 - 5 f ec - t f r o m t h e monument 11 ne*-*-*-wonl d be w e ] ] 
w i t h i n t h e S t a t e r i gh t - o f - w a v - M I a i ^ o i n v i t e ^our s p e c i a l 
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n made by t h e D i s t r i c t T r a t 4 i c 
E n g i n e e r , M r , E d w a r d D. J u l i o , w h i c h i s s e t o u t m t h e t h i r d 
p a r a g r a p h o f the- same l e t t e r , ex c o p y o f w h i c h J S . * t t a c h e u t o 
r e f r e s h y o u r memory and f o r t h e i n f o r m a t j o n o f f l a v o r I- j c i r , 
a t t o r n e y M i c h a e l M - < : u r ? n , C i t \ E n g i n e e r F r e d C a m p b e l l , end 
D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Be<=m R. H o i b r o o l - . 
I b e l i e / e i t i f , h o r n b o o l 3 r<w t h - j t r o t w i t h s t and i ng an v G'-ant 
w h i c h t h e (I L t v rridV h a v e r e c e i v e d f r o m t h e S t - » t e , t h e i " i L d o e s 
n o t t i r w e s t a n d i n g t o c l a i m o w n e r s h i p o f c\n s p o r t i o n u t 3 S t ^ t e 
r u a d s u c h as S R - 1 0 6 . Suct i a c l a i m , i f made , c a n o n l / c e made b •/ 
t h e s o v e r e i g n S t a t e o f U t a h . 
My r e s e a r c h r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e S t a t e o f U t a h a c q u i r e d w h a t i s 
now c">R--1'"»6 f r o m B o u n t i f u l t h r o u g h t h e N o r t h F - r m i ng t o n J u n r f ' o n 
on May J 2 , 13 3 1 ; and t h a t i n t h e ar<-a i n f r o n t OT m • p r i / ^ e 
pi o p e r t / , t h e S t a t e had a t o t a l r i g h t — o f - w a / w i d t h c» o» . ~ T< t c-ot 
o t w h i c h 74 t e e t l i e s t - a s t o f t h e c e n t e r monument « m e z~\fici 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 26 f e e t 4 i n c h e s l i e s w e s t o f t h e monument l i n e . 
Th i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e S t a t e h a v i n g g i ve r? p e r m i s s i o n f or t h e 
p l a c e m e n t o-f t h e p r e s e n t c u r b and g u t t e r a t a p o i n t I 'S.'o f e e t 
w e s t o f t h e monument c e n t e r l i n e l e a v i n g a p p r o x i m a t e ! ^ / 1 f o o t o f 
S t a t e - o w n e d r j g h t - o f - way f or u t 11 i t y e a s e m e n t s and p j c r i r»g t h e 
p r e s e n t c u r b ar id g u t t e r w e l l w i t h i n t h e S t ^ t e r i g h t - o f - w a y as 
p o i n t e d o u t i n Mr.. S o p i o ' s O c t o b e r 24 „ 1 ^75 , l e t t e r t o H a v o r 
G r e e n . ^See S t a t e e x c a v a t I on p e r m i t a p p l i c a t i o n s d a t e d I S 
Dav i d A.. Ha l e s 
Ci t y Admi n i s t r a t o r - 3 - Mar c h 2 0 , 19-v>J 
November 1975 and c o r r e s p o n d i n g U t a h S t a t e H i q h w a v D e p a r t m e n t 
c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r m i t s d a t e d November 3 9 t h and n u m b e r e d s e r i a l l y 
28648, , 2 Q o 4 9 , 2 8 6 & J , and 28t>51 . ) 
I t a p p e a r s t o me t o be t h e m o s t e l e m e n t a l - form o t 
e n g i n e e r i n g t o {'now t h a t w h e n e v e r y o u a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a 
r i g h t - a t - w a y w h i c h came i n t o b e i n g as a r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t i 3 I-e 
t h a t o t S R ~ 1 ^ 6 , i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e w i d t h o f t h a t 
r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t by a s u r v e y t a t en some 100 y e a r s a f t e r i t s 
c r e a t i o n s u c h as y o u m e n t i o n was d o n e by G r e a t B a s i n E n g i n e e r i n g 
on t h e A l l e n p i r o p e r t y . The w i d t h o t r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t c a n on J v 
be d e t e r m i n e d by s u r v e y i n g o p p o s i n g p r o p e r t i e s on b o r h s i d e s ot 
t h e r o a d , 
C e n t e r v i l i e C i t / , h a v i n g p e r m i t t e d i t s p r i / a t e c o n t r a c t o r t o 
c a r e l e s s l y r e m o v e t h e s u r v e y p i n i n s t a l l e d a t t h e t i Tie t h a t t h e 
E ^ r a P a r r i s h e s t a t e was d i v i d e d among h i s h e i r s i n c o n n e c t i o n 
wi t h t h e C i ty - 1 s i n s t a l 1 a t i on o f s i dewa l I- on t h e H?ro3 ci Par*" J s h 
p r o p e r t y j n November cH 198"»", c a n n o t be t a t en ^ory s e r i o u s l / when 
i t c l a i m s t h a t t h e C i t y n e e d s a new s u r v e y o t on ] v t h e p o r t i o n o t 
t h e S t a t e r i g h t - o f - w a y t h a t a b u t s mv p r o p e r t y ar id t h a t t h e r e a s o n 
t o r t h i s n e e d i s b e c a u s e o f a s u r v e y on t h e A l l e n p r o p e r t y w h i c h 
a d j o i n s my p r o p e r t y on i t s n o r t h b o u n d a r y . T\\^ r e q u e s t i s s u r e l , 
n o t made? i n g o o d T a i t h . 
So t h a t t h e r e w i l l be no m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , l e t me 
r e e m p h a s i : e t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n h e r e i s n o t a q u e s t i o n oi t h e v:<?ue 
o t a number o t s q u a r e - f e e t o t p r o p e r t y o r t h e amount t h a t s h o u l d 
he p a i d t o r t h e r e m o v a l or 4'"* - v e a r - o J d b l a c t w i l l o w t r e e ? ana " h e 
r e s u l t i n g l o s s , o f c o a l i n g s h a d e u n l e s s i t J S t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e 
S l a t e t o a t t e m p t a c o n d e m n a t i o n p r o c e d u r e so *? t o e n l a r g e t h e 
S t a t e ' s r i g h t - o f - w a y a s 1 do no t b e l i e v e t h e Ci t , w o u l d h 3 , e 
s t a n d i rig t o try and e n l a r g e a S t a t e r o c i d . I t w o u l d s p p ^ ^ r *".: me 
t o g i v e r i s e t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t v o-f a c nse o t t i r s t impr ? E ? i o n 
b a s e d u p o n t h e t a c t t h a t t h e p r e s e n t r i g h t - o f - w a y was t o u r f e e t 
w i d e r t h a n i t now i s b e f o r e t h e C i t y s e c u r e d p e r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e 
S t a t e o f U t a h t o r e p l a c e t h e s i d e w a l k o r i g i n a l l y i n s t a l l e d b> t h e 
c i l i : e n « m 3 9 2 2 on t h e 34 t e e t o f S t d t e r i g h t - o f ~w.=rv t h a t l i e s 
e a s t o t t h e c e n t e r l i n e t h e r e b y r e t u r n i n g t o p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p , 
w i t h o u t c o m p e n s a t i o n bv t h e r e c i p i e n t s t o e i t h e r t h e S t a t e o r t h e 
C j t v „ w i t h o u t p u b l i c h e a r i n g , and w i t h o u t t h e u s e o( t h e i»sua} 
p r o c e d u r e s d e s c r i b e d bv l aw when a p o r t i o n o-f a p u b l i c 
D a v i d AH H a l e s 
C i t> Ad mi \ \ i s t r a t o r - 4 - M a r c h -20 M J y"^1» 
r i gh t ~ o f - w a y i s t o be a b a n d o n e d by e i t h e r t h e S t a t e o r t h e C i t y -
The r e s u l t was t h e r e t u r n t o p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p o-t some t o u r f e e t 
ni r i g h t - o f - w a y w h i c h h a d b e e n i n t h e p u b l i c d o m a i n since 3 9 2 1 
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f a b u f f e r s t r i p on t h e e a s f 
p o r r i o n o-H t h e r i g h t - o f - w a y w h i c h had never p r e v i o u s l y e;3 s t e r i 
and w h i c h i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 J / 2 f e e t w i d e t o d a y . B u t f o r t h e 
f o r e g o i n g a c t i o n s , M i e r e w o u l d be no n e e d , or \/&ry l i t t l e n&ed,, 
t o p u r c h a s e a n y r J g h t ~ o f - w a v w e s t o f t h e p r e s e n t c u r b and g u t t e r . 
I f a n y o n e r e a s o n a b l v b e l i e v e s t h a t a c o n d e m n a t i o n a c t i o n c o u l d 
s u c c e e d a g a i n s t p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y l y i n g w e s t cH t h e p r e s e n t c u r b 
ar id g u t t e r „ I w i l l n o t o n l y r e p r e s e n t m y s e l f and my w i r e . , b u t 
w o u l d e / . p e c t t o d e f e n d a g a i n s t s u c h a c a s e t o t h e f u l l e x t e n t o+ 
t h e 1 aw. 
By t h i s l e t t e r , I r e n e w o f f e r s p r e v i o u s l y made t o p r i o r C i t > 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o s e l 3 f o r p u b l i c u s e s u f f i c i e n t r i g h t ~ o f - - w - ^ y 
a l o n g w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n s t r u c t i o n e a s e m e n t s t o p e r m i t t h e 
i n s t a l 1 a t i on of a p u b ! i c: s i dewaJ \ „ r e t a i n i ng c-jai I , and 
a p p r o p r i a t e s a f e t y r a i l . I am p e r s o n a l 1 v s a t i s f i e d t n a t w h a t e v e r 
p r i c e may be n e g o t i a t e d , i t w i l l be s u b s t a n t i a l l y l e s s t n a n t h e 
c o s t o f a p r e c e d e n t s e t t i r i g c o n d e m n a t i o n l a w s u i t o r t h e c o s * o f 
r e a l i g r i i n g t h e pav t -men t s t r i p w i t h i n t h e c e n t e r o-r t h e 
r i g h t - o f - w a y and r e l o c a t i n g t h e e a s t e r l y c u r t ' and g u t t e r a== 
m e n t i o n e d i n + he O c t o b e r 1 4 , \r*~'c'j* l e t l e r Trom t h e Hf *h 
D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ' s Andy Sopl -o t c Ma , o r - j t a n i e v G r e e n -
I t i s , , a d d i t i o n a l l y . , my f i r m c o n v i c t i o n thc<t whr -Oo /o r 
c o m p e n s a t i o n we may a r r i v e a t w i l l be c o n s i d e r a h l v l e s s t h a n t h e 
\,),r5 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s r e - c e n t ] y l e v i e d a g a i n s t t h e Ci t / o r Ftovo 
tor t h e n e g l i g e n t d e s i g n and i n s t a l l a t i o n of a h i g h v o l t a g e p o w e r 
l i n e . Tt i s a l s o r e a s o n a b l e t o s u p p o s e t h c t w h a t e v e r e i t h e r t h e 
C O v o r t h e C i t v and t h e S t a t e t o g e t h e r ma * u l t i m a t e l y p a y ior 
t h e p r o p e r t v n e c e s s a r y t o i n s t a l l a p u b l i c s i d e w a l k i n - r o n t z<{ 
my uof i ie , t h e sum w i J i be c o n s i d e r a b l v l e s s t h a n t h e c c s e « s e t ou t 
m t t<e P a c i f i c R e p o r t e r w h e r e t h e S t a t e o f U t a h h a s bcet?n f o u n d 
n e g l i g e n t i n r i g h t - o f - w a y d e s i g n -
For t h e r e a s o n s s e t o u t m o u r Mar en 5 t h m e e t i n g i n 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e C i t y ' s d e a l i n g s w i t n t h e w i d o w L y d i a r l l p a c l 
when t h e C h a s e L a n e i m p r o v e m e n t s w e r e i n s t a l l e d , b o t h my w i f e <=ind 
m v s e l f h o i d o u r s e l v e s r e a d y t o e n t e r i n t o g o o d - f a i t h n e g o t i a t i o n s 
w i t h e x p e r i e n c e d r i g h t - o f - w a y n e g o t i a t o r s who r e c o g n i j e t h e 
D a v i d A« H a J G L 
C11 y Ad m i n i s t r a t u r M a r c h 2 o , J9-:") 
• f u t i l i t y o f t h r e a t s and a t t e m p t s a t i n t i m i d a t i o n * The C i t y 
t h e S t a t e s h o u l d g o v e r n t h e m s e l v e s a c c o r d i n g l y , and i t ma 
t h a t M r . HoJ b r o o d s g r e a t e s t s e r v i c e c a n be i 
p e r s o r i t o be e m p l o y e d as r i g h t - o f - w a y n e g o t i a t o r . 
and 
be 
s u g g e s t 3 ng a 
S3 n c e r e l y y n u r s , 
J . V a l R o b e r t s 
V e r v ] H. R o b e r t s 
J V P : v h r 
Ehci , Letter dated October 24, 1975, from Anckew J. bop! o, Ut ,-«h 
bt -dte Depart nient o^ Tr anspor t a t i on 
Letter dated September 1, 1976, from C- Sidnev Nooie, 
Centerv]13e City Administrator 
cc'n Mayor R. Mjchael f j ar 
Michael MaruranH Attornev at Law 
Fred Campbell, City Engineer 
Dean Holhrooi-„ Utah Department of f r ansport at i on 
CENTERVILLE CITY 
521 North 400 West • Centerville, Utah 84014 • (801)295-3477 
75th Anniversary of Incorporation 
1915- 1990 
M a r c h 1 6 , 1 9 9 0 
» M« *>«•( * , *# 
City Council 
Michael B Barton 
Bruce E Encfcson 
Nancy W Gibbs 
Kent M Lindsey 
Steven M. Mangel 
City Administrator 
David A. Hales 
Mr. & Mrs. J. Val Roberts 
499 North Main Street 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
Re: SR106 (Main Street) Sidewalk Improvement Project 
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Roberts: 
Thank you for taking time to meet with Fred Campbell,- Dean 
Holbrook and me on Tuesday, March 6, 1990, to discuss the 
SR106 (Main Street) Sidewalk Improvement Project. 
During our meeting, I indicated the City would like to install 
sidewalk improvements along the west side of SR106 (Main Street) 
next to your property and that of Mr. & Mrs. Carl Allen and 
Mr. & Mrs. Samuel Parrish. A sidewalk safety grant has been 
awarded by the Utah Department of Transportation to Centerville 
which can offset up to 75% of the construction costs associated 
with this project. 
It is our hope to schedule project construction for this summer 
if all right of way and easements issues can be resolved with the 
abutting property owners. If land and temporary construction 
easements need to be acquired from you for this project, then 
just compensation will be offered. 
During our meeting you stated that your east property line lies 
one foot west of the existing curb and gutter. A recent survey 
of the Allen property performed by Great Basin Engineering as 
well as maps prepared by the Utah Department of Transportation 
show the same property line located approximately ten feet west 
of the current gutter. In order to determine if any of your land 
needs to be acquired and to locate all property improvements that 
may be affected by this project, we feel a survey of your prop-
erty needs to be performed. 
During our meeting, you declined to grant the City permission to 
conduct a survey of your property. After discussing this matter 
further with the City Engineer and Mr. Holbrook, we still feel 
that a survey is necessary for the reasons stated above. I 
could assure you that the surveyor would be presented with any 
and all information you have either presented to us in writing or 
that you would like to present to him prior to his conducting the 
survey. 
Mr. & Mrs. J. Val Roberts -2- March 14, 1990 
I wouldi like you to reconsider your position on this matter and 
grant the City permission to have a registered land surveyor 
conduct a survey of your property. If I do not receive any 
written communication from you within seven days from the date of 
this letter, I will assume you will not grant permission for the 
survey as requested. Thank you for your consideration of this 
matter. 
^^&incerely, 
David A. Hales 
City Administrator 
DAH:mh 
cc: Mayor R. Michael Kjar 
Michael Mazuran 
Fred Campbell 
Dean Holbrook 
March 20, 1990 
Michael J. Mazuran 
Attorney at Law 
2180 South 1300 East, #260 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Re: Centervi11e City Sidewalk 
Improvement Proje?ct 
Dear Michacel : 
As per our telephone conversation of Monday, March 19th, I am 
enclosing the following additional documents relative to State 
Road 106 and the events of IS years ago which led to the placement 
of curb and gutter one foot east of the west boundary of the 
remainder interest owned by the State which abuts my residence at 
499 North Main in Centervi1le? Utah. The documents are as 
follows: 
1. Copy of a letter dated October 28, 1975, from myself to 
the then Mayor, Stanley Green. You will note that this document 
makes reference to the October 24, 1975, letter from Andrew J. 
Sopko of the* Utah State Department of Transportation to Mayor 
Green and to a May 19, 1975, meeting which, as I recall, involved 
myself, Mayor Green, Mr. Sopko, and all of the individuals listed 
at the bottom of the letter except for Samuel Parrish. 
2. A Utah State Department of Highways, District Two, 
excavation permit application dated the 18th of November 1975, 
specifically requesting permission to install curb and gutter on a 
line 25,5 feet west of the center line of the monuments at Parrish 
Lane, or 400 North, and Chase Lane, or 1000 North. You should 
note that the excavation permits mentioned bv serial number in my 
letter of today to David Hales, the Centervilie City Manager, were 
issued by the State of Utah in response to the November 18, l?75, 
application. 
3. The next document is an "excavation permit" within 
Centervilie City road right-of-way. You should note that the 
applicant for this permit was Ronald R. Kremer, now deceased, who 
was the predecessor in interest to Carl Allen, the abutting 
property owner on my north fence?. You should also note that the 
Michael J. Mazuran 
Attorney at Law ~2~ March 20, 1990 
permit is dated May 11, 1976, and was approved b/ an individual 
whose initials are C.S.IM. or C. Sidney Noble, City Admini »tr .-itar « 
Note that it was also approved bv the Centerville City 
Administrator on the same date it was applied -for. At the time 
it was my position that since SR-10to was a State nght-of-wa\ and 
the improvements we were installing were installed entirelv on 
State right-of-way, no Centerville permits were required? however, 
an officious City Councilman named Robert ArbucHe attempted to 
stop the unloading of a truck load of wet, ready-mix cement 
because there had been no application for a Centerville permit, I 
was not present at the time* and so Ponaid l-remer went to the Citv 
Offices, applied and paid -for the* permit which ArbucMe insisted 
was necessary. 
4, The final document is a copv of a Centerville Citv 
Corporation receipt dated May 11, 1976, under recei.pt No- 132? for 
the sum of $8.00 paid by Ronald kremer for the e/cavation permit. 
In short, the thing was not done in a corner nor without the 
full approval of the sovereign State of Utah and of the then Citv 
oificials. It seems to me to be indisputable that the Cit> mav 
not now claim more than the State has ewer owned in terms of the 
right-of-way. You'd think 15 years would be enough to have 
settled the matter particularly where some of the principals are 
now deceased. 
If you're interested or it will aid in settling the issues in 
the minds of present City officials, you mav take my deposition, 
and I will give you a full account of how there got to be more 
property on one side.of the center line than the other ba*-t in 
1922 and how the right-of-way originated as a remainder interest 
rather than a dedicated street. 
Sincerely yours. 
J. Val Roberts 
Attorney at Law 
JVRrvhr 
cc: Mayor R. Michael Kjar 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS 
DISTRICT TWO 
2410 West 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
A. J. Sopko - 328-6283 
EXCAVATION PERMIT APPLICATION DATE / Q\ NCW ICv^kfy ( f ? $ 
Application of: [Cr>M?.Lr( l<Cv<LfrOer~ 
Name ofc Business 
Business Addreas: / T 3 5 N ( r ^ i h / V } T * | M P s H ^ W l / l f , u M - f f Q ^ 
For the purpose of: 1 Uphill** C.l H 4 ) ? J fir » H ^ T " 
within right-of-way l imi t s of State Maintenance Section No. rj ifi in the followirg 
Location: ^{j^ \^hd?f I** WtefSiJ?* bvtflHHtn' A 3 pfi/tf/ fl*/ M c / Y ^ f a 
Before the above work i s commenced, the applicant wil l not ify: A. J . Sopko, 
Telephone Number 328-6283, and commencement of said work i s understood to indicate 
that the applicant wi l l comply with the ins t ruc t ions of the State Road Commission 
with respect to the performance of said work, and that he wi l l properly safeguard 
said work to prevent accident and save the State Road Commission free and harmless 
from a l l damages caused through h i s operations under th i s permit. Permittee 
•assumes fu l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for f a i lu re of backf i l l in excavations, tunnels and a l l 
cu t s . He wi l l replace surface to o r ig ina l construct ion. 
APPLICATION OF: T S O M A W . f^X^hmr" 
By: il^h^r 
T i t l e : £ ^ c # ^ 3 / _ / a x L 
*^%^#-% V / - I I I W I 1 V & . IVJV1I I 
WITHIN CENTERVILLE CITY ROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY 
Jond No. Permit No. 
Name of Bonding Company Issued By 
leceipt No. _ _ . _^ 
Applicant </C* ^ / l O A, J\\t r i ^ x w ^ -
\ddress £ £)> ZZ-C-i- W/H\'^ <£!?** .c * **>- *JI* . £cf~ 
Contractor's License No Phone J ^ b £ C' / ^ 
'urpose of Excavation, Crossing or Alteration £> u v L~ a ^ V- /^— u I I 
^Vork To Commence . 
? c-^ DATE 7 4 > * T E 
-ocatton 
(Description, sketch, or plan required in triplicate — indicate nature and extent of excavation, method of 
accomplishing, mean* of handling traffic and length of construction period) 
nstructions and Provisions: 
\ . For and in consideration of the granting of said permission the applicant agrees to the following instructions and pro-
/isions of the Centerville City Corporation Street Department ordinance with respect to the performance of work under this 
>ermit: 
i. Verily with the Supt. in charge of streets or the utility 6. Not to permit any excavation to remain open in any 
companies concerned the location of all underground facili- street for a period of more than 10 days, nor to close any 
ties which might be located within the limits of said ex- street or restrict traffic without prior permission of city. 
cavalion and will be responsible for, and will repair or pay - ~ ^c™«o;wi~ *~- **.«;*,•«;„;„„ ««,* ~ u *u ~ 
for any damage to such underground facilities. 7' ^ r e s p o n s i b l e for maintaining and guarding the ex-
iui, an* ucuiiaKc ^ »uv.*i UIIU« S IUUIU 10 UC3> cavated area for a period of three years after first restor-Erect and maintain about said installation during the ation. 
excavation and until the street is restored to its normal 8. In all cases back fill according to standard specifications 
condition, sufficient guards, signals, barricades and lights and use material for that purpose which shall be properly 
to prevent accidents. tamped or a sufficient quantity of water used to properly 
. . . wi ui J « « J settle the materials to the satisfaction of the Supt. in charge 
». As soon as reasonably possible or upon order from Roads
 o f s t r e e t s I f m a t e r i a l s cannot be properly compacted sa£d 
Supt. after the completion of said work, restore the street
 o r o t h e r porous material will be used 
to the same condition in which it existed prior to said exca-
vation, including the removal of rocks, dirt, rubbish and all &• I n c a s e excavating is done by machine, do such excavat-
other materials from the street which exist as a result of i n £ w i t h either a trenching machine or pull shovel which 
excavation, and be responsible for maintaining the surface does n o t n a v e cleats, spikes or other protruding parts which 
of the excavated area from settlement and deterioration for w i l 1 come in contact with the street surface when such 
a period of three years after first restoration. machine is in motion, such machine to have a cutting width 
of not to exceed 40 inches. 
4. In case the excavation is through asphalt or cement or
 1 0 . Hold the City harmless from any and all claims, liability 
beneath stone blocks make the cut perpendicularjit the demands or damages for any and all injury to persons or 
8 l d
^
a ? d i ? n d s fr°JP toJ % r f a C e f 0 r ^ S fUi* l e n g t h a n d Property arising in any manner out of or by reason of such width of all excavations to the necessary depth. excavation. 
ft. Notify the Supt. of Streets at least 4 hours prior to back 11. Respond to the City in damages for failure to conform 
filling, indicating the time the trench is to be back filled. to any or all of the requirements set forth in this section. 
». The applicant shall file with the City Recorder a bond of indemnity to Centerville City Corporation with sureties approval 
by the City Council. Such bond shall be a corporate surety bond in the sum of $1000.00 conditioned as above provided to cover 
ill excavations made for a period of three years from date of filing said bond. 
C. If any of the provisions of said bond, this permit, or ordinance of Centerville City Corporation is violated or not observed, 
the Councilman in charge of streets may do all things necessary or proper to repair such street or way at the expenses of the 
person making the excavation. 
I hereby acknowledge that I have read the instructions and provisions of this permit and ordinance of Centerville City Corpo-
ration and agree to assume all duties and obligations provided therein. 
D a
*° *lj^ <Y ~ 7 ^ ^ 
Mayor 
JEANNETTE H. SESSIONS 
Recorder 
JANEEN K. HANCOCK 
Treasurer 
CLIFFORD RUSSELL 
Chief of Police 
(jcntcrville (jitar (jorporation 
P. 0 . Box 728 
521 NORTH 400 WEST 
CofTraviLLE, UTAH 84014 
September 1. 1976 
ROBERT M. ARBUCKLE 
R. DEAN LAYTON 
DEFORREST SMOUSE 
STEVEN C MYERS 
E. THOMAS RANDALL 
Council Members 
Mr* Yal Roberts 
499 North Main 
Canterville. Utah 
Dear Mr* Robertst 
84014 
I have Inspected the curb and gutter installed on Main Street in 
front of all your properties* As near as I could ascertain all 
alignaents and grades have been properly observed* The quality of 
workaanahip seeas good* I (fid not observe any cracks• spelling or 
other evidences of failure* If these occur within the next year or 
two I feel sure your contractor will attend to thea for you* 
In view of ay Inspection I would suggest you can safely conclude 
your financial arrangeaents with your contractor* 
Very truly yours, 
G* Sidney Noble 
City Adainistrator 
CSN/jha 
COMMISSION 
R. LAVAUN COX 
CHAIRMAN 
WAYN6 S. WINTERS 
V i a CHAIRMAN 
C U M H. CHURCH 
SAMUEL J. TAYLOR 
CHARLES E. WARO 
RONALD A. FERNLEY 
SECRETARY 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
2410 West 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
October 24, 1975 
Director 
Blaine J. Kay, P.E. 
Assistant Director 
CV. Anderson, P.E. 
District Director 
$QP«WP.E. 
W. D. Hurley, 
The Honorable Stanley Green, Mayor 
City of Centerville 
470 North 400 West 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
Dear Mayor Green: 
This office has received two letters from Mr. L. Val Roberts, 
Attorney at Law, pertaining to the desire of residents to install 
curb and gutter on the west side of Main Street, north of Parrish 
Lane. It is our understanding that Centerville has an ordinance 
requiring installation of sidewalk where curb and gutter has been 
placed. 
Inasmuch as the standard state right-of-way of 66 feet was in 
question, Mr. Bjorn Wang, District R/W Design Engineer, was asked to help 
resolve the problem. It appears the state does not have a 33 foot 
righc-of-way west of the monument line through the area in question, 
but that placement of the curb and gutter with the back of curb 
25.5 feet from the monument line (standard for 66' right-of-way) 
would be well within the state right-of-way. 
Mr. Edward D. Julio, District Traffic Engineer, and I, made an 
on-the-site inspection to determine the possibility of shifting the 
curb and gutter easterly to provide room for the parking strip and 
sidewalk on existing right-of-way. It is our opinion that shift 
should not be made due to the width of the present roadway and thp 
set-back of the existing curb and gutter north of the area. 
We regret that we could not be more helpfull in providing a 
solution, however, the department does not have funds for obtaining 
additional right-of-way in that area at the present time. We do 
appreciate your concern for upgrading and providing a safe traffic 
condition on state highways. 
You.rs truly, 
cc: W. D. Hurley 
L. Val Roberts'' 
B. Wang 
E. D. Julio 
Andrew J.y6opko, 
Contract claims & Utility Officer 

APPENDIX H 
JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
DANIEL D. HILL (A5202) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. VAL ROBERTS and VERLE 
ROBERTS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. Civil No. 890903165 
CENTERVILLE CITY, et al., 
Judge David E. Roth 
Defendants. 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled court, the Honorable David E. Roth 
presiding, on December 13, 1989. The plaintiffs were represented 
by Brian M. Barnard and defendants were represented by Jody K 
Burnett and Daniel D. Hill. Several issues were presented for 
the Court's consideration, including plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and defendants1 Motion for Summary Judg-
ment on the plaintiffs1 Complaint and defendants1 Counterclaim 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court having read 
all of the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits and exhibits filed 
with respect to these motions, and having heard oral argument on 
behalf of the parties, and having reviewed the entire file in 
this matter and being fully advised, determined that there was ac 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that defendants are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law against the plaintiffs on 
the plaintiffs' Complaint on the basis that'the activities 
described are not accessory uses to a farming operation and noi 
proper uses in an agricultural zone; and, the Centerville City 
Board of Adjustment had authority to act and their decision is 
reasonable and valid as more fully set forth in the defendants' 
memoranda. The Court further determined that there was no 
genuine issue as to any material fact as to defendants' Counter-
claim and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
against the plaintiff on their Counterclaim for declaratory and 
injunctive relief, and based on that ruling, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to all claims made in the plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint is hereby granted and the plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon 
the merits, no cause of action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on their Counterclaim filed in 
response to the plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint is hereby 
granted and a permanent injunction is entered ordering that 
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plaintiffs must immediately remove all junked, dismantled or 
inoperable motor vehicles from their property and be permanently 
enjoined from any such future use of the property in question. 
This injunction is stayed for thirty (30) days from the date P* 
entry of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs1 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
DATED this 3 r l day of ^fl^^ng^ ™3JL-
BY THE COURT: 
M 
David E. Roth 
District Court Judge 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Sharon M. Allhands, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed by the law offices of snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for Defendants herein; that she served the attached 
Summary Judgment, Permanent Injunction and Order (Case 
No. 890903165, Second District Court for Weber County) upon the 
parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Brian M, Barnard 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
as indicated above, on the day of December, 1939. 
fjAjUL&^L 
Shatfoft'M. Allhands^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i day o: 
My commission E x p i r e s : 
. ^ 3 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the state of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JOANS. PATTERSON I 
. --,-- *n . lo \ l06*cft«nS»DfeC8,11t!iFI. i 
• •§ l tAt&YJS L?) Salt Lake Oity. Utah 34111 | 
: ;
^ i * w f w v f t Uv Commission Expire* j 
"'•12&y STATE OF "JTAK ! 
APPENDIX I 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES G. PARRISH 
COMES NOW JAMES G. PARRISH, a resident of Davis County, 
Centerville, Utah, and -first being sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. I have lived at 445 North Main continuously since 1917 
except for a period o-f time which I spent in college and my 
military service during the Second World War. The property now 
owned by J. VAL ROBERTS at 499 North Main was in the PARRISH 
family prior to my time, I built my first home on the back af my 
lot at 445 North Main in 1955. I completed my present residence 
at 445 North Main in March of 1960 and have lived there 
continuously to the present time, 
2. J. VAL ROBERTS purchased the property at 499 North Main 
from my brother, JOHN D, PARRISH, in January of 1964 shortly after 
JOHN had completed the remodeling. 
3. From my personal observations as a neighbor, I am aware 
that MR. ROBERTS has used the property as a family residence and 
in connection with that use has kept on the property cows, calves, 
pigs, and chickens as well as using it as a place to repair, 
overhaul, and renovate, old, partially dismantled and wrecked 
automobiles. MR, ROBERTS' use of the property as a place to keep 
old automobiles and outdated agricultural machinery is well known 
both by me and other members of the PARRISH family who are near 
• *i 
neighbors. Such activity by MR. ROBERTS has been readily 
observable since shortly after he purchased the property in 
January of 1964 and continues to the present time. 
Dated this 9th day of July, 19B8. 
l^z*c£a .«^^*Vi m*< , — — 
MES G. PARRISH 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on July 9, 1986. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Centerville, Utah 
My commission expires January 22, 1991. 
- ? -
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID F. PARRISH 
DAVID F. PARRISH, first being sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and says that: 
1. I reside at 469 North Main, Centerville, Davis County, 
Utah. I have lived at this address since 1925 except for the 
period of time from 1943 to 1946 when I was in the military 
service and from January 1951 to February 1954 when I was in 
Japan, I have owned the property at this address since it came to 
me from the estate of my father, EZRA B. PARRISH, in 1952 or *,53. 
2. My first recollection of a particular car owned by J. VAL 
ROBERTS and his family was a Mercedes Benz. I remember thinking 
he must be doing pretty well selling insurance to be able to driv;^  
a Mercedes. I know that VAL and his sons have torn down quite a 
few cars at his place on an ongoing basis, and they were doing it 
even before I helped VAL put the cement pad west of his house. I 
also remember the large circular cement chunks we put in the 
driveway on the south side of the house. We were all repairing 
things through those years. I remember lots of old pickup trucks' 
over there. There was a red one that I recall even before the red 
one that is there now which I know he got from the TINGEY brothers 
in Centerville. I remember a Volkswagen Ghia VAL had because my 
friend, LAWRENCE MILLER, in Farmington had a Ghia that I had 
ridden in several times. 
3. As I recall, VAL had old cars at his place dating from 
the same period of time that he had milk cows. I do not recall 
the specific years involved, but SAM PARRISH-'S hay and milking 
barn still stood on the property that joins VAL'S property on the 
north. It also sticks in my mind because both of VAL'S sons were 
too young to milk, and the old brindle cow that I milked for him 
managed.to kick me off the milking stool even though I had her 
back legs in chain hobbles, her head in a stanchion, and her hips 
in a large, no-kick clamp. 
4. I remember VAL working on old cars with an acetylene 
torch, and my general recollection is that he has had a lot of old 
cars there at various times. 
5. One rusty old body that comes to my mind was the one that 
sat at the back of the house just east of where we put in the 
cement pad. I remember his sans sanding on that old car, and I 
recall that they had one painted part that they were going to put 
on the back of it. They never did get the rusty old thing to a 
point where they could drive it. 
6. I became Post Master in Centerville in 1965, and I recall 
that there were old cars on the property before 1970 which sticks 
out in my mind because 1970 was the year that the nationwide Past 
Office Convention was held in Salt Lake City and as Utah Post 
Masters, we had the obligation to hast the Convention. 
7. Another thing that stands out in my mind is the time we 
treed a raccoon at my place? and when it jumped out of the tree, 
it ran over to VAL'S and we caught it in a pile of old tires near 
the black Ford pickup that VAL drove whenever he could get it 
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running. I can't remember the exact year, but I recall that a-fter 
we caught the raccoon, some people -from over in North Salt Lake 
came to Centerville and picked it up. 
Dated this 27th day of July, 1989. 
74 
'DAVID F. PARRISH 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be-fore me on July 27^ 1988. 
NCTPAR? puBLrcr 
Ssiding at Centerville, Utah 
My commission expires January 22, 1991 
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THE AFFIDAVIT (DF LARRY G. SMITH 
COMES NOW LARRY G. SMITH, a resident of Centerville, Davis 
County, Utah, and first being sworn upon his oath, deposes and 
says: 
I have known J. VAL ROBERTS since he first moved to 
Centerville in the Spring of I960, 
I have lived at 544 North Main, Centerville, since I 
purchased the property in August of 1967. Before my present 
property, I owned the house at 2014 North Main, Centerville, 
Val and I both sold insurance for Beneficial Life of Utah in 
the early 1960's. In about 1964, I left Beneficial Life to open a 
Beeline Service Station on Beck Street in Salt Lake City. I lattr 
moved in 1965 to a Phillips 66 station an Beck Street in Salt Lc . 
City. 
I started as a Phillipta 66 lessee for TOM RANDALL 
DISTRIBUTING on 500 West in Bountiful, Utah in 1966 subsequently 
purchasing the property at that location. 
My recollection of wrecked or partially dismantled 
automobiles on VAL'S property goes back to August of 1967 when I 
moved into my present address at 544 North Main and includes the 
1941 Ford half-ton pickup that was at various times partially 
dismantled and inoperable at VAL'S home. It is still there today. 
I also recall the 1955 Chrysler New Yorker-
I do not recall other vehicles specifically though I serviced 
and inspected other old cars VAL has patched together over the 
years he traded with me in the service station business at all 
three of my locations. 
To my present recollection, VAL has never driven anything 
but old cars which he had to patch together with wire and clamps. 
Dated this 18th day of July, 1909. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be-fore me on^July 18^-1988 
>Rfc/PUBLIC 
Residing at C e n t e r v i l l e , Utah 
My commission expires January 22, 1991. 
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